Syria and forgotten memory
Al-Ittihad, UAE, March 28
During what became known as the Arab Spring – a period marked by widespread turmoil and suffering for the Arab peoples despite being backed by major powers, particularly under the vision of US president Barack Obama – Syria presented a different case.
Unlike Tunisia or Egypt, Syria was arguably more deserving of such a revolution. The country, under the rule of the Assad regime – both father and son – had reached a historical breaking point, one that defied the logic of history and represented an unprecedented level of state-sponsored and sectarian violence.
Human memory fades with age, and certain illnesses accelerate its decline. Those who once possessed sharp recollections suffer the most when they begin to notice the difference. Their struggle deepens if they fail to develop alternative cognitive tools that allow them to continue engaging with the world.
While it may not always be advisable to remind one’s peers of what one wrote or argued more than a decade ago, it remains valuable to recall certain stories that illuminate a not-so-distant past – stories that encapsulate the intellectual, political, and ideological forces that shaped that era with relentless intensity.
While an individual’s memory may be fallible, the collective memory of nations, societies, and academic disciplines must remain sharp. Spontaneous personal encounters often crystallize historical moments, distilling their meaning, compressing their essence, and providing a retrospective clarity that was elusive at the time.
In 2013, the author of these lines fervently supported any political change that would lead to the fall of the Assad regime, a stance well-documented in archived articles. By chance, during a visit to a European country for medical treatment, he encountered a driver employed by the institution where he was receiving care.
Neither man knew the other, but the driver turned out to be a staunch supporter of the Assad regime. Their ensuing debate serves as a testament to that historical moment, reflecting its competing narratives and ideological battles.
The driver asked, “What do you think of what is happening in Syria?” I replied, “I hope the crisis ends, that Syria and its people find relief, and that the country returns to itself – its people, its security, and its stability.”
He countered, “Stability comes through crushing the revolution and eliminating anyone who challenges the regime.”
I responded, “We cannot fully grasp the situation on the ground, but the regime has committed severe excesses against its own people, leaving them no hope other than its removal.”
He retorted, “No, the Assad regime will last forever,” a refrain that was widely circulated at the time.
I said, “That assertion is both historically and politically incorrect. Historically, the Syrian majority opposes him due to his regime’s internal policies. Politically, the broader Arab region has turned against him because he failed to replicate his father’s strategic balancing act, instead isolating himself in the pocket of a single regional ally.”
I did not know the driver’s political or sectarian background, but my response provoked him into open defiance. He declared that the Arab countries would ultimately crumble despite their power and alliances, while the Assad regime and its backers, including the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” would endure. I replied, “Neither you nor I can predict the future. Let us wait and see.”
Over a decade has passed since that conversation. The Syrian people, the region, and the world have endured shifting policies, fluctuating alliances, and evolving strategies. In the end, the Assad regime unraveled within days, toppled by an international agreement that neither he nor his primary backer saw coming.
My interlocutor, in his unwavering belief that the regime was invincible, was merely echoing the propaganda of the time. But history and reality proved far more decisive. Ultimately, some stories, even those that appear personal or marginal, serve as reminders that sharpen the mind and remind us of a history that would otherwise be easily forgotten. – Abdullah bin Bijad al-Otaibi
Israel supporters are in trouble
Al-Ahram, Egypt, March 28
In recent months, Israel has been exposing itself to the world at an astonishing pace – faster than even its staunchest critics could have anticipated. Its latest scandal lies in stripping away the thin, fabricated veneer of propaganda it has long used to present itself – especially to its Western supporters – as a peaceful, democratic state where the rule of law prevails and where its leaders respect both domestic and international legal norms.
However, the reality that has unfolded since its brutal assault on Gaza in October 2023 has shattered this illusion piece by piece.
With each passing day, Israel’s actions have laid bare its utter disregard for international law as it continues to commit egregious war crimes while brazenly defying rulings from the two most prominent United Nations-affiliated courts: the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court.
Just as its defenders struggled to recover from this shock – unable to justify or excuse its blatant violations – the Netanyahu government escalated its defiance further by openly clashing with Israel’s own Supreme Court.
It reacted with fury when the court froze the government’s decision to dismiss the head of the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency), pending a ruling on an appeal against the dismissal. Not stopping there, Netanyahu’s coalition then launched a new battle to oust the government’s attorney-general.
Perhaps even more alarming is that Netanyahu’s government does not face any immediate political threat. It already holds a parliamentary majority that legally ensures its grip on power. Moreover, its position in the Knesset has only strengthened with the return of the extremist minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and his faction, whose votes now provide Netanyahu’s coalition with even greater stability, allowing it to push through virtually any policy it desires.
As for the mass protests against the government, it is important to recognize that they are not driven by moral opposition to the war or by any outrage over the suffering of Palestinian civilians. Instead, the sole demand of the demonstrators is the return of Israeli hostages from Gaza.
