Is there US-European coordination toward Russia?
Okaz, Saudi Arabia, April 12
It has become increasingly evident that the West is coming to terms with the difficulty of securing a decisive victory over Russia in the ongoing war in Ukraine. Moscow has exhibited a notable degree of resilience despite the sweeping economic campaign waged against it.
While Western sanctions have undoubtedly inflicted damage on the Russian economy, they have fallen short of their intended purpose: to cripple Russia or compel it to capitulate. On the contrary, Russia has managed to offset many of these losses by forging new economic ties with rising powers such as China, India, and a host of nations across the Global South.
Europe, in turn, has borne a considerable cost in this economic confrontation, grappling with an energy crisis that has fueled inflation and hindered industrial output, even as the United States has reaped benefits by exporting alternative energy and solidifying its geopolitical influence.
From a monetary standpoint, the sanctions have temporarily bolstered the dollar’s dominance, but they have also accelerated global efforts to seek alternatives to the dollar-based payment system, thus posing a long-term challenge to American financial supremacy.
Meanwhile, the Western media campaign seeks to obscure these developments. The prevailing narrative insists on depicting the Russian economy as heading toward isolation and collapse, in an effort to mask the failure of sanctions to meet their strategic goals, dissuade other nations from adopting a similar stance of defiance toward Western pressure, and sustain the illusion of uncontested Western dominance. Yet the reality on the ground tells a different story.
Rather than retreating into isolation, Russia has successfully reoriented its economic relationships, signaling the rise of a more diversified and pluralistic global economic order.
The West’s approach has oscillated between inflexibility and pragmatism, as it strives to avoid projecting a unified but ineffectual front in the face of Russian resilience, occasionally revealing rhetorical inconsistencies that stop short of a full-blown strategic rift. Washington and its European allies have employed a dynamic strategy that shifts in response to developments on the battlefield.
When Russia advances, internal European fractures come to the fore, with some capitals – such as Berlin and Paris – gravitating toward negotiation. Conversely, during periods of Russian setbacks, Western pressure becomes more coordinated and assertive, seizing the opportunity to press for advantage.
Nonetheless, American leadership continues to steer the overall course, while European stances diverge based on distinct national interests. The trajectory increasingly points toward a reconfiguration of the international order.
Recent events suggest that Western policymakers are beginning to acknowledge the constraints of their current approach to Russia, opening the door to potential political compromises, a reshaping of global economic relationships, and a slow decline of the unipolar financial architecture long dominated by the West.
The situation has transcended the binary of “victory or defeat” and has evolved into a deeper contest of resolve – one that is actively redefining the contours of global power. Russia, far from being a spent force, has demonstrated a capacity to adapt and endure, while the West stands at a crossroads: Persist in pursuing strategies that have yet to yield success, or come to terms with the reality of a multipolar world taking shape before our eyes. – Osama Yamani
Back to shock and awe tactics
Al-Ittihad, UAE, April 11
In 2003, the United States launched a multi-front assault on Iraq, employing “shock and awe” tactics aimed at swiftly defeating Saddam Hussein’s forces. The Bush administration envisioned that this overwhelming military offensive would pave the way for a new Iraqi government and ignite a wave of democratic reform throughout the Middle East.
However, the campaign ultimately proved to be a strategic miscalculation, echoing the disastrous entanglement of the United States in Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s. Today, President Donald Trump is pursuing his own version of “shock and awe” – this time not through military might but through an aggressive trade war, imposing sweeping tariffs on key economic partners.
His administration argues that these measures will lead to a “rebalancing” of trade relationships, a resurgence of American manufacturing, and the dawn of a new era of economic strength and national pride. Trump has characterized his tariffs as “a beautiful thing to contemplate,” suggesting that the short-term disruptions they cause are a small price to pay for long-term gain.
Yet the initial reaction from global financial markets has been one of alarm. Since Trump announced his latest round of tariffs on April 2, markets have plummeted, a reflection of widespread skepticism among investors – including many who once supported his candidacy.
Even Elon Musk, once seen as a close ally and ideological protégé, has voiced disapproval of the administration’s tariff strategy. Undeterred, Trump escalated the conflict by announcing a new set of tariffs targeting countries with which the United States maintains the largest trade deficits, with China at the forefront.
China responded swiftly, imposing counter-tariffs on 84% of American goods. Within hours, Trump retaliated yet again, raising tariffs on Chinese products to 125%.
The fallout has not been confined to China. Many other nations, particularly within the European Union, have pushed back against Trump’s trade war, even as the administration temporarily suspended additional tariffs on countries outside of China. Some of these nations have expressed a willingness to negotiate, though it remains unclear whether any meaningful breakthroughs can be achieved. Unless Trump abruptly changes course, his tariff policies are likely to inflict long-term damage on America’s global standing.
