In a soon-to-be-published article in Middle East Quarterly magazine, Colin Winston, a 30-year veteran of the CIA and former head of research at the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), lays out a succinct case for an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
“Hezbollah and Hamas no longer pose a threat to Israel,” Winston writes. “The Islamic Republic of Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’ lies in ruin. Both Iran’s and Syria’s air defense systems have been destroyed, and Iran’s missile capabilities decimated.
“Despite this, Iran is on the verge of producing enough weapons-grade uranium to build several bombs – so close, in fact, that relying on a timely warning from US or Israeli intelligence of Iran’s imminent ‘breakout’ may no longer be a reliable strategy.
“Now is the time for Jerusalem and Washington to take decisive military action against Iran’s nuclear program, ideally through a coordinated and joint strike.”
There is growing evidence that thinking along these lines is now prevalent at the top of Israel’s security system. Recent regional media reports suggest that there is also broad agreement between Jerusalem and Washington on this issue.
The US, the authors of these articles assert, wants to try another round of diplomacy, backed by a return to the strategy of “maximum pressure” maintained by the first Trump administration. But if efforts to induce a firm Iranian commitment to abandon its nuclear ambitions fail, then the focus is likely to return to the military option.
HOW ACCURATE are these reports? And is a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities likely, and perhaps imminent?
Israel’s growing willingness to entertain the possibility of military action derives from a number of factors.
Firstly, as Winston notes in the passage quoted above, Iran is currently accelerating its advance toward a nuclear weapons capability. Tehran has been increasing its enrichment of uranium to 60% in recent months, apparently in response to recent setbacks it has experienced on other fronts. The time it would require to produce sufficient uranium to produce a nuclear bomb is now weeks rather than months, according to International Atomic Energy Agency estimates.
Secondly, Iran’s ability to deter an Israeli attack declined very significantly in the latter part of 2024. The destruction of 80% of Lebanese Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal by Israel during this period, and the removal of the organization’s top echelon and a large number of its fighters, reduce in importance one of the main factors that had hitherto severely complicated any Israeli move against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Yet it should be understood that this is a perishable advantage, which will decline over time, as Iran sets about rearming Hezbollah.
In its large-scale retaliation against Iran on October 26, 2024, Israel destroyed a large part of Iran’s air defense capacity. This is also a perishable asset from the Israeli point of view. Iran’s S-300 systems may have been damaged or destroyed. But Tehran’s burgeoning alliance with Russia is likely at some stage to secure the provision of the more advanced S-400 system.
So Iran’s disadvantage cannot be assumed as a now permanent factor in the Mideast strategic picture. Rather, it is an asset that will eventually decline or even disappear, unless exploited. This increases Israeli motivation to carry out a strike.
Iran is still our most significant adversary
Thirdly, despite its weakened state, Iran remains the most significant adversary for Israel in the region. Contrary to some overheated Israeli media reports, Iran’s regional project has not collapsed as a result of the setbacks of 2024.
Iranian allies and assets remain in commanding positions in a number of key regional locations. In Yemen, the Tehran-aligned Ansar Allah, or Houthi movement, is in control of a large swathe of the country, including the capital, Sana’a. Its campaign against international shipping on the Gulf of Aden/Red Sea route succeeded in severely disrupting traffic along this vital trade artery.
In Iraq, the Iran-aligned Shi’ite militias retain their independent military capacity, and in their political iteration form a key element in the current government of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani.
In Lebanon, despite its mauling at the hands of Israel in the last months of 2024, Hezbollah remains the strongest military force in the country. Despite the recent notable political changes in the country, there are no indications of any emergent willingness on the part of the current government or any other factor to challenge this supremacy.
This means that Hezbollah’s current weakness must be utilized, if it is to be utilized, within a limited available period.
The only “permanent” setback suffered by the Iranians in the last year is the loss of the Assad regime in Syria. This, without a doubt, severely weakens Tehran’s regional deployment.
But even here, it should be noted that the Sunni Islamists who now rule in Damascus have yet to impose their authority throughout the country. For the moment, Iranian smuggling networks have not been entirely cut. The recent fighting between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Hezbollah in the area of Qusayr in western Syria attests to this.
ALL THIS means Israel has the motivation, and apparently also the capacity, to strike a severe blow at the Iranian nuclear program, using its air power, and perhaps also with the involvement of its special forces. And because Iran has permanently lost only a limited part of its capabilities, any such strike needs to happen relatively soon.
The remaining element needed for a strike of this kind will be a green, or at least yellow, light from the US. A recent article by Ben Caspit, a well-connected Israeli journalist, at the al-Monitor news site, quoted an unnamed Israeli associate of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on this subject.
The “associate” sounded optimistic on the matter. “The gates of hell will be opened for Iran,” he told Caspit. “[US President Donald] Trump will give Netanyahu the green light, and the Americans will not stand idly by, but will help Israel with whatever it takes for such an attack to succeed.”
This last point remains very much to be seen, of course. As of now, Trump seems to have made clear that he desires to end wars, rather than support ambitious military operations.
It appears likely that the US administration will take its desire for a new, more rigorous nuclear accord with Iran seriously, rather than regard it as a failure guaranteed in advance that will serve as a mere prelude to military action.
Iran’s ability to manipulate this situation should not be ruled out. And Trump’s intentions and desires appear changeable, not subject to easy prediction.
Nevertheless, the chance of an Israeli strike to set back and severely damage Iran’s nuclear facilities appears higher now than at any time since the discovery of Iran’s secret nuclear program two decades ago.