IDF sources said on Thursday that the IDF is weaker in all areas of air defense than it should be, not only in drones. The land forces also lack several independent operating capacities that they should have to be ready for future threats.
While it is well-known that the IDF has had significant problems with shooting down drones as compared to shooting down rockets and ballistic missiles, the IDF sources' comments were an unusual admission that other aspects of air defenses also had holes.
One suggestion was for the land forces to receive a much larger number of their own tactical air defense platforms.
In other words, the way air defense currently works is that the air force manages a mix of aircraft, drones, Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow 2 and 3, and coordinates with radar and communications of the land forces and sets a national strategy.
Included within this strategy is force protection of military troops near the border, but that is only one of many goals which the national air defense must manage.
This means that when Hamas, Hezbollah, or other adversaries would focus a larger than average amount of aerial threats on specific IDF troops, especially those close to the border, the national defense would often be overwhelmed and inadequate.
In contrast, IDF sources said that if battalion-level forces are given control of some of their own local tactical defenses against aerial threats that are focused just on them, they will have a much better chance to defend themselves, also given that they can collect physical data on defense which long-range radars usually miss.
None of this is to take away from the around 90% shootdown rate credited to the national air defense against rockets and 70-80% against drones, but at certain points, the land forces near the border have been struck more than some commanders think should have occurred.
Land forces are too dependent on air support
In addition, IDF sources said that the land forces are too dependent on air support and lack sufficient volumes of vehicles to move them from defensive lines to forward attack lines.
In the future, the IDF hopes the land forces will have more regularly available hummer vehicles as well as to purchase many more JLTVs (Joint Light Tactical Vehicles) forfulfilling its missions and making moving larger numbers of soldiers faster and more efficient.
Currently, the IDF has a stunningly impressive 7,700 tactical drones being used by land forces, separate from how many larger strategic drones the air force is using.
This spike in land forces having their own drones started in recent years and up until the current war, this number of drones was viewed as revolutionary in terms of empowering select battalion level units to wield their own drone power.
During the war, these smaller tactical drones which cannot cover large areas, but which can be used to quickly check for enemy forces or ambushes at the nearby street and neighborhood area where IDF forces may need to advance, have been invaluable. So invaluable in fact that it has been decided that their use should be much more standardized for all units.
The IDF plans to acquire another 15,000 such drones to more fully maximize surveillance and localized air support functions beyond what the Air Force can reliably provide on a constant basis.
Moreover, the IDF has revolutionized the use of digital platforms and artificial intelligence in war fighting, but believes that there is significant additional work to be done to make such capabilities available all the time to a wider number of forward units.
Also, the sources stated that too many IDF units are trained for one specific function, such as defense, offense, or intelligence collection, whereas they should be trained for multiple functions.
Altering training such that more soldiers will be trained for multiple functions will also alleviate some of the pressure on the IDF in terms of sufficient soldiers.
For example, the IDF wanted 12,690 new soldiers in the latest recruitment class in order to fulfil all of its required missions, but only succeeded in drafting 11,900 in that class, leaving it over 700 soldiers short.
This has not been true in key combat units, like the Golani and Givati brigades, where the IDF’s recruitment has been 107-123% above stated goals.
Another major decision which the IDF has made has been to provide weapons to all rank-and-file lookouts who apply for them over the next four to six weeks.
This comes after a prior round of weapons were distributed to commanders of lookout units.
It also comes after wide ranging criticism that many of the lookouts who Hamas killed on the Gaza border on October 7, 2023, might have had a better chance to survive if they had not been situated so close to Hamas, and without their own weapons.
At the time, the strategy was based on a mix of technology warning other troops in advance of an invasion to come to the border as well as a small number of actual armed combat fighters who guarded the lookout posts.
In addition, some lookout posts, such as the position at Nahal Oz, are being permanently moved to slightly more defensible locations, which are also a bit further from the border.
IDF sources said that recruitment for lookout remains strong due to the military’s outreach to all parties involved in the issue and that the positions cannot be too far from the border without losing certain effectiveness standards.
In the broader picture, the IDF is now recruiting around 1,635 new female combat fighters per year and is now up to 7,514 female combat fighters total from 4,023 in 2017.
The IDF just initiated plans to integrate women into combat transport units last month and hopes to start integrating some women into tank units in 2025.
Additional units which the IDF hopes to establish will include an additional home land defense brigade of mandatory service soldiers, a new unit of infantry soldiers to handle explosives, and enlarging the Yahalom anti-tunnel units.
Further, the IDF plans to purchase an immense amount of new advanced ammunition and weapons for regular infantry and not only for more elite units, given that regular infantry now take a larger role in fighting.
These will also include 10,000 more night vision items and 22,000 thermal scopes for guns.
The IDF also plans to purchase 150,000 bullet proof vests and 30,000 tactical helmets,
Taking a broad view of the state of the current war, IDF sources said that the military did its job to defeat all of Hamas’s 24 battalions, but that the political echelon has, for an extended period, failed to decide who it wants to hand Gaza over to in order to replace Hamas’s political control there.
Regarding the October 7 failure and the related probes, IDF sources were apologetic for the extensive delays in publicizing the probes.
Originally, the probes were due to be published in June, then they were postponed to July-August, then an explosion of criticism over the Beeri probe published in July led the IDF high command to decide to delay publication until all of the probes were published together.
Despite the passage of time, IDF sources said that so many people were upset by October 7 and there is so much video footage, that the truth will eventually come out.
Most recently, IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi implied the probes would be published by February 2025.