Even traditional allies are beginning to question not only his trade decisions but the broader trajectory of his administration. His drive to shrink the federal government has led to abrupt and chaotic policy shifts, including the sudden termination of humanitarian aid through the US Agency for International Development, leaving many vulnerable populations – particularly in Africa – without access to vital medical and food assistance and without any clear alternatives.
The erosion of America’s soft power is not merely symbolic; it carries tangible consequences for the nation’s reputation and diplomatic leverage. The trade war has deeply strained relations with Canada and Mexico, two of the United States’ closest neighbors, who have grown distrustful and resentful of Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric and erratic policy decisions. Trump’s suggestion that Canada should become the 51st US state and his repeated threats to deploy military force against Mexican drug cartels have further alienated both governments.
His provocative declarations about reclaiming the Panama Canal and his not-so-subtle interest in purchasing Greenland – ostensibly for economic and strategic gain – have been met with alarm across the Western Hemisphere. These moves evoke a bygone era of American expansionism reminiscent of 19th-century foreign policy. At the heart of that earlier doctrine was the Monroe Doctrine, proclaimed by president James Monroe in 1823, which warned European powers against interfering in the Western Hemisphere.
Trump’s foreign policy posture today – marked by a willingness to concede spheres of influence to global powers like Russia and China – has paradoxically revived that antiquated worldview, one in which dominant powers carve up the globe along lines of influence. While such ideas may be welcomed in Moscow and Beijing, they are deeply unsettling to America’s traditional allies, who view them as further evidence of Washington’s unreliability. The fallout from this geopolitical shift could be profound, potentially catalyzing new global security dynamics, including the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as nations scramble to assert their sovereignty in an increasingly unstable world order. – Geoffrey Kemp
What is the future of NATO?
Al-Masry Al-Youm, Egypt, April 10
What has happened to the NATO doctrine of “All for one and one for all”?
The American position on Europe, its historic partner, must be understood as something far more profound than mere diverging viewpoints. Some analysts have gone as far as to describe it as a “rift.”
Everything that President Donald Trump warned about during his first term, such as the need for the United States to reduce its financial burden in support of NATO and for Europe to assume unilateral responsibility for its own continental security, has, in essence, been implemented within just two months of what many are calling the “second coming” of the “Trump era.”
The rift between American and European visions for the Russia-Ukraine war is perhaps the most glaring indicator of a genuine fracture within the long-standing transatlantic alliance. Established in April 1949 as a military alliance to defend the Western capitalist system against the “Communist tide” represented by the Soviet Union – first in Europe, then globally – NATO has stood for over seven decades as a pillar of Western unity. But today, a critical question haunts policymakers, strategists, and security experts alike: What is the future of this alliance now that the rift has become unmistakable?
How will this divide impact Europe?
What are the broader implications for a global order increasingly shaped by rising powers vying with NATO for dominance on the world stage?
In short, how resilient is NATO’s historic doctrine, ”All for one and one for all,” in the face of today’s fractured landscape?
The pivotal question that may determine not just NATO’s future but also the world’s is: “How and why did this rift happen?”
Before we can answer that, we must revisit a moment just two years ago when, during NATO’s Diamond Jubilee, the alliance released a document titled “Strategic Concept.” This document outlined NATO’s updated strategic objectives, structure, and future direction across vital global regions. At the time, it was widely seen as an effort to breathe new life into the alliance, which had come under growing scrutiny, particularly after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in early 2022.
The release of the document coincided with a heightened state of alert among Western European countries, notably France and Germany, which responded by launching the German National Security Strategy. These developments reflected a mounting sense of crisis, most candidly expressed by veteran diplomat Wolfgang Ischinger, then president of the Munich Security Conference.
At the 2021 conference, Ischinger lamented “the West’s failure as a global model to fulfill its civilizational mission,” referencing the European elite’s sobering conclusion from 2019 that Western Europe’s influence was not just waning, but potentially vanishing altogether. This introspection culminated in Ischinger’s use of the now-famous and complex term “Westlessness” at the 2020 conference – a word that encapsulated the prevailing unease about the West’s diminishing global relevance.
In this climate of deep self-critique, European political and security circles began openly confronting the historical shortcomings of the Western alliance in addressing the two greatest global crises since World War II.
For many around the world, this soul-searching symbolized a “historic decline” in the West. The atmosphere of disillusionment was exacerbated by European outrage over what they viewed as “the regrettable developments in the United States,” especially following Trump’s refusal to accept the results of the 2020 election – a stance that culminated in the storming of the Capitol, an unprecedented attack on the symbolic heart of liberal democracy.
This European disapproval did not go unnoticed. Trump, perceiving the rebuke, responded not only by advocating for reduced US contributions to NATO but also by suggesting a complete withdrawal from the alliance. In doing so, he made his message to Europe unmistakably clear: Take responsibility for your own defense. As a result, many observers argue that the prospect of a formal US exit from NATO is no longer the primary issue. Rather, Trump’s actions have already, in effect, undermined the alliance in its traditional sense.
