Once again, Turkey is leveraging the Kurdish issue to assert regional hegemony. This time, it is using its most powerful bargaining chip: Abdullah Ocalan, a founder of the PKK – which once aimed for an independent Kurdistan – who has been in prison since 1999. By orchestrating Ocalan’s call for disarmament – directed not just at the PKK but at “all groups,” Ankara aims to neutralize Kurdish movements across the region.
But Turkey has never been truly interested in resolving the Kurdish issue, which “stemmed from the closure of democratic political channels” by Ankara, as rightly mentioned by Ocalan. For a century, it has systematically denied Kurds even the most basic autonomy within its borders.
Ocalan has been under pressure to refrain from demanding any form of political structure, including “federalism, administrative autonomy, or culturalist solutions,” even within Turkey. The PKK was established with the goal of an independent Kurdistan encompassing all Kurdish regions in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. How can one forget its original maximalist aim, which has now been reduced to not even securing mere “culturalist solutions?”
He has even refrained from advocating for his own governance model, democratic confederalism. This stark retreat raises questions about Turkey’s long-term strategy and Ocalan’s evolving stance under Turkish state pressure, as the “democratic reconciliation” he proposes as a solution does not entail an overhaul of the purely ethnocentric ‘Turkish’ identity enshrined in Turkey’s constitution. So, what lies behind Turkey’s gesture?
Revising the MidEast map
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu unveiled a revised Middle East map at the September 2024 UN General Assembly, underscoring the Kurds’ critical role in the region. With their secular and democratic governance model and their historical ties to the Jewish people, the Kurds represent a strategic force in the evolving Middle East.
Although the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria in December was a major setback for Iran and Hezbollah, Israel faces new threats that could rival those posed by Assad’s regime.
Alongside two smaller ethnoreligious communities, the Alawites and Druze, who recently declared a military council, Syria’s current power structure is divided among three major factions: the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), its ally, Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham, and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), under the command of General Mazloum Abdi.
The SDF, however, is the only major liberal-democratic force in Syria, alongside the Druze community with a recently declared military council that Israel has sought to establish ties with. Although Abdi stated that Ocalan’s call is “not related to us in Syria,” a spokesperson for Erdogan’s AK Party claimed that Ocalan’s call includes the SDF.
Turkey’s recent overtures toward Kurdish disarmament are not motivated by a genuine desire for peace but by a strategic attempt to block Israeli influence in the region. Ankara fears that the Kurds could become a pivotal force in reshaping the Middle East, challenging both Turkish hegemony and the Islamist networks it supports.
If Turkey was genuinely committed to peace, why did it not seize the opportunity on the centennial of the Lausanne Treaty (July 24, 1923) or the founding of modern Turkey in 2023? Why now? This calculated move by Erdogan comes in the aftermath of the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel.
With Iran potentially looking to replicate Turkey’s century-old strategy of suppressing ethnic minorities, the broader geopolitical game remains complex. Just as Reza Mirpanj, known as Reza Shah, adopted Turkey’s model of ethnic chauvinism in the 1930s to suppress Kurdish identity, modern-day Iran may follow suit, further complicating the region’s dynamics with the same goal of eliminating any Kurdish movements in eastern Kurdistan/western Iran.
If Turkey fails to achieve its objectives in Syria – namely, the disarmament of the Kurds and the dissolution of their autonomous government in Rojava Kurdistan – and within Turkey, its bargaining card in Ocalan will be wasted.
Ankara’s ability to manipulate Kurdish politics through Ocalan’s captivity hinges on its success in weakening Kurdish forces on the ground. Should this strategy fail, Turkey’s leverage over the Kurdistan case, which acts as a double-edged sword for the Turks, significantly diminishes.
In this evolving landscape, the Kurdish-Israeli alliance could prove to be a decisive factor. Strengthening ties between the two could counterbalance Turkish and Iranian ambitions, promote regional stability, and redefine power dynamics in the Middle East. Will Israel recognize this opportunity before it is too late? It has already taken steps to protect the Druze – are the Kurds next?
The writer, an expert on Kurdistan and the Middle East, is a fellow at the Middle East Forum. He is the author of Towards an Independent Kurdistan: Self-Determination in International Law (Routledge, 2023).