The IDF released several reports over the past few days, investigating its role in the failures that led to October 7, as well as its management in the first few days following the attack. These probes cover everything from the lead-up to the attack, the IDF’s response and also individual battles. While the investigations are thorough, they leave many questions unanswered, as does the recent Shin Bet (Israel Security Service) report on the same subject.
On the one hand, the IDF and Shin Bet have admitted failures, but on the other hand, there is lack of clarity on how Israel’s security establishment should have done better prior to October 7. This is because the reports, so far, suffer from a “forest for the trees” problem. The overall forest of failure on October 7 relate to large themes, such as the complacency and arrogance that underpinned Israel’s Gaza policy; the details revealed in the investigations make this clear. They relate to problems such as the IDF not practicing to defend bases and posts along the border in the case of a mass attack. This left bases, like Nahal Oz, without the proper defenses. The bases were exposed, didn’t have enough armed combat soldiers to defend them, and the brigades and division command seemed overwhelmed.
The Shin Bet said that the “organization failures” have been examined and that lessons have been learned. Yet it also said – before – that it had a deep understanding of Hamas. So, what went wrong?
IDF, Shin Bet unprepared
While there was military intelligence about the Hamas attack plan, the IDF didn’t seem to give it the proper amount of credence: Israel’s security authorities didn’t think Hamas was capable of organizing an attack with thousands of men at dozens of points along the border fence.
However, looking back, this leaves many questions unanswered. The Shin Bet report indicates that it wasn’t able to confront the type of capabilities Hamas acquired – it had become a terrorist army. The Shin Bet wasn’t designed to confront armies, but rather terror threats. This poses a problem, because the IDF actually had already concluded that Hamas was a terror army, but was more focused on the Hezbollah terror army threat.
What doesn’t make sense regarding October 7, after the information presented in the reports, is why Israel’s security establishment didn’t express skepticism about the theory that Hamas was “deterred” or didn’t pose a major threat? If Hamas had become a terror army, why was it underestimated?
What is particularly strange here is that the IDF chief of staff on October 7, Herzi Halevi, knew the challenge. Back in 2020, when he was a Maj.-Gen., Halevi was the head of the Southern Command and gave a talk about the threats Israel faces.
He said that “a good, alert army prefers to take the initiative and attack. Combining initiative and defense is more complex.” However, when Hamas attacked on October 7, the IDF didn’t seize the initiative.
Instead, it waited two weeks to enter Gaza, giving Hamas time to take the hostages and prepare a defense. By contrast, during the Yom Kippur War, Ariel Sharon and IDF generals had taken the initiative, reversing enemy gains after just a few days.
In 2020, Halevi said, “our military strength, as a maneuvering army, is precisely what turned our enemies into guerrilla armies, due to their unwillingness and inability to face off against us, army against army.” On October 7, Hamas mobilized thousands of men in platoon-sized attack elements and overran the IDF, defeating it on the ground for a day, massacring civilians and soldiers.
However, Halevi knew that this was a threat. “Our current enemies – Hamas and Hezbollah, in particular – are planning land-based attacks into our territory. These operations aren’t meant to hold onto territory for extended times. Rather, they are meant to cause damage, take captives, and beyond that, seriously affect the consciousness of the Israeli public and cause media buzz over something unprecedented that occurred.”
He actually predicted the October 7 attack. Yet, when it came time to deal with the threat, the IDF left the border undefended with only a few hundred combat soldiers. Halevi had said that the terrorist groups were not afraid of an Israeli incursion as long as they manage to “deal a tough blow to the Israeli hinterland with their firepower, and especially in the course of a ground attack.” That’s exactly what Hamas did on October 7.
Bizarrely, Halevi also addressed the alert system for enemy attacks. “A defense situation awareness that looks at all of the dimensions can identify an attack through a sign in one of the domains, even if it isn’t the attack’s main effort. Surprises might be reduced considerably by looking at all domains and the interfaces between them. If a sign is found in one domain, one must prepare all of them and ready them for battle.” He then added, “the best defense is offense. If you want your defensive battle to succeed, you must prepare offense capabilities from among your defensive forces, which will deal a heavy blow to the enemy’s attack effort.”
The fact that Israel understood the threat but still was unprepared is strange. One lens through which this can be analyzed is by comparing October 7 to other historical examples of surprise attacks.
In 1941, the US knew the Japanese navy and its aircraft carriers were a threat. However, it didn’t know the precise way or time of the attack. Joseph Stalin knew that Nazi Germany could attack the Soviet Union, yet he downplayed the threat prior to the invasion. US cavalry commander George Custer knew about fighting Native American tribes, but he rode his men into disaster at the Battle of the Little Big Horn. In 1968, US commanders in Vietnam knew that the Vietnamese could be planning something, but they didn’t expect how the Tet Offensive would unfold. Union Army General George McClellan was a competent general in many ways, but he couldn’t bring his well-trained army to achieve victory. He dawdled and stalled.
Throughout history, there are many examples of commanders who seemingly understand the threat they faced but nevertheless failed. The IDF knew the threats and had even predicted them in some cases, but still left the border undefended. It didn’t plan for the low probability of a massive attack, but it should have, because there was far too much to lose along the border. Unlike in 1973, there was no large buffer between the Suez Canal and Israeli cities. Hamas was on the border, meters away from border towns – any mistake could lead to disaster.
When any small mistake can lead to disaster in a system, one has to take that low probability seriously.
At the end of the day, that is the story of the probes: They didn’t take the threat seriously and they downplayed and underestimated what Hamas might do, which left Israelis vulnerable to massacre. This tendency to have group think and not express skepticism must change if Israel is going to defeat its enemies in the future.