This shift has forced Western Europe – led by France and Germany – to confront a new geopolitical reality, one that veers toward detaching from its historical reliance on America.
Consequently, there is now a growing push to restructure NATO along distinctly European lines, both militarily and in terms of security – a process commonly referred to as the “remilitarization of Europe.” Experts estimate that this transformation, even with full European financial backing and absent US support, will take at least five years to complete.
This brings us to the unresolved questions: What becomes of the American nuclear arsenal currently deployed in Europe under NATO’s aegis? What would be the implications, not only of a US departure, but of a fundamental shift in Washington’s global security strategy?
And finally, what sort of world order are we headed toward as a result? – Samir Marcos
Trump’s fireworks are a success
Asharq Al-Awsat, London, April 11
Despite the uproar and outcry sparked by US President Donald Trump’s recent tariff decisions, it may be too early to assess their lasting impact. However, some things remain certain. The first of these is that, contrary to what some analysts are suggesting, we are not on the brink of a global trade war. While the United States is the world’s largest economy and the second-largest trading power, its share of global trade is approximately 12% – some estimates place it even lower, under 10%.
The remaining 88% of global trade, conducted by 192 other countries, will not be immediately affected by Trump’s actions. Moreover, nearly half of US foreign trade is conducted with its closest neighbors, Canada and Mexico. Though both nations clashed with Trump over tariffs, they eventually reached an agreement and are likely to do so again. In addition to a general 10% tariff on all imports, higher tariffs have been proposed on roughly 60 countries, including nearly 30 that collectively account for approximately 40% of total US foreign trade. As of now, many of these countries have expressed a willingness to negotiate. Even the European Union, which initially threatened a forceful retaliation, seems to have reconsidered – recognizing, perhaps, the wisdom of the old adage: When you find yourself in a hole, stop digging.
The upcoming G7 summit may offer a forum to address and de-escalate these tensions. What stands out is that China, initially defiant in the face of US pressure, will almost certainly come to the realization that it cannot afford a full-scale trade confrontation with Washington. Meanwhile, some economists, including Columbia University’s Jeffrey Sachs, warn that Trump’s tariff policies could trigger a recession. These experts often cite the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which imposed sweeping tariffs on American imports and, according to some historians, contributed to the Great Depression.
On the other hand, recent fluctuations in global stock markets have led to fears of a new recession – but such concerns may be premature. If a downturn occurs, it may result more from market overreactions driven by fear and speculation than from any structural damage. American factories will not cease production, nor will farms stop harvesting crops. In a provocative comparison, The Washington Post likened Trump to president William McKinley, hinting that the US is once again behaving like an imperialist power. However, such comparisons ignore the core tenets of imperialism, which do not apply to the United States.
An imperial power exports its people, whereas America, shaped by waves of immigration, has always been a net importer of population. Trump is accused of pursuing protectionist policies, yet a measured level of protectionism can be beneficial for economic development. Without it, Victorian Britain might never have built its industrial base or expanded its global reach, and Bismarck’s Germany may never have emerged as the continent’s industrial leader in the 19th century. Likewise, Japan’s Meiji-era transformation – often described as a “miracle” - was made possible by protectionist strategies. However, excessive protection can backfire, stifling competition and innovation and fostering intellectual complacency.
Even Adam Smith, the father of modern economics, supported the use of tariffs despite championing the free market. His model of comparative advantage rests on the assumption of ceteris paribus (“all other things being equal”). In the real world, however, things are rarely equal. Variables such as access to raw materials, cost-effective labor, proximity to key markets, technological infrastructure, political and legal stability, and regulatory frameworks all influence trade dynamics.
Given this complexity, expecting equilibrium in global trade is unrealistic. Any trade agreement will invariably favor one party over another. This is the predicament facing Washington today, as reflected in its sizable balance of payments deficit, its mounting public debt, and the disproportionately high tariffs it encounters in a globalized economy.
In his first term, Trump sought to correct some of these imbalances by introducing tariffs – a policy that was continued, at least in part, by his successor, despite president Joe Biden’s support for globalization.
In a second term, Trump appears poised to go further, targeting deeper vulnerabilities in the global economic system, including fragile supply chains and strategic over-reliance on foreign sources for critical goods and services. Should these plans materialize, the United States could begin to address other long-standing challenges, such as the economic decline of regions hollowed out by outsourcing and a cultural addiction to inexpensive, low-quality imports.
An unintended yet potentially significant consequence could be a reduction in the US dollar’s dominance in global trade. Though Trump insists that “the dollar is king,” curbing its centrality could, paradoxically, help him achieve another strategic goal: shielding the United States from the instability of a volatile global order that seems increasingly difficult to control. – Amir Taheri
Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb. All assertions, opinions, facts, and information presented in these articles are the sole responsibility of their respective authors and are not necessarily those of The Media Line, which assumes no responsibility for their content.