The Israeli military will present the lion’s share of its probes into the October 7 massacre between February 25 and March 4, with IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi being replaced by incoming chief Maj. Gen. Eyal Zamir on March 5.
Fourth, the probes will focus on the decisions and battles for the day of the invasion and the 72 hours or so after that, during which the IDF gradually retook over the 22 Israeli villages which Hamas initially conquered.
This probe will break down the roles and responsibility of the Southern Command, the Gaza Division, the Operations Command, specific lower level commanders, the air force, the navy, and other relevant forces.
How Hamas's October 7 attacks transpired
Hamas started maneuvering its forces for the invasion around 5:30 a.m. under cover of thousands of rockets being fired and using drones and hang gliders to destroy Israeli sensors and lookout towers, around 6:30 a.m., Hamas started penetrating the border into Israel in many areas.
Between 6:55 a.m. and 2:30 p.m., a huge number of things went wrong for the IDF beyond the lack of IDF or Shin Bet warnings and the lack of forces preventing the Hamas invaders from arriving to their target villages.
Around 7:30 a.m., Hamas was already attacking and overwhelming the IDF’s forward headquarters for Gaza at Reim which would have been the main party to coordinate reinforcements.
Gaza Division Commander Rosenfeld eventually fled and there was no one left nearby to coordinate a broad reinforcements operation or defense.
Rosenfeld resigned from the IDF in summer 2024.
By 8:00 a.m., Hamas was already starting to move some hostages to Gaza, with more being moved by 9:00 a.m., and on a rolling basis over the coming hours.
By around 8:30 a.m., helicopter units were providing support gunfire and missile fire to residents at Beeri and some other places, but their effectiveness was limited because they were not coordinating in any strategic manner and it was difficult for them to know when to open fire with Hamas already mixed in with the Israeli civilian population.
Around 8:45 a.m., the first reinforcements, the Shaldag special forces unit, were arriving in certain areas, and sometime between then and 9:45 a.m., they engaged Hamas forces in Beeri to try to save the residents.
However, by that time, Hamas had 80 fighters in the area and overwhelmed the small Shaldag forces, many of which retreated.
Around 10:30 a.m., the air force issued the “Hannibal Directive” order – basically to fire on anything that was moving on the Israel-Gaza border, but the probe will show that pilots were still squeamish about this for fear of hitting hostages who they might not be able to see.
Also around 10:30 a.m., air force jets started bombing Hamas command positions with 1,000 pound MK-84 bombs.
The air force would carry out around 945 attacks with helicopters firing 11,000 times.
Out of 1,600 killed Hamas fighters, the air force estimates that it killed between 700-1,000, though that gap shows that the chaos of the day makes it impossible to completely reconstruct events.
157 Israelis were rescued by air force special forces Unit 669 and in at least two cases – at the IDF Nahal Oz position and near the “Black Arrow” and Miflasim village area – air force interventions scared away or killed Hamas invaders who were about to kill more Israelis.
Around 10:45 a.m., the Sayeret Matkal special forces was on its way to help in Be'eri, but was ambushed at the 232 junction, which other Hamas forces had taken over.
This delayed Sayeret Matkal from entering Be'eri until around 1:30 p.m and was a repeat theme with many other intended reinforcement forces.
By 12:00 noon, Hamas had taken additional hostages to Gaza, which was in many places among the last groups it would succeed in kidnapping.
A number of other forces at various times in the afternoon and evening were nearby and failed to enter Beeri and other villages earlier either because they were waiting for additional commanders to show up or because they viewed their role as evacuating residents only once Hamas was defeated.
The IDF Beeri probe harshly criticized these forces for passivity and emphasized the need for a spirit of risking one’s life to confront enemy forces to protect civilians.
By 1:00 p.m., two major developments occurred.
The IDF high command had started to get a handle on the situation only around 11:00 a.m., but by 1:00 p.m., it had assigned a number of commanders zones on the Gaza border to retake.
Brig. Gen. Barak Hiram was assigned to direct retaking Be'eri and surrounding areas.
Also, by 1:00 p.m., the IDF had retaken the 232 junction which Hamas had been using all morning to ambush and block Israeli attempts to reinforce Gaza border towns.
