Iran spent years developing proxies to fight Israel, investing heavily in Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Houthis, Hamas, and Iraqi militias. Tehran’s goal was to use the pro-ISIS period in the region to create the circumstances for a multi-front war.
After October 7, Iran put this plan into action, one that seemed to go well for them for most of the year. However, setbacks for Hezbollah over the last two weeks, including the killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah on Friday, are a major setback for Tehran.
Now, Iran has to formulate a game plan, and its strategy is not clear. After October 7, it appeared that Iran believed it could leverage Hamas’s massacre as a way to bring the terrorist group to power in the West Bank. It sought to achieve this by supporting arms smuggling to groups in the West Bank. It also sought to destabilize Jordan.
However, the IDF has not only weakened Hamas in Gaza, but Israel has also cracked down on terror in the West Bank through the use of more military force in July and August.
In September, Iran leaned on the Houthis and Iraqi militias, the former of which launched three ballistic missiles at Israel, while the latter targeted Eilat.
On Monday, the pro-Iranian Al-Mayadeen said that Hamas and PIJ carried out several attacks in Gaza, pointing specifically to an attack in Khan Yunis and one targeting IDF forces in the Netzarim corridor in central Gaza, the latter of which was carried out by PIJ, the article claimed.
In Iraq, the Iranian-backed “Islamic Resistance” claimed to have carried out four attacks using drones and missiles. This could not be verified. However, what is important for Iran is to show that the groups it backs can still carry out attacks, even if they are unsuccessful.
In recent days, Iraqi militias have also been targeting Eilat with drones, with Iran’s IRNA state media highlighting this as one of the many examples of its attempt to rally groups to strike at Israel.
Hezbollah, weakened by daily strikes from the IDF, also claimed more attacks on Monday, saying it launched rockets at Safed and other areas. Pro-Iranian media claimed that Hezbollah carried out 11 different attacks on Monday, targeting areas like Rosh Pina, and, according to IRNA, Hezbollah used Fadi-1 rockets to do so.
Iran is at a crossroads
Iran knows it is at a crossroads. After 11 months, it is feeling that the tide may turn against it. Iran planned for a long war of attrition against Israel and did not expect the country to seize the initiative in Lebanon. It is likely concerned, after the strikes against the Houthis, that the IDF has readied itself and is prepared for more long-range operations.
Tehran has watched how Israel was forced to contend with fighting in Gaza for most of the year; its goal was that it could exploit the country’s focus on Gaza to accomplish other things in the region. Now Iran is likely concerned that things have shifted in Israel’s favor.
One example of this can be seen in Arabic-language media, such as Al-Ain Media in the UAE. Reports there paint a glowing picture of the strike on Nasrallah. Iran is aware of the battle for hearts and minds in the region and its enemies there.
While Saudi Arabia was willing to reconcile with Iran, it doesn’t mean that many Saudis feel the same. Many of the voices in the region are watching closely, and they see Israel’s success. Iran knows it could easily lose the “street” it has sought to cultivate.
Many people in the region don’t like the Houthis, Hezbollah, or the Iraqi al-Hashd al-Shaabi, an umbrella group of numerous pro-Iranian groups. Iraqis have bitter memories of these militias killing protesters back in 2019.
Now, Iran is grasping for success after weeks of seeing its Hezbollah proxy reeling from blows. Tehran likely doesn’t really care if the IDF strikes Lebanon; its main concern is the loss of influence and prestige in the broader region.