IDF probe: IDF failed to defend Moshav Pri Gan, Israel Police, civilians left to protect themselves
An IDF probe found that the IDF failed to protect Moshav Pri Gan, two IDF units refused to enter the Moshav. The Moshav did not have a functional readiness team and the IDF did nothing about it
The investigation into the October 7 attack on Moshav Pri Gan has emerged as of Thursday morning. It was one of the most disturbing reports in the ongoing review of that day’s events. Two IDF units — the Nahal Reconnaissance Battalion and the Caracal Battalion — failed to engage the terrorists who infiltrated the moshav in southern Israel.
At the time of the assault, Pri Gan lacked a functioning readiness team. Prior to the attack, only two of four positions on the team were filled, and the IDF had not addressed the shortfall. The failure to ensure basic defensive infrastructure contributed to the vulnerability of the community, which has a population of approximately 330.
In stark contrast, the residents were saved through the efforts of the readiness team from neighboring Shlomit. Their rapid deployment and coordination with local law enforcement officers and armed residents — some of whom were off-duty police personnel — were instrumental in repelling the attack.
According to the investigation, led by Brig.-Gen. Itamar Ben-Haim, the IDF failed in its duty to defend Pri Gan. The security forces, especially the Shlomit team, exhibited significant bravery and mutual responsibility under fire, ultimately preventing further loss of life.
Four security personnel were killed in the fighting, including one police officer and three members of the Shlomit readiness team.
Infiltration and timeline of the attack
Ten Hamas terrorists infiltrated Israeli territory via vehicle and on foot, targeting Pri Gan and surrounding military installations. The attack began at 6:29 a.m. with a heavy barrage of rocket fire from the Gaza Strip toward western Negev communities.At 6:41 a.m., after the “Red alert” alerts sounded, the commander of the Southern Division declared a state of war. The 934th Battalion of the Nahal Brigade, designated as the “Kerem Shalom” battalion combat team, was responsible for the sector. However, it was quickly overwhelmed.
The battalion commander and his platoon leader were both killed early in the engagement. Despite being outnumbered, a tank crew under the platoon commander’s earlier orders took up a defensive position and returned fire for approximately three hours, eliminating several terrorists.
Nearby, at the Sufa base located two kilometers from Pri Gan, soldiers were pinned down as the base came under direct assault. Many were trapped in the dining hall, and command headquarters in the region were also hit.
IDF response and structural failure
The investigation was divided into three phases, the first of which examined the initial wave of the assault. The inquiry determined that while the tank unit and individual readiness teams displayed operational competence, the broader IDF structure failed to respond adequately in the critical early minutes.The terrorists were eventually driven back toward the Gaza Strip, but only after a deadly and chaotic confrontation. The readiness team from Shlomit and a few others from the local security establishment played a decisive role.
This case adds to the mounting list of IDF operational failures from that day, raising questions about systemic preparedness, command protocols, and inter-unit coordination.
