From an economic perspective, Trump’s visit to the Gulf can be considered highly successful. The United States signed deals worth over one trillion dollars with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, in exchange for which they will receive advanced weaponry and technology.
Time will tell whether these deals materialize – many of the agreements Trump signed during his 2017 visit remained on paper. It is also unclear whether these three countries – especially Saudi Arabia – will be able to afford the costs, given declining oil prices and other economic challenges.
Although the visit focused on economic matters, it also carried political significance, with important implications for Israel.
The first implication is the message sent to Iran. Amid ongoing nuclear negotiations, the Gulf states have effectively created a “defensive belt” with the US. Although Trump visited only three countries, his meeting with representatives of all six Gulf Cooperation Council states – including Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain – conveyed a united anti-Iranian stance.
In reality, these countries maintain relations with Iran, but the visit made clear the Gulf states’ true priorities regarding the Iranian challenge.
The second implication concerns the rising importance of the three countries in the regional and international arenas. While Trump’s first visit during his previous term was also to Saudi Arabia, he then flew to Israel.
Qatar's determination for allyship with Trump
Among the Gulf states, Qatar’s demonstration of friendship appeared especially significant, given the criticism Qatar has faced in the West and in Israel for financing terrorist organizations and promoting extremist educational programs. Egypt, mired in massive debt, can only look with envy at its wealthy Arab sisters.
The third implication is that the struggle over Syria is taking a new turn. The question of whether Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has truly changed remains unresolved, but the high-profile meeting between Sharaa and Trump may indicate Syria’s new direction.
It is unclear why Trump was so quick to give up the leverage of sanctions without receiving concrete returns on the demands he had made, but the promise he offered was meant to strengthen Western influence – further reinforced by a Saudi commitment to repay Syria’s debts to the World Bank.
The fourth implication is that the dividing lines between the regional blocs have blurred. During the war, a clear distinction emerged between the “Axis of Resistance” led by Iran – comprising Syria and non-state actors such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias – and the elites of the “moderate camp,” which included Israel, the signatories of peace and normalization agreements, and Saudi Arabia.
Turkey and Qatar stood in the middle: the former adopting an explicitly anti-Israel stance, and the latter mediating between Hamas and Israel, albeit with a bias toward Hamas. Trump’s visit to Qatar, along with his meeting with the Syrian president – attended virtually by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan – suggests that the previously rigid lines of alignment have begun to unravel.
These political implications carry significant consequences for Israel. The first and most important is that Israel is not necessarily the preferred, and certainly not the exclusive, ally of the United States in the region. More troubling still, the Gulf states offer the US economic and financial opportunities with which Israel cannot compete.
This conclusion has two subsidiary implications: first, that Israel may, in the long term, lose some of its technological advantages in the eyes of regional states; and second, that it will no longer enjoy a free hand in pursuing every political or military whim.
If Israel wishes to be part of the region, and to benefit from its membership in the US Central Command (CENTCOM) – which played a crucial role in defending its skies during the Iranian attack in April 2024 – it will need to take into account the considerations of the camp it aspires to be part of.
The second outcome is the emergence of a potential new framework for relations with Turkey and Syria. The meeting between Trump, Sharaa, and Erdogan took place against the backdrop of proximity talks held between Israeli and Syrian representatives in the UAE, and between Israeli and Turkish representatives in Azerbaijan.
These developments are clearly interconnected and create the potential for rapprochement among the three countries.
Naturally, there is a difference between Israel’s relationship with Turkey – which maintains diplomatic – and with Syria, with which Israel is still officially at war, having conquered and annexed the Golan Heights and currently controlling the demilitarized zone.
Lebanon could also be incorporated into this new framework of possibilities. The heavy blow suffered by Hezbollah has weakened its position domestically, led to the election of an anti-Hezbollah Christian president, and amplified voices calling for a fresh start in relations with Israel.
The third outcome relates to the Palestinian issue, even though it did not receive central attention during the visit. Trump was directly exposed to the Arab position calling for an end to the war and an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza – which, of course, also includes the release of the hostages. He also now better understands the futility of the idea of encouraging Palestinian emigration from Gaza. Even if he does not fully adopt the Arab stance, he now better grasps its strength and implications for achieving American interests.
At the same time, it is clear that spending time in the wealthy Gulf did little to help him understand the dire situation of impoverished and devastated Gaza, if he is serious about his statement to “take it.”
Meanwhile, the visit made it evident that normalization with Saudi Arabia is not currently on the table. October 7 marked a turning point in the Saudi position on resolving the Palestinian issue. Just as Israel has long rejected the Arab Peace Initiative, the current Israeli government refuses to “pay the Palestinian price” for the Saudi-Arab offer.
It is important to note that during this visit, no decision was made regarding the signing of a defense pact between Saudi Arabia and the United States or the granting of American approval for a Saudi civilian nuclear program – two conditions that were previously tied to a normalization agreement with Israel.
The immediate conclusion from Trump’s visit to the Gulf is that it strengthened Israel’s isolation within the camp of moderate states. Israel was not expelled from that camp, but its position was weakened. However, a deeper look reveals that the diplomatic outcomes of the visit hold positive potential for Israel – if it knows how to seize them.
Much like the outcome of the 1967 war, Israel has achieved military successes but has failed to capitalize on them diplomatically. War cannot be an end in itself, as Clausewitz taught us; it is merely another tool to achieve political objectives.
A decision to end the war and release the hostages – now that Hamas is already defeated, with no real support or leadership – would alter Israel’s standing on the regional and international stage and enable it to leverage the opportunities created by the war and the visit.
The window for an agreement with Saudi Arabia is not necessarily closed. It depends solely on Israel’s willingness to end the war and move forward toward resolving the Palestinian issue.
However, Netanyahu’s need and desire to preserve his coalition overshadow all of these opportunities. Once again, we learn that the Israeli mantra – that only the Arabs, and especially the Palestinians, never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity, as Abba Eban famously said – can no longer be taken for granted.
The writer teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University, is a board member of Mitvim, and a member of the Coalition for Regional Security.