“Disappointing and irresponsible.”
With these two words, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas reacted to the US veto at the latest UN Security Council session, in which 12 members voted for granting the State of Palestine full membership in the UN. Holding that the US bore “full responsibility for the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East,” the Palestinian president labeled the veto “a blatant aggression against the right of our people and a challenge to the international community’s will.”
This wasn't the first time Palestinian leadership felt let down by US policies. Despite high hopes for Joe Biden, which they held even before his electoral victory nearly four years ago, their anticipation only led to increased frustration. Biden, as a presidential candidate, had committed to reopening the PLO office in Washington and the US Consulate in East Jerusalem, suggesting a significant shift from the policies under President Donald Trump. Yet, these hopes dissipated as promised actions failed to materialize.
For over three decades, the US's significant influence in the region has left the Palestinian Authority with scant optimism. Subsequently, the peace process, as it has been called since then, has encountered numerous hurdles and biases that made its completion a wild nightmare in a sleepless night. After the US became one of the main sponsors of the Oslo Accords signed at the White House in September 1993, the Palestinian leadership hoped it would shift roles and become a fair mediator between Israel and Palestine as opposed to its preceding role as a one-sided supporter of Israel. From a Palestinian perspective, that never happened. The Palestinian frustration and despair went on like an endless, surreal television series with continual new seasons.
Is there cause for optimism?
The October 7 2023, attack across Israel’s southern border marked a new phase in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, bringing unprecedented levels of death, destruction, and displacement for both sides. The ongoing war in Gaza is shaping new dynamics that will inevitably influence the future of the Middle East. The outcome, whether positive or negative, will depend on the actions of all relevant parties to stop the war and move into a different zone of peacemaking instead of warmongering.
Within this context, discussions within the Palestinian leadership continue as they consider how to handle the US's antagonistic stance toward independent Palestinian statehood. These discussions take place against a backdrop of repeated US affirmations of support for a two-state solution, which have yet to be substantiated by concrete actions.
Additionally, the US Congress recently approved a $26 billion aid package for Israel, intended to replenish its military supplies. A member of the PLO Executive Committee told me this weekend that a thin line separates between US support for Israel to defend itself and US support for it to continue its wars in Gaza and elsewhere against the Palestinian and other Arab nations. “Defensive aid for Israel doesn’t worry me as much as offensive military assistance does,” he said. In his view, the fact that an overwhelming majority of Congress voted for the aid package—366 members for the military assistance and only 58 members (37 Democrats and 21 Republicans) against it—was a “dark mark of Cain on the Congress’s forehead.”
Complaints about US attitudes toward the Palestinian cause are certainly not the only hot and bitter dish on the Palestinian leadership’s menu. Other challenges are no less complicated, such as the future of the Gaza Strip and how this ugly war will come to an end. The talks in Doha, Cairo, Paris, and elsewhere have repeatedly failed to reach a truce that would stop the war for several weeks and give way for a proper and fruitful way to end the second Palestinian Nakba, with the first being the mass displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians around the 1948 war. Qatar became the center of blame for the talks’ failure when Israeli and some US officials began pressuring Doha to squeeze concessions from Hamas, even if that involved kicking its political leaders out of the Gulf state.
Defending their support for Hamas, Qatari officials stated they acted upon requests from the US administration and with Israel’s tacit approval. The Shin Bet facilitated Qatar’s substantial financial support to Hamas, which peaked at $20 million monthly leading up to October 7.
Qatar thought its support for Hamas would give the authorities the leverage they needed to soften Hamas’ position and reach a cease-fire deal. But then, Doha faced a new reality that changed its political mood. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu denied his negotiating team, led by Mossad chief David Barnea, the mandate it needed to seal a deal with Hamas through the tripartite mediation of the US, Egypt, and Qatar, and yet rudely blamed Qatar for not exerting sufficient pressure on Hamas. Netanyahu’s stand contributed to the talks’ failure, a point he ignored, regardless of whether his contribution exceeded that of Hamas.
The Qatari warning to Hamas that it might kick its leaders out of the country has led to intensive contact between the Islamist movement and Turkey. The movement hoped the Turks would grant its leaders permission to return to Turkey. The latest such contact was the recent visit to Turkey by Hamas’ political bureau chief, Ismail Haniyeh, and his meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Hamas denied it was threatened with eviction from Qatar. Meanwhile, various reports have said the Turks were keen on allowing Hamas to return, provided that it disbands its military arm, transforms into a political party, and becomes an integral part of Palestinian political life. This transformation process has been raised on several occasions, even by President Abbas, who has always insisted there would be only one rule and “one gun” in Palestine.
Intoxicated with the missile and rocket capabilities it acquired over years of Iranian support, the Hamas military command in Gaza never accepted the idea of transformation. What Hamas once rejected from a position of power in the Gaza Strip might now be reconsidered in light of the significant losses to its military power during Israel's recent military actions.
The seriousness of Turkey's intentions remains uncertain, as does the possibility of them using Hamas for international leverage, similar to Iran's tactics and Qatar's previous strategies. But Hamas must wake up—the sooner, the better—to the new reality that demands a strategic 180-degree shift in its platform. This change would represent one of the few potential sources of hope for the region.