The clock appears to be ticking down in Lebanon in terms of the IDF’s presence there. The IDF entered Lebanon in a ground operation last October, and Israeli forces have now been there for almost five months.
While it’s not Israel’s longest presence in southern Lebanon – the IDF operated there from 1982-2000 – it has been a complex and challenging experience.
The IDF’s goals were very limited in this war. It didn’t go all the way to the Litani River, as it did in 1976. It also didn’t do what it did during the First Lebanon War in 1982 or during the Second Lebanon War in 2006.
This has been a very different kind of war. It is in line with how the IDF operates these days, which involves seeking to reduce enemy capabilities but not holding onto land.
Israel’s defense doctrine in recent years does not believe holding land is important. It believes precision strikes are a better way to win a war. The IDF targeted Hezbollah rocket depots and its leadership during the war, for instance.
Will the Lebanese army fulfill its duties in the south?
The dilemma in Lebanon today is whether the Lebanese army will actually fulfill its duties. The Lebanese army is supposed to be deployed to southern Lebanon and move into villages where Hezbollah was present.
This is supposed to ensure that Hezbollah cannot again create a terrorist base in southern Lebanon. But there are already signs that it is trying to regrow its fangs.
Hezbollah attacked a UN convoy near Beirut’s airport, and it has been flying drones in southern Lebanon. Israel has had to retaliate for the provocations.
Hezbollah also knows that the IDF is withdrawing from Lebanon, however, and the IDF intends to complete its withdrawal this week, according to recent reports.
The IDF says it will stay in five small strategic locations. The US supports this decision, but it is unclear how this will work. The locations are close to the border, so it is conceivable this won’t create too much tension yet.
What happens over time, as Lebanese civilians return and Hezbollah operatives return with them, remains to be seen.
The IAF “struck and eliminated the terrorist Muhammad Shaheen in the area of Sidon,” the IDF reported Sunday. “Shaheen served as the head of Hamas’s Operations Department in Lebanon.”
This illustrates how Hezbollah continues to be a threat, and other terrorist groups in Lebanon also threaten Israel. Hezbollah’s drones are the greatest concern.
Israel must withdraw from Lebanon, Lebanon’s prime minister told a British official on Tuesday. This is the same new prime minister who didn’t seem to have done much when rioters attacked UN vehicles near the airport.
Although Lebanon has a new president and a new prime minister, it appears clear that neither of them are ready to do the hard work of changing things. It’s possible that things could change and the government, prodded by the US, might do more.
It also appears increasingly likely that when Israel does withdraw, Hezbollah will slowly seek to reestablish its stranglehold on aspects of Lebanon. The terrorist group has been weakened, but it will not give up easily.
THIS LEAVES Israel with many dilemmas. There is a lot of inertia against Israel returning to fighting in either Lebanon or Gaza. The dilemma is that while Israel has said it will reserve the right to strike at threats, these kinds of policies have tended to shift toward doing less, not more, over time.
This is what has happened in the past. In 2006, Israel also wanted UN Resolution 1701 to be enforced. What happened over time, however, was that the UN resolution was not enforced, and Hezbollah returned after the 2006 war and became exponentially more powerful.
The main difference today is that Hezbollah does not have the Assad regime as a conduit to Iran. Hezbollah increased its power due to backing Assad during the Syrian civil war and by exploiting Assad’s reliance on Iran. Now, there is a new government in Syria that ostensibly opposes Hezbollah and Iran.
It remains to be seen whether that government will stay the course or relent and let Iran return to some nefarious activities. The real story of Iran’s involvement may be more complex today, and it might seek to back Hezbollah via Turkey.
If Iran seeks to support Hezbollah increasingly via Turkey, this will be a challenge for Israel. Ankara is deeply involved in Damascus with the new government there. If Iran sees an opportunity to rebuild Hezbollah via Ankara, then this will not bode well for Lebanon or the region.
Turkey is a member of NATO. Israel already must contend with the fact that Hamas is backed by a major non-NATO ally, Qatar. Hamas is also present in Lebanon, and that could lead to a very complex challenge for Israel.