The first phase of Israel’s ceasefire with Hamas ended on Saturday, closing a chapter that saw the release of 25 Israeli hostages, five Thai hostages, and eight bodies.
In return, Israel released hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, including terrorists involved in some of the worst attacks in recent memory.
It also pulled back from most of Gaza, except for the Philadelphi Corridor, the enclave’s perimeter, and some areas in northern Gaza.
The past six weeks also saw a massive influx of humanitarian aid into the Strip – some 25,000 trucks’ worth – and Israel’s withdrawal from the Netzarim Corridor, allowing hundreds of thousands of Gazans to return northward.
For weeks, the burning question was: what comes next?
Under the original plan, by now, both sides were to be deep in negotiations over a second phase that would culminate with the release of all remaining hostages, a withdrawal of all IDF troops, and an end to the war.
Israel was to withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor by next Saturday. Then, talks were to begin on the third phase: the reconstruction of Gaza.
But overnight, the entire equation shifted with the introduction of a new term into the lexicon: the Witkoff Framework, named after US Middle East negotiator Steve Witkoff.
It is easier to follow than the previous ceasefire:
The plan calls for a temporary ceasefire during Ramadan and Passover (Ramadan began Friday night, and Passover runs through April 20). On the first day, half of the living and deceased hostages are to be released. At the end of the framework, if an agreement is reached, the remaining hostages will be freed at the same time.
According to the Prime Minister’s Office, Witkoff proposed this framework after concluding that an immediate resolution between the two sides was unattainable and that more time was needed to negotiate a lasting agreement.
Why the need for more time? Because the core Israeli dilemma – how to eliminate Hamas while securing the release of the hostages – remains as intractable as ever.
Israel’s position is clear: Hamas must be dismantled, both militarily and politically, and its leaders need to be exiled before any discussion of ending the war can take place.
Hamas, on the other hand, demands an immediate end to the war while insisting on keeping its armed capabilities, even if it agrees to relinquish some degree of civilian control.
Israel faces the same dilemma it did nearly 16 months ago when the war began: how to dismantle Hamas militarily and politically while freeing the hostages. The Witkoff Framework is the latest attempt to square that circle.
THE NEW FRAMEWORK was announced just after midnight on Sunday following a high-level security consultation led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. It was accompanied by two other major developments.
First, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio signed an emergency declaration to expedite the delivery of more than $4 billion in military aid to Israel.
A State Department statement made it clear: this move reverses the Biden administration’s partial arms embargo. Since taking office, the Trump administration has already approved nearly $14b. in major arms sales to Israel.
The latest decision is part of a broader shift in US policy – one that is no longer about applying pressure on Israel but rather about enabling it to fight Hamas on its own terms.
The timing of the military aid announcement was no coincidence. By unveiling it alongside the new framework, a pointed message was sent to Hamas: either extend the ceasefire and agree to the terms, or Israel will resume fighting – with full US support and no restrictions on its military campaign.
Hamas predictable rejection
Hamas, predictably, rejected the Witkoff Framework outright.
Israel’s response was immediate. The Prime Minister’s Office announced that, effective this morning, all goods and supplies entering Gaza would be halted.
This, too, appears to have been coordinated with Washington – Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer was in the US last week, and Netanyahu said Sunday that Israel is “fully coordinating with President Trump and his people.”
Under former president Joe Biden, the flow of humanitarian aid to Gaza was a constant source of friction between Israel and the US. The Biden administration repeatedly pushed for Israel to provide Gaza with food, electricity, and fuel, even as it waged war against Gaza’s rulers.
In retrospect, this approach likely prolonged the war. The first hostage release in November 2023 came only after Hamas faced dwindling supplies, raising the question: what might have happened had there been no external pressure on Israel to maintain aid deliveries?
The Trump administration is making no such demands. In a notable shift, it recently lifted sanctions on Tzav 9, a group that protested the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza. Now, it appears that the policy that the group advocated – cutting off supplies until Hamas released the hostages – has traction at the highest levels.
At this stage, stopping aid trucks from entering Gaza does not include halting the supply of water and electricity, though Netanyahu seemed to leave that possibility open. Before Sunday’s cabinet meeting, he warned that if Hamas persists in rejecting the Witkoff Framework, there would be “additional consequences.”
Hamas reportedly has enough food and supplies to sustain Gaza’s population for another four or five months, but cutting off water and electricity could have more of an immediate impact.
If all of that wasn’t a loud enough message, the cabinet on Sunday extended legislation allowing for the call-up of 400,000 reservists until the end of May. In addition, the IDF struck suspected terrorist targets in northern Gaza, with the Palestinians reporting that four people were killed.
The accumulated message: There is a new framework on the table. If Hamas refuses, Israel will resume the war with its arsenal of weapons well-stocked and without the constraints of having to supply its enemy with food and supplies.
INTERNATIONAL PROTESTS against the halting of aid will follow, particularly in the Arab world, where they have already started, Europe, and the UN. But with Washington firmly in Israel’s corner, those arguments will be easier to rebuff, and there will be much less danger of Israel being the target of any significant international sanctions.
All of this points to an apparent willingness of Israel to return to war. But why should fighting this time succeed in fully achieving the war’s aims where 15 months of fighting – though it significantly degraded Hamas’ capabilities – fell short?
First, it might not. There are no guarantees. But the battlefield has shifted in key ways.
Hamas is more isolated than ever. No one is militarily coming to its rescue – neither Hezbollah nor Iran. The Houthis may resume firing their missiles, but that is not a game-changer.
Diplomatically, as well, they are losing support. Qatar and Turkey, its principal backers on the world stage, have to be careful not to antagonize Trump, and the Trump administration may also be able to convince Russia to take a more constructive role in this arena in return for the dramatic US about-face regarding Ukraine.
Secondly, if fighting is renewed, it will be done with Trump in the White House, who will not constrain Israel in the way Biden did.
Hamas reaction
So, how will Hamas react?
Its immediate response was to reject the framework. The next phase of its strategy will likely involve psychological warfare – more staged videos aimed at getting the Israeli public to pressure the government to end the war and bring all the hostages home.
There have been reports that Hamas has recruited new fighters and rebuilt its forces. But such claims should be taken with caution. It’s one thing to put masks and green headbands on volunteers and parade them around brandishing Kalashnikovs in white pick-up trucks at staged events where hostages, or the bodies of hostages, are released. It’s quite another to rebuild an organized fighting force capable of repelling a massive IDF air, land, and sea operation in Gaza.
Yes, Hamas still has terrorists able to engage in guerrilla warfare. But the type of capabilities to fend off a full IDF offensive? Hardly.
And while much has been made of how Hamas has used this pause to regroup, so has Israel – likely with at least as much, if not more, success than Hamas.