Before the current crisis of the war in Gaza erupted, there had been four major clashes with Hamas, beginning with Operation Cast Lead in 2008 to Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2021. While the media report the human face of the tragedies of war, the book The Hamas Intelligence War against Israel (Cambridge University Press, 2025) by Netanel Flamer uncovers Hamas’s carefully constructed infrastructure. Flamer, an academic at Bar-Ilan University, is adept at utilizing Hebrew and Arabic sources to produce a detailed picture of Hamas’s modus operandi.
The book aims “to describe and analyze the evolution of Hamas’s intelligence warfare,” and does so admirably. It breaks down Hamas’s approach into different categories, such as human intelligence (HUMINT) gathering and signal intelligence (SIGINT) and cyberwarfare.
Hamas understood very early on that the minutiae of any assault had to be dissected carefully in advance. Café Hillel on Jerusalem’s Emek Refaim Street, attacked by Hamas in September 2002, was one of many restaurants surveyed before any detailed planning took place. As with the attack on Café Moment some 18 months earlier, young people were deliberately targeted because Hamas believed that it would unnerve an Israeli public sensitive to this type of attack.
The author notes that reconnoitering was carried out as early as 1992, when the Gaza settlement of Ganei Tal was the object of detailed surveillance. Hamas’s operatives looked at the perimeter fence, focused on security patrols, and noted the type of vehicle they drove. The terrorist group also observed that there was no extra security on Shabbat.
Hamas planned to seize weapons from Ganei Tal’s morning patrols and surmised that it would be more successful at sunrise. At that time, hands would be in pockets to keep them warm – and the reaction time to use the weapons could be considerably longer.
FLAMER OFTEN refers to the institutionalization of Hamas in 2007 – a watershed in its evolution from being a ragtag bunch of instigators, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, into a ruling elite of Gaza that had no opposition.
Hamas not only threw members of the Palestinian Authority off the rooftops of Gaza, it also seized its counter-intelligence security apparatus. Frequency scanners intercepted encrypted IDF messages.
Hamas took an early interest in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and drones. It secured the services of Muhammad al-Zuari, a brilliant aeronautical engineer from Tunisia. Zuari was also an opponent of the Tunisian regime and fled first to Libya, then Sudan, ending up in Bashar Assad’s Syria, where he made his first contact with Hamas.
Ideologically committed to the Islamists, he was sent to Iran, where he collaborated harmoniously with the regime’s developers of UAVs and drones. Hamas then sent him to Gaza to train others and join its military wing’s drone unit. In December 2016, the author notes, Zuari was assassinated by “unknown individuals” in Tunisia.
The international nature of Hamas’s reach, and specifically its use of Israeli citizens, is noted repeatedly. The author describes the enlistment of an Israeli student studying in Cluj, Romania, inhabitants of Umm al-Fahm and Kawkab in Israel, and a network of operatives in Turkey.
Since 2014, Hamas has been increasingly involved in cyberspace activities, where there are no borders and no fences.
It has specialized in stealing identities and photographs and using Hebrew slang to entice IDF soldiers to chat to seemingly enthusiastic partners via Facebook. If the soldier can be seductively persuaded to download a specific app, such as GrixyApp or ZatuApp, the Hamas operative then possesses almost total access to his or her device. This would allow controlling the camera, photographing surroundings, and eavesdropping via a microphone.
The author notes that Hamas is constantly on the lookout for vulnerabilities within Israeli society. To some extent, this is an open door to walk through, since Israeli citizens can lambaste government ministers as a democratic right and call out moral corruption in all areas – a distinct comparison with the ever-suspicious Islamists of Gaza.
Hamas, therefore, assiduously reads the Israeli press – including The Jerusalem Post – to channel any public information into the planning of future operations.
After its takeover of Gaza, Hamas’s al-Qassam Brigades published the weekly bulletin “Israeli Affairs.” Its 136th issue, published in mid-February 2010, reported on Ehud Olmert’s behind-the-scenes decision-making about Operation Cast Lead. After this clash, Hamas established an academy, headed by Mohammed Dababish, director of Hamas’s military intelligence department.
In 2002, a Hamas cell leader, Muhammad Arman, commented to his contacts that “following the media provides jihad fighters with free information they have never previously considered.” In this context, Arman urged jihadists to learn Hebrew so that they could read the Israeli press. An open society is seen as an ideal opportunity for the upholders of authoritarianism and the purveyors of terrorism. Democratic norms and basic human rights are seen as weaknesses to be exploited. In this, Palestinian Islamists join others who believe that the end justifies the means.
This understanding by Hamas is extended to Israel’s historic reticence by past governments to use force if civilians are nearby. The author remarks perceptively that Hamas clearly understands Israel’s catch-22. “If Israel refrains from attacking, Hamas can continue and even intensify its operations; but if Israel attacks, it will harm non-combatants, leading to international condemnation that delegitimizes the action.”
The author notes that Hamas has had little time for different views. During the First Intifada, Sheikh Yassin, Hamas’s then-spiritual leader, ruled that suspected collaborators should be executed. Some 750 Palestinians were killed as suspected collaborators.
Hamas’s use of tunnels in Gaza
FLAMER DETAILS Hamas’s use of tunnels in Gaza. This was first highlighted in an interview with Mohammed Deif in July 2001, when he was head of the Izzadin al-Qassam Brigades, the “military” wing of Hamas. The interview was followed by a subterranean attack on the Tarmit army post in the Philadelphi Corridor a few weeks later, and subsequent attacks on the Chardon and Orhan army posts.
There were five tunnel attacks between 2001 and 2004. By 2010, the construction of tunnels had become much more sophisticated. Tunnels were dug under the border fence into Israeli territory, allowing 120-mm. rockets to be fired from underground pits. This system of tunnels became known as “the Gaza metro.” By 2021, it was estimated that the cost per kilometer of tunnel was $500,000; therefore, constructing the Gaza metro amounted to tens of millions of dollars.
This is a remarkably informative and detailed book – even if peppered with a cascade of acronyms. It elucidates the intransigence of Palestinian Islamists and their absolutist desire to eliminate both Israelis and Palestinian nationalists. It is a far cry from the superficiality of the slogans and stickers of the street. The author’s attention to what seems to be minutiae is not for those who need an immediate explanation.
Flamer paints an astonishing picture that is rarely viewed. His book makes the reader appreciate Israel’s efforts to challenge the almost Stalinist obsession of the Islamists to crush anyone in their path under the fluttering but deceptive banner of “national resistance.” It is an excellent resource for anyone who wants to look deeper at Hamas’s inner workings.
The writer is an emeritus professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. His latest book, The Rise of the Israeli Right: From Odessa to Hebron, is published by Cambridge University Press.