Their only disagreement with Netanyahu’s government is over the urgency of this objective; they express no opposition to their country’s ongoing war crimes against defenseless Palestinian civilians.
Unlike much of the world, they do not recoil at the killing of Palestinian infants. They do not denounce the deliberate deprivation of food, water, medicine, and electricity to an already besieged population. They do not condemn the Israeli army’s ongoing crimes in the West Bank, its attacks on Lebanon and Syria, its provocations against Iran, or its assaults on UN institutions, journalists, medical personnel, artists, and even Oscar winners.
This reality underscores not only the aggressive and expansionist nature of the Israeli government but also the wider societal complicity in its policies. For any truly free press in the West, this moment presents a critical opportunity to expose Israel’s true character, unfiltered and undeniable. – Ahmed Abdel-Tawwab
Time remains frozen for Lebanon
Nida Al Watan, Lebanon, March 30
Yesterday, Hezbollah Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem appeared for International Quds Day a day later than usual, breaking the long-standing tradition of marking the occasion on the last Friday of Ramadan.
The delay was attributed to recent Israeli airstrikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs – the first since the ceasefire on November 27 – bringing an abrupt end to a practice that dates back to 1979 when it was first established by the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV broadcast Qassem’s speech but chose to replace live footage of the event with archived clips of the party’s military parades from previous years, along with past appearances by former secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah and his speeches at the event, filled with threats and intimidation toward Israel. The broadcast was accompanied by a song lamenting Nasrallah’s absence, titled “Where Is the Secretary?”
Shortly after, Al-Manar aired a speech by Hamas leader Khalil al-Hayya on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr, outlining the movement’s stance on developments in the Gaza Strip. Notably, Hayya referenced former Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh but made no mention of Yahya Sinwar, the man who led the strip during the Al-Aqsa Flood war, a conflict that reshaped both Gaza and the region.
Qassem and Hayya reaffirmed their respective organizations’ commitment to armed resistance, presenting the continued presence of Hezbollah’s weapons in Lebanon and Hamas’s arsenal in Gaza as essential to expelling Israel. Yet while these leaders spoke, an unprecedented development was unfolding in Gaza: hundreds, possibly thousands, of Gazans took to the streets in protest, openly demanding an end to Hamas’s rule.
Their chants of “Out with Hamas!” echoed through the strip, with demonstrators insisting that their suffering – exacerbated by Sinwar and his associates’ actions on October 7, 2023 – would only end when Hamas relinquished power. After more than a year of war and devastation, Gazans have begun to challenge Hamas, seeking a return to normalcy amid destruction so vast that it will take generations to repair.
In Lebanon, a similar sentiment is beginning to take root. Just as Gazans are demanding Hamas’s departure, growing numbers of Lebanese are calling for an end to Hezbollah’s dominance as an armed faction beholden to Iran. The group has long been the catalyst of Lebanon’s suffering, a reality now exacerbated by Israel’s resumption of airstrikes on the southern suburbs, in addition to ongoing attacks in the south and the Bekaa region.
The United States, which leads the five-member committee overseeing the ceasefire resolution, has explicitly stated that Hezbollah must disarm. This message was delivered in no uncertain terms by Morgan Ortagus, the deputy US envoy to the Middle East and the committee’s political chair. Yet Sheikh Naim Qassem dismissed the American stance outright, instead demanding that the committee focus on disarming Israel in Lebanon and ensuring its complete withdrawal.
A stark contrast has emerged between the leadership of Hamas and Hezbollah. The former understands that no external force will intervene to protect it from Israeli strikes, while Qassem behaves as if a functioning Lebanese state exists to shield his organization from consequences. In his speech, he went so far as to demand that the Lebanese government take immediate action to expel Israel, issuing his proclamation as though reprimanding a disobedient student.
Qassem was fortunate that President Joseph Aoun, during his visit to Paris, absolved Hezbollah of responsibility for the missile fire that triggered Israel’s renewed airstrikes on the southern suburbs. Yet, despite this political favor extended to him, Qassem offered no gratitude in return.
Meanwhile, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam took a significant step toward aligning with Ortagus’s position when he declared in an interview with Al Arabiya that the “people, army, and resistance” equation is now obsolete.
Lebanon’s executive leadership must now push forward with a decisive resolution: the disarmament of Hezbollah, first in accordance with the Taif Agreement and then under international resolutions, most notably UN Security Council Resolution 1701.
The people of Gaza have made their message clear. Does Hezbollah believe it is immune from a similar reckoning? Sooner or later, will it not hear the Lebanese people demanding: “Out, out, Hezbollah”? How long will it be before the Lebanese government acknowledges that what Ortagus articulates in English will soon be declared loudly in Arabic by its own citizens?
Last night, Lebanon moved its clocks forward for daylight saving time. If only there were someone in power willing to move the country’s political clock forward as well – to finally free Lebanon from the burden it has borne since the former Syrian regime and the current Iranian leadership took control of its fate half a century ago. Yet for now, time remains frozen, with the weight of this endless cycle pressing down on the country with no relief in sight. – Ahmed Ayash
When will Israel be secure?
