Has Israeli society’s resilience weakened after months of war? – opinion

Has public opinion in Israel shifted focus from war victory to hostage return?

 Israelis watch the release of hostages from Hamas captivity as part of a deal between Israel and Hamas, at Hostage square in Tel Aviv, February 22, 2025. (photo credit: YONATAN SINDEL/FLASH90)
Israelis watch the release of hostages from Hamas captivity as part of a deal between Israel and Hamas, at Hostage square in Tel Aviv, February 22, 2025.
(photo credit: YONATAN SINDEL/FLASH90)

In every war, two equations determine its outcome. The first focuses on which side can exact a greater price through the use of force. The second concerns which side can endure more suffering in the violent struggle. A people who find it harder to bear pain and for whom the necessity to pay in blood and treasure in a war with enemies is not clear have less chance of winning.

This is certainly true in the Middle East, where the use of military force is an integral part of the rules of the game and enjoys widespread popular support. Following the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein became a hero in the Arab world. Hamas’s invasion on October 7 and the accompanying atrocities garnered 70%-80% support from the Palestinian people.

While Israel’s superior capacity to exact cost from the Palestinians is unquestioned, one cannot ignore the Palestinians’ ability to withstand the heavy price of the violent confrontation with Israel.

They continue to reject the Jews’ right to self-determination and continue violent resistance despite the severe blows they have suffered since 1948. The adherence to the idea of refugees returning to their homes and the ethos of “sumud,” which means “steadfastness,” that evolved after 1967 remain powerful forces in preventing a compromise.

In Israel as well, the use of force enjoys public legitimacy due to the prevailing perception of existential threats and the widespread understanding that military force is the guarantee of the state’s survival. The IDF has consistently been the most trusted institution in the country, and military service is regarded as a vital societal value.

 IDF operates in the West Bank, February 23, 2025. (credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON'S UNIT)
IDF operates in the West Bank, February 23, 2025. (credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON'S UNIT)

Israeli War effort

The remarkable mobilization of the reservists for the war effort immediately after the state’s failure on October 7 is also evidence of Israeli willingness to pay the necessary price in the multifront military confrontation. Likewise, the large numbers of young people eager to enlist in combat units attests to Israeli national resilience.

Nevertheless, one cannot avoid asking whether there are signs of weakening in Israel’s resilience after a year and a half of fighting. In the past, doubts were also raised about the people’s ability to endure wars.

Yitzhak Rabin agreed to sign the Oslo Accords partly due to his assessment that Israeli society no longer possessed the resilience to bear the cost of violent conflict as previous generations had. Ehud Olmert admitted, “We are tired of winning wars.”

Since the IDF’s military entanglements in Lebanon which lasted until the withdrawal of May 2000, Israel’s political and military leadership increasingly factored in what they perceived as high public sensitivity to casualties when making decisions about military operations that required ground incursions into enemy territory.

Lt.-Gen. (ret.) Moshe (Bogie) Ya’alon noted in his autobiography the hesitations in the IDF before Operation Defensive Shield (2002) to capture the West Bank cities due to fears of numerous casualties. After the Second Lebanon War (2006), Maj.-Gen. Elazar Stern lamented the exaggerated sensitivity to loss of life and revealed that one of the battles was stopped due to the number of casualties. Israel’s restrained responses to repeated missile attacks from Gaza were also influenced by this consideration.


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Yet the Israeli public has instinctively understood that the reluctance to climb the ladder of violence is not helpful in achieving victory and deterrence. Escalation is a competition in risk-taking that signals determination and willingness to pay higher prices.

Indeed, the containment policy, which hesitated to escalate, frustrated the Israeli public. All public opinion polls after the end of previous rounds in Gaza showed majorities dissatisfied with the absence of a decisive victory, willing to continue fighting.

The current Israel-Hamas War pointed to the failure of containment and the misperception of national resilience by the political and military leadership. The response of reserve soldiers was very high, and civil society showed impressive resourcefulness. A random review of the eulogies given in memory of the fallen shows an admirable patriotic spirit.

As the war continued, Israel has been increasingly focusing on the great tragedy of the war – the hostages abducted by Hamas. In a period of deep political divisions following the attempts to pass a judicial reform, a sophisticated and well-funded PR campaign, partly motivated by hostility toward Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, led the majority in Israeli society to believe that the immediate and foremost goal of the war is the return of the hostages, rather than the defeat of Hamas and the collapse of its rule in Gaza.

The tension between the two objectives was clear from the beginning of the war, and it seemed that the government preferred to pursue the second objective. The growing emotional response in Israeli society to the issue of hostages was one of the factors for the erosion in the commitment to eradicate Hamas from Gaza.

Does the current public preference stem from excessive emotionality and signal a turning point in national resilience? It is difficult to determine at this stage. Mutual responsibility is certainly an important value. In the past, too, Israel used to release terrorists with blood on their hands who endangered Israeli lives in the future.

But the many calls to release the hostages “at any cost” and to stop the war as demanded by Hamas raise concerns. Statements that “Israel will not recover without the return of all hostages” indicate a lack of proportion and historical perspective.

The difficulty in hearing the moral argument, determining the Jewish law that “captives are not to be ransomed for more than their value” and that one must consider the long-term implications of this issue, does not bode well for the resilience of Israeli society in similar situations in the future.

Has Israeli society succumbed to understandable emotions but without rational deliberation? In the hostage affair, has Israel prioritized individual welfare over the collective good?

The answers are not self-evident, especially because the issue of national resilience is intertwined with issues related to the current political cleavages, which eroded the legitimacy lent to the use of force. The images in the country these days do not project determination and strength. Time will tell how Israeli society, which has thus far endured harsh wartime tests, will navigate this challenge.

The writer is senior researcher at JISS and head of the Strategy, Diplomacy and Security Program at the Shalem Academic Center.