Dozens to hundreds of Hamas members activated Israeli SIM cards in the early morning hours of October 7, just before the massacre began, Israeli censorship cleared for publication on Monday – four months later. IDF intelligence and the Shin Bet noted the activity in real time.
This could have very well been an indication of a potential invasion. Despite the evidence however, the overall approach at the time was that Hamas would not dare try invading, because Israel’s technology would give prior warning, and any invaders would be killed by overwhelming Israeli air power and reinforcement forces, which would arrive in time to stop an invasion, and also because an Israeli counterattack would be devastating.
Initially, on Monday, the IDF would not give a substantive response to this disclosure, other than to say that the issue is under review, along with many others. An interim report on IDF tactical failures is due in May-June.
Later in the afternoon, the IDF and the Shin Bet said that “the publication that 1,000 Israeli SIM cards were activated at the same time is false and far from what happened. In actuality, signs were received that suggested, among other things, that dozens of SIM cards which had been activated during previous incidents, were activated. Based on this, the defense apparatus prepared and undertook intelligence and operational actions in the field.”
Signs were received prior to October 7
They added that “as has been previously published, on the eve before October 7, signs were received, resulting in a situation assessment meeting, after which decisions were made. The signs were based on a diversity of tools and capabilities, including technological tools whose operations cannot be published.”
The two bodies also requested that the intelligence methods used by Israel should not be revealed in a way that would harm forces’ continued use of those capabilities, including during the war.
The Jerusalem Post has pressed sources on whether the number of Israeli SIM cards activated was dozens or hundreds. Neither side was able to independently verify which.
There were hints that there was more than one round of SIMs being switched on, such that possibly at one stage there were dozens, and at a later stage, hundreds.
For months, the Post and other outlets have known that the IDF and the Shin Bet received signs of danger from Hamas, signs that led to two middle-of-the-night security meetings the night before the invasion, one around midnight, the other at around 3:00 a.m.
There are differing accounts regarding what was and was not told to IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi at the time. The main narrative is that he was not told about the SIMs issue specifically, but more broadly that the IDF and Shin Bet considered it part of a drill.
At most, the Israeli intelligence agencies thought there might be an attempt for a small kidnapping of a small group of border patrol soldiers. To prevent this, the Shin Bet sent a small but highly trained squad to the border.
This squad ended up in the middle of the invasion; the Shin Bet lost more of its combat fighters on October 7 than it has in any other single operation in years.
The SIM story was kept under wraps until Channel 14 revealed the story on Sunday night. The military censor said this was a violation. But once Channel 14 put the information out, media outlets independently confirmed the reports.
Meanwhile, retired IDF general Israel Ziv is threatening to sue channel Channel 14 for allegedly misquoting him. Channel 14 said Ziv was the basis for revealing the SIM story, and claimed he said that Halevi had not informed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu about the issue. Ziv said he never said anything at all about Halevi, Netanyahu, or the SIM issue.