Hezbollah’s Weapons Are Just Decoration
Nida Al Watan, Lebanon, April 5
How does a state like Lebanon assert its sovereignty? Can it disarm Hezbollah in pursuit of that sovereignty? And if it does, will it suddenly become a super-state?
One question inevitably leads to another, and each answer opens a door to complicated possibilities – none more daunting than the risk of erecting barricades and bunkers that deepen sectarian divides and shatter the dreams that once floated like colorful balloons in the sky of the Lebanese conscience, buoyed by the promise of a new era and its hopeful rhetoric.
The attempt to seize weapons by force could ignite direct confrontation between the army and Hezbollah, potentially rallying the party’s supporters – long dormant under the weight of disillusionment – into action, channeling their frustration into renewed battles that would, tragically, harm those they claim to protect, and inject their surroundings with hollow “victories” meant to resuscitate a fading morale.
Conversely, excessive leniency and complacency toward the continued existence of these weapons carry their own dangers. To rely on vague inaction, to wait for regional or international shifts, or to gamble on some external magic fix, only ensures the state’s prolonged paralysis, perpetuates its weakness, and magnifies its absence from the national equation.
Most dangerously, this vacuum hands Hezbollah a compelling justification to hold onto its arms, using them not for defense but as a political scarecrow – a symbol of power and deterrence.
The party knows these weapons have lost military relevance, especially under the relentless and increasingly brazen Israeli attacks, which are matched only by the audacity of America’s unflinching support, excusing every violation of Lebanese sovereignty with the catchall claim of Israeli preemptive security operations.
Therefore, perhaps the moment does not call for rhetorical questions or tired condemnations of Israeli aggression, nor for symbolic gestures or sterile communiqués. What is urgently needed is a firm stance rooted in reality – a deliberate and serious pursuit of solutions to the crises born from the state’s frailty and the complexity of daily life for ordinary Lebanese.
Such solutions must be grounded in practical governance. While national security strategies must be pursued through diplomacy and global alliances, attention must also be paid to small but impactful details – details that do not require vast funding, which is in short supply, but which can be addressed by integrating ministerial efforts to coordinate, cooperate, and ease the burden on citizens through straightforward, intuitive laws that tangibly improve everyday life.
Confronting existential challenges should not exempt the state and its institutions from facilitating daily existence, nor from encouraging citizens to re-engage with a framework of rights and responsibilities grounded in social justice. It is through the meticulous handling of small matters that a gradual shift from sectarian loyalty to national identity can occur, slowly climbing the ladder of collective priorities.
A state that enforces the law and alleviates daily hardships is one that can credibly confront larger challenges, ultimately persuading its citizens that Hezbollah’s arsenal is neither a safeguard nor a threat. Rather, such weapons become irrelevant – mere relics with no purpose, not even worth their upkeep.
Only then, in a climate where the state reclaims its role and legitimacy, will Lebanon be able to release those colorful balloons again and watch them soar freely across the sky. – Sana Aljak
Our Era’s Superstar Sun and Moons
Al-Ahram, Egypt, April 3
Every era in history has its superstar, and in our time, that role is occupied by Donald Trump, who has become the gravitational center of global events and political positions. Like any dominant celestial body, Trump has his orbiting moons, and two stand out: Elon Musk and Steve Witkoff.
The first is envisioned as the man who will bring efficiency to the federal government; the second, remarkably, has been tasked with nothing less than securing global peace. Witkoff, a real estate mogul, has been authorized by the president to lead negotiations on two of the world’s most pressing crises: the war in Gaza and the war in Ukraine. Virtually overnight, he became a star in his own right – though one cut from a very different cloth than previous diplomatic heavyweights like Henry Kissinger or James Baker.
Witkoff hails not from the traditional foreign policy establishment but from the elite circles of business and real estate, mirroring the background of the man who elevated him to prominence. In a revealing television interview with Tucker Carlson, Witkoff, visibly moved, admitted that Trump is the inspiration behind his negotiating style, expressing his lifelong admiration for the president and his desire to emulate him.
It was a moment that encapsulated the profound transformation underway in American governance. The nation’s most sensitive and high-stakes negotiations are no longer being helmed by the State Department, the National Security Council, or even the CIA, but by a businessman accustomed to closing property deals rather than shaping geopolitical outcomes.