Asharq Al-Awsat, London, March 27
I remember that in the 1980s, a senior Israeli politician – perhaps the prime minister or defense minister – remarked that Israel’s security borders extended from Mecca to Pakistan.
The mention of Mecca implied that Islam itself was a threat, while Pakistan’s inclusion was not about religion but rather its nuclear ambitions, rumored at the time to have been developed with the expertise of Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani physicist who was also believed to have played a role in the Libyan and Iranian nuclear programs.
In reality, after peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, Israel’s strategic concerns were largely confined to the Palestinian issue until the Second Intifada and the subsequent prolonged wars in Gaza. Over time, however, alongside the Iranian nuclear program, the threat of Iranian proxies emerged, most notably Hezbollah. Then came Iran’s direct presence in Syria, the involvement of pro-Iranian Iraqi militias such as the Popular Mobilization Forces, and finally, Yemen, where the conflict with the Houthis is now escalating.
Israel’s relationship with Hamas, and whether the group constitutes an existential threat, has always been complicated. Israel viewed Mahmoud Abbas as its primary adversary while at the same time negotiating ceasefires with Hamas, engaging in wars against it, and even facilitating financial aid in exchange for temporary truces.
The October 7, 2023, attack unleashed a brutal war, escalating Israeli security concerns on multiple fronts. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed he was fighting on seven different fronts, most of them against Iranian-backed militias advocating for a united resistance. Since most of these fronts lay along Israel’s borders, its military campaign was not only about eliminating militants but also preventing their rearmament and, by extension, discouraging the countries harboring them from continuing their support.
But the Israeli security- and politically-minded Right was not content with this approach alone. It began contemplating broader geopolitical shifts, considering how neighboring states might be weakened or even fragmented.
This could be pursued in two ways: through direct military strikes under the justification that these nations harbored terrorist groups and by exploiting internal divisions, encouraging ethnic and sectarian minorities to seek independence, instigating armed conflicts with central governments, or staging localized uprisings.
Israel had attempted a version of this strategy in Lebanon during the 1950s and sought to weaken Egypt in a different manner during the same period. Distinguishing between conspiracy theories and actual strategic plans is often difficult, especially as normalization efforts continue to be framed as a more effective alternative to war and coercion.
The White House, for instance, insisted that its multilateral peace deals were preferable to military action. Yet, in the wake of the wars in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon, normalization has become increasingly challenging, no matter how dependent or vulnerable certain states may be.
What remains unknown, however, is the true origin of the forced displacement rhetoric and how any rational leader could openly endorse it. US President Donald Trump floated the idea regarding Gaza, and Netanyahu quickly embraced it, extending the concept to the West Bank and even Palestinian citizens of Israel.
But where could 7 or 8 million people go, and who would be willing to accept them? Even if the forced displacement of half a million Gazans was somehow orchestrated, what about the rest? Would they not continue to be a persistent challenge for Israel?
These are unrealistic notions, yet they reveal two fundamental truths: an overwhelming sense of Israeli impunity – bolstered by unwavering American support – and the deeply ingrained belief that Israel can only achieve security if Arabs and Muslims are absent from the region.
However, behind closed doors, ongoing negotiations suggest that Trump’s proposal was more of a bargaining chip, whereas, for Israel, displacement remains an ideological objective. Trump now appears to be retreating in favor of an Egyptian-backed settlement endorsed by Arab and Muslim states. Ironically, the renewed Israeli assault on Gaza may, contrary to Israeli expectations, end up reinforcing the Egyptian solution rather than undermining it.
Lately, discussions have centered on Turkish power and its military presence in Syria, with reports of negotiations involving former Syrian vice president Farouk al-Sharaa regarding the establishment of a Turkish military base near Palmyra. Hard-line Israeli voices are warning that war with Turkey over Syria is inevitable, signaling an ever-expanding theater of conflict.
While these extreme views remain limited in influence for now, Israel is unwavering in its belief that an attack on Iran’s nuclear program is imperative before the opportunity slips away.
Israeli officials were caught off guard when, despite his harsh sanctions on Iran, Trump secretly reached out to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei with an offer to negotiate – albeit on American terms. This was something Israel categorically opposed, insisting that military action, not diplomacy, was the only viable course.
A permanent war in Gaza. A looming conflict in Syria. Ongoing hostilities with Hezbollah in Lebanon. A military campaign against the Houthis. And the possibility of direct confrontations with Iran and Turkey. This is the reality of Israel’s regional strategy – a comprehensive war on multiple fronts. But can such a war be won? And if, as Netanyahu claims, Israel seeks to reshape the Middle East, when will it finally achieve the security it so desperately seeks? – Radwan al-Sayed
Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb. All assertions, opinions, facts, and information presented in these articles are the sole responsibility of their respective authors and are not necessarily those of The Media Line, which assumes no responsibility for their content.