A new, balanced Israeli combativeness could cause Russia to reduce some of its hostility toward Jerusalem, former IDF intelligence officials at the Institute for National Security Studies think tank argued in a surprising, recent publication.
They believe that Israel can push back harder than it has in the past against Moscow’s hostile activities while still meticulously avoiding any risk of a larger conflagration with the Asian world power.
The unusual assertiveness by Israel since fall 2024 – with the use of force against Hezbollah, Syrian threats, and Iran – has shown that despite Moscow being a world power associated with the East against the West, it can be pressed into reducing some of its problematic actions against Israel, wrote Georgy Poroskoun, a former IDF intelligence officer and current INSS fellow.
Tamir Hayman, a former IDF intelligence chief and current INSS executive director, also supported Poroskoun’s argument, explaining that even before 2024, certain Israeli strikes against the Iranian axis in Syria pushed Russia in the direction of restraint toward Israel to avoid an unintended, damaging confrontation.
According to Hayman, it is not so much a question of Israel ever daring to engage in a head-on, direct conflict with Russia as much as it was Moscow realizing that if it crossed certain lines, the Jewish state could retaliate by indirectly but significantly harming Russian interests.
According to Poroskoun’s analysis, Israel’s muscle-flexing in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran indirectly contributed to the fall of the Assad regime in Damascus.
“Following Israel’s actions, Russia adjusted its approach, launching a series of initiatives (unusual visits to Israel by Kremlin representatives and involvement in an offer to mediate vis-à-vis Iran and Lebanon) aimed at mitigating potential damage from Israel’s continued operations,” he said.
“These initiatives did not necessarily bear fruit but reflected Moscow’s concern and understanding that it must take the Israeli factor more into account.”
If during Hayman’s time in IDF intelligence he noticed Russian officials taking stock of Israeli military moves that, on occasion, impacted their strategy, since Israel’s unusually aggressive actions starting in fall 2024, Moscow is ready to do a whole rethink of that strategy, according to Poroskoun.
“While, from Jerusalem’s perspective, this was not intentional, it nevertheless indicates a way to reduce Russia’s motivation to act against Israel: Israel should demonstrate power and a willingness to act against Russian interests wherever Moscow supports Israel’s enemies,” he asserted.
“THE FIRST stage is the stability of the actors and geographical regions that the Kremlin relies on – after the fall of Assad, this includes the Russians’ shaky position with respect to Syria’s new leadership” and the stability of the regime in Iran.
Moreover, the INSS article stated, “The second stage should be identifying other clear areas where Israel can hurt Russia and block its efforts, such as the credibility of Russian weapons and pointing out the manipulative nature of sensitive political narratives (for example, “Nazism” in Ukraine).”
Poroskoun added, “These require thorough analytical development and the formulation of concrete targets that correspond with Israel’s political and security objectives, including in the ‘soft’ spheres of building up resilience” against hostile disinformation.This new perspective comes after a complex analysis of punches and counterpunches in the Israel-Russia relationship, which is all framed by Moscow’s ever-evolving competition with Washington.
For example, the INSS analysis says Russia’s policy in the Middle East consistently “aims to expand its toolkit in the global struggle (which is mainly against the West) while attempting to exploit the various local actors in its favor and create an image of dominance and influence.”
In that light, Russia sees Israel as a regional actor with several main characteristics.
Israel-Russia ties mix conflict of interest with strategic potential
On one hand, “Israel has a clear affiliation with the Western camp, which makes it a convenient target for hostile criticism from Moscow. Russia thus ‘wins points’ with countries in the Global South, inside and outside of the Middle East, through both purely rhetorical actions and by providing aid to Israel’s adversaries,” stated the assessment.
This public criticism, explained Poroskoun, “helps Russia strengthen relations with countries and organizations in conflict with the West and its allies… further solidifying its influence in the region. In this respect, Israel itself is not a primary target of Russia’s adversarial activity, and the Kremlin’s interests are sufficiently served by a regular routine of diplomatic libels” and disinformation campaigns.
On the other hand, the former IDF intelligence official explained, “Israel has significant offensive capabilities that occasionally remind Russia of the risks associated with its overtly anti-Israel policy (as expressed, for example, from October 7, 2023, until the summer and fall of 2024).”
According to the report, all of this “highlights the main insight that Israel must internalize as a default: Russia is acting opportunistically in the region and is not taking Israel’s interests into consideration, but it is sensitive to the potential damage that Jerusalem can cause it and is willing to make adjustments in order to minimize the dangers involved.”
SO FAR, Israel has refrained from taking direct action against Russian interests, even when the goal is to push back against diplomatic or media attacks from Russia, he said.
However, following the decision to attack Hezbollah and as part of its powerful response against Iran, Israel’s use of force has effectively begun to pose a threat to Russian assets regarding its military and political base in Syria and Iran’s stability as a secure and reliable supplier for Russia, in addition to contributing to weakening Russia’s standing in the region, he noted.
Poroskoun contended that Israel should not be as meek about challenging Russia as it was in the past decade. Instead, it should clarify to Moscow that it prefers cooperation and deconfliction but is ready to undermine Russia in the region, if only indirectly, when Russia goes too far in undermining Israel.
Another twist in the policy mix is that presently, US President Donald Trump’s administration has offered the Kremlin the possibility of a multi-arena inter-power settlement.
Under this broad geopolitical deal, “Russia is working to maximize the scope of its proposals across various global arenas, including the Middle East, in return for securing its core demands regarding ending the war in Ukraine – an issue of paramount importance for the Kremlin,” he said.
To this end, the former IDF intelligence official wrote, “If the negotiations proceed successfully, Russia may demonstrate a willingness to decrease – temporarily and for the purpose of reaching an agreement on Ukraine only – its involvement in supporting anti-Western forces throughout the region, including Hamas, Iran, the Houthis, and the Shi’ite militias, and offer a constructive approach regarding American efforts to resolve the regional conflicts.”
These offers, besides helping with Iran, have not yet been made, he noted, but if the first stages of the negotiations between the American and Russian teams are successful, they may be forthcoming soon.
Despite this temporary potential improvement in Russia-Israel relations courtesy of a temporary rapprochement between Washington and Moscow, the INSS assessment said, “Israel must understand that this is a purely instrumental move that aims to achieve concessions from the other side (Trump) and not a fundamental, long-term change of strategy, and should not be swayed by Russia’s rhetoric.”
Poroskoun explained, “It is important to coordinate with the Americans and to insist on concrete steps from Russia – public criticism of terrorist organizations, transferring information or other assistance to curb their activities, withdrawing forces and ceasing cooperation with destabilizing actors (such as the Houthis),” and cooperation on Iran’s nuclear program.