Israel's 2024 military successes came at a cost - will it pay in 2025? - opinion

Looking back at 2024, Israel has strengthened its strategic position in the Middle East, but this has come at the cost of deepening internal divisions within Israeli society, straining relations with the international community, and damaging its self-image as a democratic, peace-seeking state committed to protecting individual rights.

A year after Hamas’s murderous surprise attack on October 7, Israel has succeeded in restoring its deterrent edge. All the main members of the “Axis of Resistance” – Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis – have suffered major military setbacks, with the entire leadership echelons of Hezbollah and Hamas having been eliminated. Israel has proved that, militarily and technologically, it is superior to its enemies.

Alongside these achievements, an unexpected development has occurred in Syria, indirectly benefiting Israel. The collapse of the Assad regime and the rise of Sunni Islamic rule have led to Syria’s exit from the Axis of Resistance, resulting in the removal of Iranian military presence and influence on Israel’s borders and the closure of the corridor through which Iran previously supplied arms and ammunition to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The fall of Assad also exposed the vulnerability of Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah, which, despite the geopolitical significance of Syria, were unable to prevent the regime’s downfall. However, this positive shift is tempered by concerns that Syria may now be controlled by extremist Islamic factions backed by Turkey, though it remains too early to fully assess the nature of the new Syrian regime.

On the other side, the camp of moderate states that have signed peace and/or normalization agreements with Israel, along with Saudi Arabia, has managed to maintain its cohesion, even if much of the activity has been conducted behind the scenes.

The cooperation between these states was publicly visible during the Iranian missile attack on Israel. With the exception of Jordan, none of these countries withdrew their ambassadors from Israel or severed diplomatic relations. Furthermore, the prospect of normalization with Saudi Arabia remains on the table, though the Saudis are now demanding a higher price for such an agreement.

DESPITE THESE achievements, Israel has so far failed in its handling of the hostages in Gaza. The military defeat inflicted on Hamas was expected to be Israel’s main bargaining chip, yet the insistence on not ending the war in Gaza is driven by political rather than operational considerations. This represents a moral failure that stands in stark contradiction to the core values of Judaism and humanity in general.

Moreover, the delay in securing an agreement for the release of the hostages, the humiliating treatment of the hostages’ families by ministers and Knesset members from the coalition, and the continuous attempts to push forward the judicial revolution while stalling on solutions for enlisting haredim (the ultra-Orthodox) into military service, have all exacerbated the divisions within Israeli society.

Alongside these failures, there has been growing criticism of Israel, including hate speech and antisemitism, particularly in relation to its policy toward the Palestinians. Israel has been accused of committing war crimes against Gaza’s civilian population.

The International Criminal Court’s issuance of arrest warrants against Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on charges of war crimes seems to be only the tip of the iceberg.

While these accusations are politically motivated, even if they are primarily or partially unfounded – and opinions are divided on this, given the lack of reliable information in the Israeli media – they have severely damaged Israel’s standing in the international community as a law-abiding state.

“War is the continuation of diplomacy by other means,” as the famous quote from the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz suggests. In the current situation, one of the significant failures has been the inability to translate military successes into diplomatic achievements.

The ceasefire with Lebanon, which includes the removal of Hezbollah fighters beyond the Litani River and the deployment of UN peacekeepers and the Lebanese military in the area between the Litani and the Israeli border, might be considered a success. Yet, only time will tell if this achievement is sustainable, unlike the outcome of the Second Lebanon War in 2006.

In contrast to the situation in Lebanon, a diplomatic resolution to the Palestinian problem appears to be a distant prospect. Numerous plans have been proposed for the “day after” the war, yet the Netanyahu government remains adamant not to engage in discussions about them.

It appears that the IDF has been instructed to establish a permanent presence in Gaza, at least in its northern part. Additionally, far-right elements within the government are actively considering the possibility of re-establishing Israeli settlements in Gaza.

Opposition to the continued control of Hamas over Gaza is justified, but resistance to the return of an upgraded Palestinian Authority or another recognized and legitimate Palestinian leadership is unwarranted. The vacuum created by the absence of governance is an open invitation for chaos or for Hamas to desperately cling to power. In any case, maintaining the current deadlock is a recipe for failure.

The key question is whether the current Saudi position, which insists on the establishment of a Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem, is open for negotiations. Regardless, any Israeli government pursuing normalization will likely have to make concessions regarding the Palestinian issue, although the exact price remains uncertain.

Sinwar caused permanent changes

Despite the significant setbacks and failures suffered by the Axis of Resistance, Sinwar may be remembered for successfully bringing the Palestinian issue back to the forefront of the international and regional agenda. This, however, came at an immense cost, particularly for the Palestinian people in Gaza, who have borne the brunt of the consequences of his actions.

In conclusion, Israel’s military successes must be translated into diplomatic achievements. The war has opened up a unique opportunity to reshape regional dynamics, but realizing this potential will require visionary leadership. The challenge, however, is that, at present, such leaders are not evident on either side of the conflict. After the calamity of October 7, failing to seize these new opportunities would amount to another profound tragedy.

The writer teaches at the Department of Islamic and Middle East Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is also a board member of Mitvim – the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policers.