It is easy and natural to look at Gideon Sa’ar’s decision to enter Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government as nothing more than a cynical move by a desperate politician to salvage his sinking political career.
After all, here is a man who left Likud in 2020, formed his own New Hope party amid great fanfare shortly thereafter, merged with Benny Gantz to form the National Unity party in 2022 after New Hope underperformed in the previous year’s election, and split from National Unity earlier this year.
Then, he left the national emergency government the party had entered after October 7, set up his United Right faction, and watched week after week as poll after poll showed his party not passing the 3.25% electoral threshold to make it into the next Knesset.
Here is a fiercely ambitious politician facing the political wilderness – a former cabinet secretary to Ariel Sharon, an education and interior minister under Netanyahu, and a justice minister under Naftali Bennett. When he announced the formation of New Hope, he was seriously being talked about as someone who might replace Netanyahu.
But his luster has faded with each leap from party to party, and getting back into the government, and from there possibly back into Likud, is his only political lifeline.
It is also easy to look at Netanyahu’s willingness to take Sa’ar into the government – a man who only a few months ago Netanyahu would not let into the War Cabinet – as a cynical ploy to widen his government and enable him to do something almost no one thought was possible on October 8 – finish his term as prime minister and only go to elections when mandated to do so by law, in October 2026.
All of the above is true. Sa’ar is trying to salvage his political career, and Netanyahu is trying to strengthen his government and ensure that he serves until the end of his term.
But just as people are complex and multi-dimensional, so too are the consequences of political actions. They do not serve only one end or lead to one result; the ripples from these actions spread far and wide.
The broader implications
What does that mean in this context? It means Sa’ar’s move, though aimed at saving his political career, has broader implications: it breaks the long-standing refusal to sit in a government with Netanyahu, even when that refusal paralyzes the country politically – a practice that forced the country into five elections over three and a half years.
Yes, when Sa’ar left the Likud in 2020, he said Netanyahu was not fit to serve; he said after the 2021 elections when his party won six seats that he would never join a Netanyahu-led government; as recently as June, he said Netanyahu needs to step aside.
Nevertheless, there is something positive in the spectacle of fierce political rivals, even enemies, willing to sit together. The inability to do so in the past led to the political stalemate that bedeviled the country until Netanyahu was finally able to form a hard-right government of 64 seats in 2022.
October 7 was the catalyst for the type of political recalibration that made Sa’ar’s joining the government possible.
In the first few months after October 7, there was a sense that, unlike the inconclusive elections in 2019, 2020, and 2021, when the nation next goes to the polls, a clear winner will emerge, and those currently in power – and bearing responsibility for the failures of that day – would be swept aside for politicians representing something new.
The polls, however, are painting a different picture. Ma’ariv, which publishes election polls every Friday, found this week that if elections were held now among the current parties, Netanyahu’s Likud party would be the biggest party and win 25 seats, his best showing in the poll since October 7.
These polls also showed that the current opposition parties would still need to rely on an Arab party to form a government. If Bennett enters the race, as is expected, then – at least according to this poll – he would be able to form a government without any of the current coalition parties, but just barely.
The bottom line is that were the country to go to elections today, it could end up as stalemated as it was during the elections of 2019, 2020, and 2021. The main reason for the political logjam during these years was that even though right-wing parties fared well, they – including Sa’ar’s parties – were not willing to sit with Netanyahu.
Sa’ar’s joining the government now breaks that taboo and sends a message that the days of boycotting Netanyahu need to end, as it has proven counterproductive for the country. If Sa’ar can sit with Netanyahu, then – perhaps – so too can Bennett, Avigdor Liberman, Benny Gantz, and even Yair Lapid.
Likewise, Netanyahu’s motivation for bringing Sa’ar into the coalition may be to ensure his own political longevity, but a broader government during wartime has its benefits.
The government now consists of 68 members, not 64, which means that Otzma Yehudit party head Itamar Ben-Gvir’s impact on the policy will be diluted since he will no longer be able to threaten to bring down the government, as with his six seats he no longer has that ability.
The same is true of the Religious Zionist Party and United Torah Judaism. Neither of them, alone, can topple the government.
Beyond that, however, Sa’ar joining the coalition presents a stronger government to the world, both to Israel’s enemies and its friends.
The country’s enemies may see a wobbly government as a sign of weakness, one that will not be able to effectively wage a war. This may have been one of the reasons Hezbollah’s head, Hassan Nasrallah, did not take Israel’s pledge to return citizens to the North seriously, believing that the government was too weak to make that happen.
Likewise, foreign actors, perhaps interested in a different government in Israel, may see a weak government as an invitation to try to prop up the opposition, believing that this may help them unseat the government. They may realize now, with the addition of Sa’ar to the cabinet, that this has just become significantly more difficult.
The expansion of the government, particularly bringing together two bitter political rivals, also sends a message of greater internal cohesion that could be interpreted by Israel’s enemies as a sign of resolve and determination to continue the war effort.
To the international community, this greater internal cohesion indicates that Netanyahu is able to maintain stability even during a time of instability. This means he will have a broader base to withstand efforts to impose a ceasefire deal on Israel.
This could then potentially strengthen Netanyahu’s negotiating position on the international stage, as it projects a more united front within Israel. The expansion of the government also shows that Israel is committed to its military objectives, which may influence the international community’s assessment of how likely they could be to move the government away from those objectives.
Both Sa’ar and Netanyahu were undoubtedly heavily motivated to join forces by narrow political considerations. But the move itself has much wider ramifications.