Ex-IDF intel chief amends Egypt plan to end war, 'Day After' plan

The key to achieving Israel’s long-term goals in Gaza is to end the war soon in exchange for the return of all the hostages simultaneously, but continue IDF raids, and in a departure from the Egypt-Arab plan, delay any Palestinian Authority takeover until Hamas is more decisively undermined, former IDF intelligence chief Tamir Hayman wrote on Tuesday.

Hayman, currently the executive director of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), said that while the majority of the principles and proposed course of action align with the April 2025 Egyptian-Arab proposal for ending the war, which the Israeli government has ignored, crucial amendments should be made.

Most importantly, Hayman’s position paper said that Israel should insist on “the disarmament of Hamas and the assurance that it will not be able to rebuild its military capabilities.”

“Steps must be taken to prevent the integration of Hamas into any future Palestinian governing framework,” something that was missing from the Egypt-Arab plan, Hayman wrote.

Also, Hayman said that the Egyptian plan, which envisions the PA returning to Gaza within six months, was “unrealistic.”

He added that “instead, the return of the PA must be conditioned on measurable, comprehensive reforms. Many Palestinians demand reform of the PA due to frustration with corruption and ineffectiveness.”

Egyptian-Arab-Western plans have obscured the question of how committed they will be to uproot Hamas both militarily and politically from Gaza thoroughly, and have treated the idea of reforming the PA primarily as a formality.

“Recent opinion polls conducted by the INSS indicate that the Israeli public prioritizes the return of the hostages over the destruction of Hamas,” wrote Hayman, while noting, “the reality is more complex.”

“The survival of a controlling Hamas authority is essential for hostage release,” he continued. “However, once the hostages are freed, Hamas would lose its insurance policy for survival. This is the crux of the dilemma”.

Current Gaza operation is designed to put pressure on Hamas

“This cumulative pressure is intended to force Hamas to agree to a hostage deal under improved terms for Israel,” he added.

But he cautioned that in all scenarios, it is likely that Hamas will refuse to relinquish some portion of the hostages without securing both an end to the war and guarantees for its own survival as a resistance movement.

HOW TO cut a deal that helps Israel significantly both now and in the future in taking apart Hamas, while leaving it intact enough for now to be willing to return the hostages, is the challenging tightrope Hayman said Israel must walk.

“For the government, agreeing to end the war is not an option. Politically, halting the war could destabilize the ruling coalition and strengthen calls for early elections,” Hayman observed.

Also, from a security perspective, “The political leadership believes that ending the war before Hamas is completely destroyed would leave the challenge posed by Hamas unresolved.”

“However, it is highly questionable whether the total destruction of Hamas – ‘until the last Hamas operative’ – is even a feasible military objective,” he added.

All top IDF officials in the current high command under IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir and the most recent former high commander under IDF chief Herzi Halevi have told The Jerusalem Post and other media that it would be impossible to eliminate every single Hamas terrorist.

Because of this, any plan must replace Hamas with “a relatively pragmatic civil administration” with the IDF and Shin Bet continuing periodic raids against terrorists, coordinated with the Palestinian administration in Gaza, “similar to what is practiced in Judea and Samaria,” he said.

“As Hamas weakens and an alternative civil and educational infrastructure emerges, the chances of a successful de-radicalization process will improve,” predicted Hayman.

Such transformation is of critical importance, as profound changes require a comprehensive political, social, and educational process, noted the former IDF intelligence chief, lest Hamas fester and grow back.

In terms of governance, Hayman accepts aspects of the Egypt-Arab proposal, which proposes the establishment of an initial international and Arab cabinet to coordinate and control Gaza’s reconstruction.

Also, “a temporary technocratic administration that is neither the Palestinian Authority nor Hamas will be established, staffed by capable, influential individuals approved by Israel as non-affiliated with terrorist groups.” That administration will liaise with the PA on certain issues, Hayman wrote.

In addition, he said that Palestinian police officers trained in Jordan by the US military (around 7,000 are already waiting in Egypt for approval to enter Gaza, and many more can be trained to hold down Hamas if needed) will be employed by the new administration.

NEXT, HE said that humanitarian aid will be distributed via civil contractors, such as the American firm currently operating in Gaza, managed by a technocratic Gazan entity, with the 7,000 Palestinian security officers securing distribution to prevent chaos.

At the end of the process, a date Hayman seems to leave intentionally vague so that it will be based on conditions on the ground and not the six-month Arab plan’s artificial timeline, the PA would return to Gaza, and weapons would be transferred to its control.

Also at this later stage, a “wanted persons agreement” would offer “amnesty for anyone who accepts the authority of the PA and joins its ranks while surrendering their weapons,” he said.

Hayman wrote that, “The Philadelphi Corridor and the Rafah crossing... and all underground tunnels between Egypt and Gaza would be blocked by a subterranean barrier.”

This would be coupled with “an advanced international monitoring system at Rafah to prevent smuggling and ensure transparency toward Israel”.

Ultimately, Hayman expressed hope that “this process of stabilizing and rehabilitating the Gaza Strip” will lead to the “signing of a normalization agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia.”

He recognized that the proposed strategy does not constitute a clear path to a Palestinian state, as articulated by the Saudis.

Still, Hayman wrote that these changes would “improve the situation in the Israeli-Palestinian arena relative to the current state of affairs and lay the groundwork for a future political process,” which might be enough for the Saudis.Hayman added that “the major flaw of the proposed strategy is that Hamas will not vanish completely and will initially retain remnants of military capability.”

“This presents a significant challenge, particularly for those who believe that a more expansive military campaign could lead to the organization’s destruction,” Hayman wrote.

Further, “Opponents of this scenario call this the ‘Hezbollah model,’ comparing it to Lebanon’s prewar reality, although, in truth, it more closely resembles the West Bank model.”

Still, Hayman wrote, “Hamas has been severely weakened. Its organizational structures have been dismantled; its senior commanders have been eliminated (except for Izz al-Din al-Haddad, the commander of Gaza City); it has no capacity to largely invade Israel (the entire security zone has been cleared and destroyed, and its Nukhba force has been badly damaged); its firepower is residual (it is now approximately 10% of what it was on October 7, 2023); and two-thirds, or about 18,000 of its original 30,000 fighters have been killed, according to an imprecise estimate.”

“Resumption of fighting and warfare, if necessary, will be possible after the release of the hostages: Experience proves that Israel cannot be prevented from resuming the fighting,” Hayman said.

Crucially, he wrote that, “Gaza’s population does not see hope for the future. These days, joining Hamas is the only way to earn a basic salary and support a family.”

“Any alternative source of employment for young people in Gaza as part of a regional reconstruction program (besides work in Israel) could weaken Hamas and loosen its grip over the population,” Hayman said.

“The government of Israel has no interest in accepting the Arab-Egyptian proposal,” Hayman maintained in conclusion, “but the citizens of Israel have the right to demand that it be considered and improved in such a way that it will advance the return of the hostages – living and deceased – and end the war.”