The “Philadelphi Corridor” is the code name given by the Israeli army to the 14 km. long border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, which extends southeast from the Mediterranean Sea. Until 2005, Israel held it as part of the Gaza Strip. However, following its complete evacuation from Gaza in 2005, Israel also evacuated this border. Since then, up until the current Israel-Hamas war, it was held for two years by the Palestinian Authority and then by Hamas after the terror organization took control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007.
Hamas managed to transfer people, goods, and weapons into the Strip through the border crossing at Rafah and tunnels dug under the corridor. However, once Israel re-occupied this corridor several months ago, it blocked Hamas from using the border crossing and, in parallel, began to destroy the tens of tunnels underground – far greater in number, size, and complexity than the security establishment in Israel had imagined.
This has led to a debate in Israel about the importance of controlling the corridor when the war in Gaza ends. Opinions vary. While Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, like many others in the country, believes that maintaining control of the corridor is a necessity because it is the only way possible to block the entrance of ammunition and terrorists to the Gaza Strip through the only passageway they have, thus preventing Hamas from rebuilding its power to attack Israel, other serious people from the security establishment disagree.
They argue that although the Philadelphi Corridor is a strategic asset, the prime minister attributes too much importance to it since most of the smuggling to Gaza was transferred illegally from inside Israel, adding that arrangements with Egypt, backed by the US and based on technological means, should reduce the smuggling to a reasonable amount.
WE ARGUE, however, that since most of the debate focuses on the military aspects of the corridor, it might miss other perspectives that are no less important to the deliberations, mainly the political and diplomatic aspects. First and foremost is the understanding that the entity that rules Gaza, probably Hamas, has a sort of “international border” with Egypt.
At the political level, the ruler can use the international transit, openly or covertly, to invite and host delegations and officials from all over the world and increase the legitimacy of its “sovereignty” over Gaza. Will anyone in Israel or Egypt be able to prevent a visit by a senior Russian or Chinese official to the Gaza Strip? Or a senior representative of the UN? Or a visit by senior officials from countries sympathetic to Hamas? Israel didn’t prevent these types of visits in the past, and it will be no easier to prevent them in the future.
Not in Israel's best interest
The limitations that Egypt may impose are dependent on its own goodwill and interests, not on Israel’s. Such visits would help to strengthen the Palestinian terror organization, enhancing its legitimacy among Palestinians and the global audience. Not just senior officials but delegations and supporters from around the world could use the passageway to hold demonstrations or strikes, work to turn some of the ruined tunnels or buildings into museums or places of pilgrimage, and hold (violent) marches to the border with Israel.
Their aim will be, among other objectives, to damage the fading Israeli determination to maintain a perimeter on the border with the Strip. At the same time, Hamas will also be able to launch agencies similar to UNRWA, including countries and organizations that support it, which will increase its international posture and reduce the scope of Israeli actions to limit the terror group’s rehabilitation.
Past experience clearly illustrates that Israel is not good, to say the least, at dealing with such events involving civilians, and it tends to lose the battle for public opinion and international legitimacy. Hamas, with the support it has received since the beginning of the war, will be better able to channel its identification with actions within the Strip against Israel. It will be able to carry out actions that bear a diplomatic or declaratory label, including “popular” violence and more.
In this context, Hamas will know how to use the same international passage, lacking an Israeli presence and control, to slowly deny Israel any ability to continue operating in the Gaza Strip against terrorism. It would mark the beginning of a reorganization of Hamas as a hybrid organization, like Hezbollah in Lebanon or the undisputed ruler of the Strip.
In conclusion, relinquishing control of the Philadelphi Corridor means that Israel will allow Hamas to return to being a significantly present organization in the Gaza Strip and even a practical sovereign. Given the support that Hamas has received throughout the war, we cannot rule out the possibility that this presence could also result in increased international recognition, which would further prevent any Israeli attempt to monitor the rebuilding of its force against Israel.
Therefore, to the extent that Israel still adheres to the war goal it set for itself of defeating Hamas, both militarily and governmentally, it should be understood that such a goal necessitates control of the Philadelphi Corridor. While not the only element, it is a crucial step toward achieving this goal.
Dr. Ori Wertman is a lecturer and research fellow at the University of South Wales, UK, and a research fellow at the Israel Centre for Grand Strategy (ICGS). Prof. Eviatar Matania is the head of the MA program in security studies at Tel Aviv University.