As in previous confrontations, in the recent one Israel did not seize the Strip or aim to topple Hamas, because doing so was a significant policy risk. For lack of better options, Israel has chosen to contain Hamas instead. Hamas maintains its anti-Israeli ideology, but is nonetheless aware that it cannot annihilate Israel.
The latter and Hamas need to reckon with their current approaches, interests and risks, if they wish to prevent another confrontation.
Israel and Hamas routinely decline direct discussions with each other. However, the two sides communicate indirectly, through the use of brokers, media, and actions on the ground. Israel and Hamas should improve this system in order to avoid mistakes and miscalculations that might escalate tensions and promote another armed conflict.
Israel and Hamas can learn from the Cold War. A hotline could be established to enable each side to check if hostile actions were planned affronts or simply mistakes. It would serve both sides. Hamas and Israel don’t want to be seen as recognizing the legitimacy of their foe, but can avoid doing so by keeping the hotline out of public knowledge.
Israel and Hamas must not focus only on resolving an urgent crisis. The Gaza Strip is in a downward economic spiral bringing it to the verge of collapse.
The rapid decline in the standard of living, a crumbling infrastructure, and ongoing peril from lack of basic services such as water and electricity, combined with vast unemployment, create a deep state of despair in Gaza Strip residents.
Ignoring this reality might fuel continuing clashes between Hamas and Israel, all of which could lead to a confrontation. The international community needs to be more involved by using the UN to help the Gaza Strip to survive.
Hamas and Iran are allies. The latter sees Hamas in the Gaza Strip as a fire base against Israel. Iran provides $100 million a year to Palestinian groups such as Hamas.
Yet Hamas nonetheless retains its independence as a separate entity, as shown in the civil war in Syria, where Hamas refused to assist Iran. In the Gaza Strip, Hamas both confronts and negotiates with Israel, without asking for Iranian approval.
This strategy could be exploited to convince Hamas to weaken its ties with Iran in exchange for much-needed economic aid.
The Palestinian Authority is a rival of both Hamas and Israel. However, the PA and Israel have ongoing security cooperation in the West Bank, against Hamas. Unlike Hamas, the PA is willing to negotiate with Israel and to reach a two-state solution. There has been no progress in this matter, for many reasons, particularly lack of mutual trust.
The PA lost the Gaza Strip in 2007, but has nonetheless continued to send money there, as part of its goal of regaining the territory. The PA reduced its financial aid to the Strip because of disputes with both Hamas and Israel. This approach increased pressure on Hamas and contributed to the economic decline of the Strip, creating a ready precursor to war.
The recent confrontation ended inconclusively. It was a tie, as in previous rounds. Many in Israel are frustrated that Israel can’t defeat Hamas, despite its military superiority. Hamas claimed it won, which was not the case. If Hamas chooses to perpetuate this false propaganda, it is likely to ignite yet another armed conflict.
Hamas has failed in running the Gaza Strip, because the group has been focusing on its military buildup. Israel imposes a blockade on the Strip, in order to make it harder for Hamas to receive weapons. However, Hamas has managed to build low-cost, homemade rockets, from civilian materials, such as pipes. A creative solution for sending civilian supplies to the Strip without also providing things that enable military usage would delay a Hamas buildup and reduce the probability of a confrontation.
Israel’s Iron Dome was again very successful in shooting down rockets. Israeli air power was also quite effective in destroying Hamas targets such as tunnels. Nevertheless, some in Israel argue that Israel relies too much on the Iron Dome and air power, without forming an actual strategy for handling the Gaza Strip.
The Biden administration strove to make the confrontation as brief and minimally destructive as possible, with few casualties. Other states such as Egypt also helped to shorten the recent round. The end result could have been different. The 2021 confrontation lasted 11 days, while the campaigns of December 2008-January 2009 and July-August 2014 lasted for 22 and 50 days, respectively. These protracted periods of armed conflict demonstrate the need to prevent confrontations or reduce their duration.
Hamas and Israel, with the assistance of others, need to work on resolving the serious economic problems of the Gaza Strip and creating constructive mechanisms to prevent armed conflict purely because of mistakes.
The writer has been dealing with and studying Israel’s national security for more than 25 years. He served in the Israeli military, and later worked for the Defense Ministry as a researcher. He has a PhD and has published six books, the latest of which is Containment in the Middle East (University Press of Nebraska, 2019).