Israel faces immense security threats, both external and internal, more significant than those faced by perhaps any other democratic state. To address its internal security threats, Israel established a strong domestic security agency—the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency)—which holds extensive investigative, surveillance, and intelligence-gathering powers.
For instance, the Shin Bet is authorized to remotely infiltrate computers and covertly search them for information. It also collects vast amounts of communication metadata. The enormous accumulation of this data, combined with the Shin Bet’s advanced technological capabilities, gives the organization access to a wealth of information about every Israeli citizen.
During the COVID-19 crisis, for example, it became evident that the Shin Bet could track the location of any Israeli citizen via their mobile phone, and identify the people with whom they had been in proximity.
The Shin Bet also has broad powers and statutory authority in the field of investigations. It may prevent a suspect under investigation from meeting with their attorney, extend detention before a court hearing, and hold hearings on detention extensions without the suspect's presence. Additionally, the Shin Bet has authority over the security clearance of public officials and civil servants.
These considerable powers granted to a secretive organization demand the establishment of appropriate oversight mechanisms to ensure that they are used solely for their intended purposes and to prevent misuse against individuals or communities in Israel.
Internal oversight mechanisms are critical
Due to the secretive nature of the organization and its operations, standard oversight mechanisms—such as the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the courts, civil society, and the press—are not always effective. The Shin Bet’s internal oversight mechanisms are, therefore, critical: these include the Shin Bet Comptroller, its legal advisor, and, crucially, the organizational culture and ethos instilled by the head of the Shin Bet.
The Shin Bet underwent a major organizational reform following scandals exposed in the 1980s, replacing a culture of deception and abuse of powers with an internalization of the importance of restraint and rule of law in a democratic society. This current perspective, for example, has led the Shin Bet to hesitate in using its intrusive capabilities, intended for national security purposes, to combat organized crime in the Arab society.
The agency’s extensive powers create significant temptation for the minister responsible for it—the Prime Minister—to direct the Shin Bet chief to use those powers against political opponents or to suppress individuals and groups perceived as oppositional to the government.
In recent days, former Shin Bet chief Yoram Cohen alleged that Prime Minister Netanyahu requested the Shin Bet to use its capabilities and powers against his political opponents (these allegations have been denied, at least in part, by the Prime Minister).
To protect the Shin Bet from political interference, the Shin Bet Law includes a special provision stating: “The Service shall operate in a mamlachti manner; no task shall be imposed on the Service for the purpose of advancing party-political interests.” (Mamlachti refers to the Israeli concept of civic duty, prioritizing national above sectorial or political interests).
Shin Bet Law restricts partisan action
This provision—which has no parallel in other laws for Israeli government agencies—not only prohibits the Shin Bet from acting in a partisan manner but also restricts political leaders from directing the agency to do so. In effect, the Knesset intended to provide the Shin Bet chief and the organization with protection from political interference and to empower the Shin Bet chief to refuse to comply with any “political” orders from the Prime Minister.
This unique authority creates an inherent potential tension between the Prime Minister and the head of the Shin Bet. While the Shin Bet chief is obligated to implement government policy, he is not required to follow a directive from the Prime Minister if he deems it political and contrary to the mamlachti principle enshrined in law.
The head of the Shin Bet is not a personal appointment of the prime minister and does not serve “at his pleasure.” It is, of course, important that a professional trust-based working relationship exists between them. However, the Shin Bet chief has a degree of independence from any prime minister. This independence is further reinforced by the fixed five-year term of the Shin Bet chief, which is deliberately longer than the parliamentary term and is independent of a change in the prime minister or government.
True, the government has the authority to shorten the term and dismiss the Shin Bet chief, but this power should clearly be used sparingly and only for professional reasons and subject to the rules of administrative law. Otherwise, every time the Shin Bet chief resists the prime minister’s political demands, the latter could simply dismiss him—thereby hollowing out the obligation of acting in a manner that is mamlachti.
The importance of a Shin Bet independent from political intervention cannot be overstated. It is what ensures that the Shin Bet does not become a draconian political tool against opposition forces, akin to the “secret police” of dictatorships. This independence from politicization also enables the Shin Bet to recruit the best of Israeli's citizens into its ranks, regardless of their political views. If perceived as a political organization, many would refuse to join it, and growing public distrust might impact its effectiveness.
Above all, this independence guarantees that the Shin Bet’s primary focus remains its central mission: protecting Israel from its enemies. Protecting the Shin Bet’s independence from political intervention is critical to safeguarding Israel’s security and the rights of its citizens. If we do not protect it—the Shin Bet will not protect us.
Dr. Eran Shamir-Borer is Director of the Center for Security and Democracy at the Israel Democracy Institute.
Prof. Amichai Cohen is a Senior Fellow at the Israel Democracy Institute and a faculty member at the Ono Academic College Faculty of Law.