In recent conversations with audiences in North America, I threw out a sentence and asked to be challenged. I stated that Israel had not acted in a preemptive manner since 1967. My assertion was made in the context of a discussion regarding the Six Day War.
Before that war began, the armies of Arab states had been massing on Israel’s borders. Arab leaders were threatening Israel with annihilation. The US and France warned Israel not to strike first. The tiny Jewish state took the threats of the Arab states seriously, and did not heed the American and French warnings.
Israel preempted. Israel struck first. The result: Within a week, the State of Israel had expanded to include a unified Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, and Golan Heights.
On the other hand, when Israel faced threatening enemy military movements and warnings of an imminent war just six years later, in 1973, it did not take the threats seriously. The result was the devastating outbreak of the Yom Kippur War.
The holiest day on the Jewish calendar, Yom Kippur, would take on a different dimension. The spiritual holiness of the day was transformed into an occasion of national trauma which lasted decades.
Yet, 50 years and one day later – October 6, 1973, to October 7, 2023 – it happened again. Once more, there were intelligence warnings. Once more, there were telltale signs of movements on the border.
Would we act as we did in 1967, or would we demonstrate denial as we did in 1973? We all know the answer. Hostages are still held in Gaza; the war continues.
In response to my statement to the various audiences regarding 1967 as the last case of an Israeli preemptive action, I justifiably received pushback. The immediate thought that came to the minds of a number of the participants in the discussion was the June 1981 Israel Air Force attack on a nuclear reactor under construction in Iraq.
I noted to the participants that Israel also acknowledged an attack on a Syrian reactor in the works in 2007, though it took over a decade for that confirmation to come, in 2018.
From the air, Israel reportedly has acted periodically to prevent supplies from reaching its enemies. Often Israeli media couch their descriptions of specific strikes as “according to foreign reports.” For their part, Israeli political or military leaders hint at such action, making headlines with their comments but at the same time leaving enough ambiguity to avoid direct Israeli confirmation.
Incidents have frequently been reported close to Israel, such as attacks on supplies from Iran to Hezbollah, arriving in Syria to be transported into Lebanon. There have also been airstrikes on Sudan, a couple of thousand kilometers away from Israel. Here, too, the objective was said to be thwarting the transfer of Iranian arms, in this case preventing them from reaching Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
Short of claiming responsibility, an often-stated Israeli catchphrase is that the Jewish state has a long arm which can reach anywhere necessary. Israeli political and security sources have stated with great confidence over the years that certain operations that were carried out would never be uncovered.
All the intrigue attached to the longer-range operations, however, takes us back to Israel’s policy right along its own borders. Connecting the dots between the different types of responses to the threats from afar as opposed to those at Israel’s doorstep are statements that were made between 1973 and 2023.
The time frame was the 1990s. The circumstances were the secret talks taking place in Oslo which were later publicly revealed, and which led to the establishment of the self-rule Palestinian Authority in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. Intricate talks took place, over the course of time, regarding security arrangements, including the issue of where Israel could take risks to hand over security control to Palestinian forces.
Ultimately, the Oslo process, as it became known, collapsed. But before it did, various Israeli officials were looking for ways to save it. An ironclad doctrine that had guided the Israeli mainstream political and security echelons was that the Jordan Valley shall remain Israel’s eastern security border.
However, as “territorial compromise” became a term with which we were getting increasingly familiar, voices were being heard stating the position that modern technology was making the exact location of borders on the ground a less significant element in determining the region’s future.
The logic of this argument was that we were entering an era when the far greater security threat was from the air and from afar, with the development of advanced missile systems. The more conventional cross-border warfare was now less of a threat, according to this argument. What is more, the land threat could be countered through technological warning systems as opposed to relying on military and security personnel, according to experts who were promoting this strategic outlook.
Israel and Jordan signed a peace treaty in 1994, and their common border has been relatively very quiet. With the collapse of the Oslo process, the PA never became a state, despite what some in the international community might think, and Israel stopped handing over territory to the Palestinians.
However, reading the just-mentioned updated security doctrine of some 25-30 years ago regarding land border strategy should send chills down the spine of anyone reviewing the events of October 7, 2023.
Initial findings publicized so far regarding what happened on that Simchat Torah morning speak of an underestimation of the clear and present danger posed by the situation on the ground at the Gaza-Israel border. The feeling, whether within the Israeli military establishment, the political establishment, or both, was that the impending threat was nothing worse than what would necessitate another targeted killing or two, an isolated operation, knocking out some rocket launchers from the air, and that would be it, at least for the moment. Hamas would be deterred.
Does Israel have control of its own defense?
THERE IS much more that goes into deciding on Israeli security moves than can be included within an article of this length. Still, two major aspects of Israeli security that have been addressed specifically over the past week are at the core of what’s been described here.
From afar, there is the ongoing threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program. Did US President Donald Trump put the brakes on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s plan to attack? On the other hand, right across Israel’s border, in the Gaza Strip, there are still 59 hostages.
Is Israel struggling to show the same self-confidence in Gaza that it is willing to show in the skies over Iran? Is it not possible to make a deal to gain the release of our hostages? Sure, tell the world that you’re ending the war. Then, hopefully at a moment when no one expects it, and you detect an opportunity to destroy Hamas, go for it.
The same long Israeli arm that is not afraid to attack, no matter how far away and no matter what the international reaction, must certainly also have a shorter arm to fight back on its own doorstep to do what it has to do.
Do we not think that we can win this war on our own terms? Those terms should mean the hostages come home, and then when the world complains that we’ve resumed the fight, we stand up for our just cause.
In 1967, Israel preempted when its neighbors wanted to destroy it. In 2025, the threat is still there. The Israeli mindset in response should be the same.
The writer is op-ed editor of The Jerusalem Post.