IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir has evaluated all of the key fronts faced by the military since taking the IDF’s helm two months ago and has reached a number of important conclusions, The Jerusalem Post has learned.
Regarding aid to Gaza, Zamir’s position is that the IDF cannot allow Palestinian civilians to starve, but cannot be directly involved in distributing food aid and also won’t permit Hamas to control it.
As such, his position is that international groups and private companies should distribute food aid, though he believes in leaving the choice of which groups to the political echelon.
Food aid may end up restarting just as the IDF significantly increases its operations in Gaza.
Despite wide debates in Israel about what the primary goal of the war is at this point, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu indicating that defeating Hamas takes precedence over returning the hostages, while Zamir views returning the hostages as the primary goal.
It is not entirely clear how this view aligns with Israel’s decision to refuse recent Hamas offers to return half of the living hostages for multiple months of a temporary ceasefire, as well as the rest of the hostages, in exchange for an end to the war.
Regarding the second round of evaluating the October 7 probes that Zamir ordered to be undertaken by IDF Maj.-Gen. (res.) Sami Turgeman, his view is that the goal should be to lift the military up moving forward, and not looking backward.
Although various right-wing coalition officials were hopeful that Zamir would fire a wide range of officials viewed as moderate within the IDF, this view of the chief of staff suggests that he will not.
Zamir fired former IDF spokesperson Brig.-Gen. Daniel Hagari and appointed Maj.-Gen. Tamir Yadai and Maj.-Gen. Yaniv Asor as his deputy IDF chief and Southern Command chief after they were on the outs with former IDF chief Lt.-Gen. (res.) Herzi Halevi.
Zamir has yet to fire many likely responsible for October 7 failures
But other than those moves, Zamir has so far fired few officials relating to October 7, and many of the top IDF officials accused of having a primary hand in the failure resigned on their own between March 2024 and this March.
Of course, until Zamir receives Turgeman’s recommendations, the issue remains open.
Also, his view is that while some of the prior October 7 probes were performed at high levels, some were negligent, and Turgeman will need to redo them.
During Zamir’s tenure and including some periods immediately prior, the IDF has racked up some statistics regarding attacking adversaries.
Over 400 Gazan terrorists have been killed since hostilities were renewed, and around 1,800 targets have been struck, though it is unclear how significant some of those targets were.
Regarding Hezbollah, more than 140 fighters have been killed, and over 350 targets have been struck by the IDF since the November 2024 ceasefire.
Over 100 West Bank terrorists have been killed and around 320 suspects arrested since hostilities were renewed in Gaza on March 18.
All signs from Zamir are that there is no deadline for the IDF to withdraw from its five positions inside Lebanon or its nine positions inside Syria.
He appears ready to use these positions and unlimited IDF aerial superiority in those countries to continue to strike and weaken current and emerging threats facing Israel.
In order to accomplish the IDF’s tasks on so many fronts, he is pushing hard to recruit haredi (ultra-Orthodox) men into the army.
Zamir believes the military is short 7,000 fighters and 10,000 soldiers total from losses during the war and expanded security threats.
He hopes that a mix of the 24,000 summons the IDF has sent to already eligible haredi recruits and the fact that the IDF will now send draft notices to every haredi male who reaches the age of 16 and a half will make a difference.
At the same time, Zamir thinks that the government and Israeli society must resolve this 77-year-old issue.