Witkoff’s appointment also reflects the broader character of the new administration’s approach to both domestic and foreign policy – an urgent push to distill issues down to their perceived essence, with little patience for nuance or institutional process. At home, where Elon Musk’s influence is increasingly pronounced, a staggering 132 lawsuits have already been filed in US courts in just two months, some raising fundamental constitutional questions.
Abroad, under Witkoff’s purview, the war in Gaza has escalated, becoming even more brutal and unrelenting. In Ukraine, while there is a push for a ceasefire and a Ukrainian withdrawal from the contested Kursk Oblast, Russia has offered only a limited concession: an agreement to avoid targeting power infrastructure.
What is most concerning for our region, however, is that Witkoff appears to lack a basic understanding of the Middle East and its intricate dynamics. It is evident that he does not have a specialized advisory team to brief him with critical knowledge or context. His comments on Egypt, in particular, revealed a glaring level of ignorance that underscored the dangerous implications of entrusting such delicate affairs to someone so ill prepared. – Abdel Moneim Saeed
US Victory Over the Houthis: Not Enough
Asharq Al-Awsat, London, April 5
For 20 days, US forces have been conducting intensive airstrikes on Houthi missile systems, drones, air defenses, weapons depots, command centers, training sites, and the residences of militia leaders across several governorates, including Sana’a.
If these operations continue with the same precision and ultimately dismantle the remnants of Houthi military infrastructure, will that spell the end of their existence – and if so, what comes next?
In Syria, once Assad’s capabilities were degraded, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham seized the moment, advancing from Idlib and Aleppo nearly 400 kilometers toward Damascus, eventually toppling the regime. And in Lebanon, when Israel dismantled Hezbollah’s military infrastructure and eliminated its leadership, the Lebanese army stepped into the vacuum, securing highways, the airport, and other strategic facilities. A president was elected, and a new government was formed.
In Yemen, however, while Houthi capabilities are being degraded and may be collapsing, no viable alternative force has yet emerged. The military campaign appears effective, and it is likely the Houthis will seek a deal with Washington to preserve what remains of their influence.
But aerial and naval strikes alone will not be enough to uproot them; what’s awaited is a ground-based Yemeni force capable of seizing Sana’a. Without that, once the fighting subsides, the Iranian-backed militia could rehabilitate its position and retain control of northern Yemen.
Like Hezbollah, the Taliban, and similar religious militias in the region, the Houthis will not vanish with a battlefield defeat. They can regroup, recruit youth, raise funds, and exploit regional and international divisions to stage a comeback.
The significance of the current US military action lies in the rare international consensus it reflects, with broad agreement that the Houthis’ actions warrant condemnation. However, Washington appears focused on achieving just two objectives: neutralizing the Houthi military threat to international shipping lanes and extracting a commitment from the group not to target vessels transiting the Bab el Mandeb Strait.
Even if the Houthis become a global problem, they remain, at their core, a Yemeni and regional crisis. As the Houthis are militarily cornered, it is vital to ensure this moment is not squandered. A complementary political solution must be pursued – one that addresses the entire Yemeni conflict, not just maritime security.
Any viable political settlement must be based on the new reality: The Houthis no longer hold the leverage they once claimed. Their prior demands, such as control over sovereign ministries and the security apparatus, are now obsolete in light of their weakened position.
The US has been engaged militarily since the middle of last month, awaiting a moment when the Houthis might raise the white flag and pledge to stop threatening global shipping. That moment may not be far off, and the Houthis will likely try to frame any cessation of attacks as tied to developments in Gaza. In truth, it will be a result of the destruction of their capabilities in Yemen.
Should the Houthis maintain control of Sana’a, it would be a symbolic victory, especially as the Assad regime has fallen, Hezbollah teeters on the brink, and Hamas is negotiating the end of its rule in Gaza. The military campaign may shift the balance – either through the total elimination of the Houthis or by compelling them to relinquish significant power – but this outcome depends on the emergence of a capable military force on the ground.
Is there a Yemeni force, credible domestically and internationally, that can move swiftly to capitalize on Houthi weakness and preempt a dangerous vacuum? The alternative to Houthi dominance should not be another militia or a military coup but a legitimate force that defeats the group and supports a political resolution grounded in prior negotiations.