Around 1:30 p.m., Hiram had directed the gathering of significant forces to reinforce Israelis in Beeri and turn the tide.
Sayeret Matkal finally joined the fight at that point, along with portions of Shaldag, fighting in different sections of Beeri, though still not properly coordinated.
By 2:30 p.m., with 230 fighters against 219 for Hamas in Be'eri, the IDF finally had its first military advantage, and started to rout and isolate the remaining Hamas forces in various villages.
Around 4:15 p.m., the military forces in Be'eri had ballooned to 350 and around 10:00 p.m., they would reach a climax point of 730.
The IDF would need an additional three to four days to flesh out pockets of Hamas fighters who took up smaller positions or who were hiding in ambush in various areas.
By October 11, most of the Gaza border was clear and by October 12, the whole area was viewed as clear, though there would be very small numbers of Hamas fighters still found and caught even for some days after.
The IDF said it will unveil its findings first on these four main segments and then on some of the larger individual battles among the 41 battles, including: Kfar Aza, Nir Oz, Nahal Oz (both the battle over the Kibbutz and the battle over the nearby lookout position) Netiv Ha'asara, and the Nova Festival.
Further, the IDF noted that in July 2024 it put out its probe of the battle of Be'eri and that the criticism it received from that probe led to a restructuring of the process for publicizing the probes.
At one point, the IDF had said it would publish all of the probes over the course of July-August 2024, starting with the smaller battles and eventually reaching the larger macro issues probes, which were more complex and taking longer.
Why were the IDF's October 7 probes delayed?
However, a wider range of IDF field commanders bristled at the idea that they would be criticized for small level errors they made on October 7 when they were taken by surprise by Hamas, while their superiors in the IDF high command who set the stage for them to be surprised would only be critiqued later.
This led the IDF to decide to delay issuing out further probes, even those from smaller battles which were ready, until the larger macro probes could be issued first.
Moreover, the IDF claims that unexpected additional fighting with Yemen, Iran, and then an extended several months more intense war with Hezbollah from July-November 2024, followed by ceasefire negotiations with Hamas in December 2024, led to further delaying publicizing the probes.
Despite these explanations, there has been heavy criticism within the IDF that the probes are only being issued now, around 17 months after October 7, and that Halevi did not announce his resignation until last month.
Aspects of the probes also required dialogue with the police and the Shin Bet, who had many combat fighters in the field who were killed or fought to repel the Hamas invasion.
Some of the smaller battle probes will only be issued by the end of March, after Halevi has stepped down.
According to the IDF, this timing was determined by making sure the macro probes come out first, and then that the families of the attacked villages and hostages get to see the results before the public.
There are some other side issues which will also come out at some unclear point, including about information security (Hamas knew where many IDF bases were located and how to maneuver within them) and the handling and mobilization of the reservists.
Although the IDF has started probing at a macro level its invasions of Gaza, Halevi is leaving the completion of those probes to Zamir, so he can focus on getting out the October 7 probes before he steps down.
The IDF said Halevi has spent 230 hours working on the probes to get them out to the military and the public.
The probes generally investigate decisions and moves dating back to 2018, but in some cases go even further back.
A major question is whether any of the probes will go back earlier than 2015, given that National unity party leader Benny Gantz was IDF chief from 2011-2015. Gantz’s number two, Gadi Eisenkot, was IDF chief from 2015-2019, such that he is expected to receive some criticism during the probes.
It is unclear how the probes will impact the political future of Aviv Kohavi, who was IDF chief from 2019-January 2023.
Specifically, the probes will address how the IDF mishandled intelligence it had about the “Jericho Plan”, a scenario of a Hamas invasion which significantly marched what happened on October 7.
The IDF said it has started to dialogue with the five female lookouts who were held hostage and were recently returned to Israel about receiving information relating to the October 7 probes and will add their information as it comes in.
Other recently returned hostages like Sagui Dekel Chen, who fought at Nir Oz, before being taken hostage, will also eventually have the accounts added to the probes, but given that Dekel is currently hospitalized, this process could take time.