Israel has not yet achieved “absolute victory” in Gaza – a fact painfully evident each time Hamas releases hostages in staged propaganda displays. Yet its military actions over the past 16 months have reshaped the Middle East.
Two days after the October 7 massacre, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared, “We will change the face of the Middle East.” On Sunday, in a speech to soldiers graduating from the IDF Ground Forces officers’ course, he reminded his audience of that statement.
Indeed, this transformation is underway. Its extent became clear on Sunday, when Netanyahu and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun made statements that would have been unthinkable just months ago.
Netanyahu, in his speech to the soldiers in which he laid out Israel’s policy in the region, turned to Syria.
The comment that attracted the most attention regarding Syria was his declaration that Israel would not allow Syria’s new army or the axis that led to former president Bashar al-Assad’s fall to “enter the area south of Damascus.”
He also demanded “the full demilitarization of southern Syria from troops of the new Syrian regime in Quneitra, Daraa, and Suwayda provinces.”
That is a significant policy statement. Then, almost as an afterthought, the prime minister added that Israel would “not tolerate any threat to the Druze community in southern Syria.”
In other words, Netanyahu spread Israel’s protective canopy over the Druze in the area in Syria near the border, called Jabal Druze. This is the first time an Israeli official has publicly made such an offer, and by doing so, he sent a clear message to Syria’s new rulers: Harming the Druze means confronting Israel.
Why? What interest does Israel have in sticking its neck out for a Syrian minority that has historically been hostile and supportive of the Assad regime?
Israeli Druze community
The most obvious reason is that this is important to the Israeli Druze community. Many have relatives on the other side of the border – and Israel feels that it owes its own Druze a debt because of the sacrifices that community has made for Israel in the IDF over the years, including during the current war.
While the Druze inside the 1967 lines are full citizens who fight for the country, those on the Golan – though offered citizenship when Israel annexed the Golan Heights in 1981 – long refused it. They feared that aligning with Israel could endanger their families in Syria or backfire if Israel, as was widely discussed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, withdrew from the Golan in exchange for peace with Damascus.
Even before Assad’s fall, however, a shift was under way. Over the past decade, more Golan Druze have begun identifying with Israel. By the end of 2023, about one-fifth of some 27,000 Druze on the Golan had acquired Israeli citizenship.
Assad’s downfall has accelerated this trend, and now, even some Druze on the Syrian side of the border are interested in being incorporated into Israel.
Soon after Assad’s fall, videos went viral on social media of Syrian Druze speaking in favor of joining Israel. This was less about affinity for Israel and more about fear – fear of what Islamist factions might do to them if they took control.
During the Syrian civil war, the Druze suffered attacks from ISIS, including a 2018 massacre in Suwayda, where more than 200 were killed and at least two dozen taken hostage. Understandably, many now view Syria’s new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, with deep concern due to his Islamist ties.
Before Assad’s fall, Netanyahu never would have considered extending Israel’s protection to the Syrian Druze. That he is doing so now underscores how much has changed.
During and just after the Six Day War, then-cabinet minister Yigal Allon floated the idea of Israel pushing for a Druze state in the Druze areas of Syria and the Golan that would serve as a buffer.
“I dreamt the dream of the Druse republic, which would spread in southern Syria including the Golan Heights and would serve as a buffer state between us, Syria and Jordan,” he wrote in his memoirs.
That idea never gained traction, but Netanyahu’s offer of protection to the Syrian Druze is an indication that the concept of an alliance with Syria’s Druze has not vanished.
Then there is Lebanon.
Many marched in support of Hezbollah
On Sunday, hundreds of thousands of people turned out for the funeral of assassinated Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut. That so many marched in support of Hezbollah – joined by Iranian, Iraqi Shi’a, and Houthi senior officials – was no surprise.
What was surprising was how Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf was received when he met with Aoun.
The meeting was cordial, but afterward, the Lebanese president’s office posted this statement on X: “Lebanon is tired of others’ wars, and the unity of the Lebanese is the best way to confront any loss or aggression. Lebanon paid a heavy price for the Palestinian cause. It supports what was issued by the recent Riyadh summit regarding the two-state solution.”
In other words, Aoun bluntly told the Iranians – who, through Hezbollah and with a lifeline from Assad’s Syria, have long dominated Lebanon – that Beirut no longer wants to be a pawn in Iran’s long game against the Jewish state.
Even his endorsement of a two-state solution was significant, since implicit in it was an acknowledgment of Israel’s existence, something Hezbollah never accepted, remaining committed – like Hamas and Iran – to Israel’s destruction.
Both developments signal a changed Middle East – a new Mideast ushered in by IDF victories in this seven-front war, even if “absolute victory” over Hamas has yet to be achieved in Gaza.