Before the Houthis seized power in late 2014, Yemenis had made commendable progress toward a national consensus, having negotiated a roadmap, drafted a constitution, and agreed on transitional governance. Even after the Houthi coup, Yemen’s internationally recognized government preserved its legitimacy, maintaining ministries, embassies, a national currency, and a functioning central bank. It remains the legal framework through which an inclusive resolution can be pursued – one that ends the war and restores stability under a national umbrella.
Today’s US military campaign against the Houthis presents a rare and significant opportunity for transformative change in Yemen, one that may not come again for years. – Abdulrahman Al-Rashed
Between Protests in Gaza and Tel Aviv
Al-Ittihad, UAE, April 5
It may seem like an imprecise comparison to juxtapose the ongoing protests in the Gaza Strip against Hamas’s continued rule – despite the massive destruction, thousands of Palestinian casualties, and a glaring absence of any credible path toward resolution – with the large-scale demonstrations unfolding in Israel, driven by demands for a hostage exchange and a ceasefire.
In Gaza, the internal vacuum surrounding the handover of hostages, the ambiguity over partial Israeli withdrawals and reconstruction efforts, and the vague proposals to restructure the security and political scene via a consensus committee between Fatah and Hamas – all amid responses to American and Israeli initiatives – reflect a paralyzed political landscape.
On the other side, Israel’s societal unrest is tightly linked to its internal political disarray, particularly the makeup of its governing coalition and its controversial maneuvers – including attempts to dismiss the chief of the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) and the attorney-general, and the reinstallation of National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir to enforce his aggressive security vision.
The core issue in both Gaza and Israel remains the same: a deep state of internal fragmentation and the absence of a coherent political roadmap.
In Gaza’s case, the situation is made even more complex by Israel’s persistent military strategy, which relies heavily on force, targeting critical infrastructure, resuming the policy of targeted assassinations against mid-level and internal security figures, and cutting off internet, water, and electricity in line with a broader plan seemingly intended to render the Strip uninhabitable and to encourage voluntary migration – a trend already underway. This approach appears designed to impose a new reality on all parties involved.
In Israel, the unrest demands serious internal introspection despite the government’s current hold on power. Public opinion is increasingly split between factions for and against the status quo, with growing concerns of an impending civil war should the situation persist. This internal division suggests Israel is unlikely to seriously engage in ceasefire negotiations until it achieves what it considers sufficient security and ensures that a repeat of Oct. 7 is impossible.
This is further complicated by looming threats on the Lebanese front, where no solid guarantees exist, despite Hezbollah and Hamas’s setbacks and the current American-Israeli focus on neutralizing the Houthi front.
Within this complex web, the search for alternatives is gaining traction. In Gaza, this could mean the imposition of tribal leadership – an idea floated by Israel after months of conflict – or perhaps civilian, nonpartisan governance. These scenarios underscore Israel’s belief that Hamas is unlikely to relinquish control voluntarily and will continue to sacrifice lives to maintain its grip.
Any Hamas willingness to consider current proposals is seen in Israel as tactical rather than strategic, while in parallel, calls for early elections and an end to political polarization grow louder.
However, the political establishment in Israel remains relatively united around the vision of stability under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership, bolstered by the backing of the religious establishment and senior rabbis who see the continuation of conflict not only as a negotiation tool but as a vehicle for a larger objective: the erasure of Palestinian presence.
Accordingly, the Israeli strategy in Gaza is likely to remain expansive, precluding any real or even temporary solution, particularly amid ongoing disunity between Hamas and Fatah and the absence of a robust Palestinian political alternative.
For a meaningful shift to occur, Palestinian public opinion must mobilize around a new paradigm, one that moves beyond factionalism and demands the revitalization of the PA, PLO, and the broader political system to demonstrate to the international community a genuine commitment to reform rather than continued political maneuvering.
The protests now erupting in both Israel and Gaza are rooted in deeper realities that reflect the broader crisis engulfing both territories – realities that could profoundly shape the course of events, especially as multiple scenarios remain in play and the region teeters on the edge of new, unpredictable developments. – Tarek Fahmy
Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb. All assertions, opinions, facts, and information presented in these articles are the sole responsibility of their respective authors and are not necessarily those of The Media Line, which assumes no responsibility for their content.