The recent developments in the affair known as “Qatargate” have brought to the public eye one of the most striking relationships in the Middle East: that of Egypt and Qatar. One claim heard several times over recent days said that the Qataris had an interest in “contaminating” relations between Israel and Egypt, perhaps over the issue of mediation in Gaza and other ideological and geopolitical differences.
Regardless of the veracity of these claims, to understand why they are even possible, one must attempt to understand the history of relations between countries and the ideologies they espouse and drive.
Although both Arab countries are located in the Middle East, they stand in stark contrast to each other: Egypt is led by a secular military regime, boasts over 100 million citizens, most of which suffer from a plague of poverty, and stands as a natural successor of an ancient civilization with millennia of proud history and heritage.
Qatar, on the other hand, is a monarchy espousing a radical Islamist ideology, with a population of around 380,000, all of them living in dazzling wealth – in addition to over two million foreign workers. Its richness in oil and gas stands in an almost inverse proportion to its virtual lack of history and roots as a relatively modern political entity.
However, a series of colliding interests have shaped their shared experiences in the region, including ideological differences, regional power struggles, and conflicting approaches to key Middle Eastern issues. Their relationship offers an instructive window into the complex web of alliances and rivalries that define contemporary Middle Eastern geopolitics.
The Muslim Brotherhood factor
The most significant point of contempt between Egypt and Qatar centers around their antithetical positions regarding Islamist movements, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. Qatar has long provided financial, political, and media support to the Brotherhood and its affiliates across the region, a backing which became particularly evident during the Arab Spring when Qatar supported Islamist groups across multiple countries – Egypt included.
In contrast, Egypt under current President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization following the 2013 military overthrow of Brotherhood-affiliated elected President Mohamed Morsi, and true to a long-standing tradition in the military-led country since its early days.
The Egyptian government formally designated the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization in December 2013, criminalizing its activities and membership. This fundamental ideological dispute has repeatedly strained relations between Cairo and Doha.
Egypt views Qatar’s support for the Brotherhood as direct interference in its internal affairs and a threat to its national security, while Qatar tends to frame its position as innocently as supporting democratic or popular movements and promoting “political pluralism.”
In this context, Qatar’s state-owned Al Jazeera has been another major stumbling block in bilateral relations. Egypt has accused the network of biased coverage that undermined Egyptian stability and sovereignty. During the 2011 revolution in Egypt, which led to the ousting of president Hosni Mubarak, as well as the aftermath of these events, Al Jazeera’s extensive coverage of protests and its perceived sympathetic portrayal of the Muslim Brotherhood led to increasing Egyptian hostility toward the network.
Following Morsi’s ousting, Egyptian authorities raided Al Jazeera’s Cairo offices, arrested several of its journalists on charges of spreading false news and supporting terrorism, and eventually banned the network from operating in Egypt altogether. This ban became emblematic of the deteriorating relationship, with Egypt viewing the network as a de facto arm of the Qatari government for political influence and interference within the country rather than an independent media organization.
In this context, the Qatari-owned channel often views itself as a staunch denouncer of normalization efforts with Israel, constantly bashing at Egypt, the first country to have signed a peace agreement with Israel.
Tensions reached their peak during the 2017-2021 Gulf Crisis, when Egypt joined Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain in imposing a diplomatic and economic blockade on Qatar, with measures including trade and travel bans.
The boycotting countries issued a list of demands that included shutting down Al Jazeera, severing ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, and scaling back relations with Iran; but though none of these ended up consolidating, the blockade ended in January 2021 with the signing of the Al-Ula Declaration, which paved the way for reconciliation.
Since lifting the blockade, both countries have taken measured steps toward normalizing relations. In 2021, Egypt was the first country to officially restore its ties with Qatar. High-level visits followed, including meetings between Sisi and Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani during the latter’s visit to Egypt in June 2022 – the first since the blockade.
The economic dimension has been at the forefront of this reconciliation. Qatar has pledged billions in investments for Egypt’s struggling economy, including a $5 billion package announced in 2022. This economic cooperation provided both countries with benefits while allowing them to sidestep the more straining ideological issues that remain unresolved.
The Gaza effect
One of the most notable areas of competition between Egypt and Qatar involves their respective roles in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly regarding the Gaza Strip. The Gaza Strip was administered by Egypt from the War of Independence in 1948 until the 1967 Six Day War, and more modernly, Cairo has aimed to position itself as the principal mediator between Israel and Hamas, such as the case in the 2011 Shalit deal.
Egypt aims to leverage its geographical position at the border with Gaza, the peace treaty with Israel, and the long-standing diplomatic relationships between Egypt and Palestinian forces to meet its diplomatic goals.
Qatar, meanwhile, has established itself as an alternative mediator with significant financial leverage in Gaza and special relationships with Hamas, especially as Doha opened its doors to Hamas’s leadership over a decade ago. Notably, as Qatar is one of the main sponsors of the Muslim Brotherhood, and as Hamas describes itself as the “Muslim Brotherhood branch in Palestine,” the designated terrorist group and the tiny Gulf nation also share an ideological proximity.
Qatar’s financial support to Gaza, which includes regular payments that help sustain the territory’s economy, has given Doha considerable influence in the Strip as well. Qatar provided hundreds of millions of dollars to Gaza, including funding for infrastructure, housing, and monthly stipends to thousands of Palestinian families, with Israeli consent.
This competing mediation role has created tensions, with Egypt often viewing Qatari involvement as an encroachment on its traditional diplomatic terrain. In the context of the current war, Egypt’s traditional role as a potential mediator appears to have been overridden by Qatar for a long period of time, and only recently has Cairo’s name sprung up again as an important party in the process.
The current state of Egypt-Qatar relations might best be described as pragmatic coexistence with a staunch geopolitical competition. Both countries have recognized the costs of open hostility and have prioritized economic cooperation and diplomatic engagement over ideological purity.
Nevertheless, fundamental differences remain unresolved. Egypt continues to view the Muslim Brotherhood as an existential threat and continues to accuse Doha of attempting to meddle in its inner affairs through its state-owned Al Jazeera; while Qatar still fosters the Brotherhood and its leaders in the Palestinian arena and across the globe, accusing Egypt of not allowing ‘the people’ to express their voices. These underlying tensions suggest that while the relationship has stabilized, it remains vulnerable to regional developments that might reignite ideological disputes.
So, did Qatar have an interest in ‘contaminating’ relations between Egypt and Israel through a series of unfounded claims about Egyptian military infringements in the Sinai? Does this ideological and geopolitical rivalry between the countries over Islamism and influence in Gaza provide for conclusive evidence to this claim, made in the past few days as the Qatargate affair grew ever more heated?
As of now, the answer will remain unknown, but a well-informed and reasonable approach to the ideological and geopolitical drives, as well as towards the modus operandi of both nations, is always advised.