The IDF recently provided a summary of its examination of an incident in which Israeli soldiers fired on and killed a number of Gazan medical and rescue personnel.
The IDF said “The examination included extensive data collection from operational systems, the forces on the ground, and along the entire chain of command.
“This included debriefings conducted by units in the field, in the division, and in the Southern Command, as well as relevant operational orders and directives, footage from various surveillance systems active during the event, and radio recordings.”
However, the summary leaves several key questions unanswered such as why the vehicles in an aid convoy were crushed and how it was determined that six of the dead were terrorists.
The investigation led to several conclusions.
“The examination determined that the fire in the first two incidents resulted from an operational misunderstanding by the troops, who believed they faced a tangible threat from enemy forces. The third incident involved a breach of orders during a combat setting,” said the military.
Although the IDF did reprimand one officer and dismiss another, the overall series of incidents continues to leave questions that were not answered in the summary of the investigation.
The case appears serious. “Fifteen Palestinians were killed, six of whom were identified in a retrospective examination as Hamas terrorists,” the report says.
The BBC noted that “14 emergency workers and a UN worker were killed on 23 March after a convoy of PRCS [Palestine Red Crescent Society] ambulances, a UN car, and a fire truck came under fire by the Israeli military.”
The ambulances and vehicles are at the center of the case because initial reports claimed the vehicles had approached with their lights off. However, a subsequent video showed this was not the case.
Questions on the case
First, there are concerns about the rules of engagement that occur in areas that have been subjected to IDF evacuation orders or where the IDF is operating in Gaza.
The report’s findings show that the incident occurred in a hostile and dangerous combat zone, under a widespread threat to the operating troops.” It also notes that Hamas uses civilian infrastructure.
The question is this: If it is dangerous for medical teams to transit areas where the IDF is operating, then shouldn’t there be a standing order to keep these convoys from doing so, especially at night?
It is a reminder of a different but similarly deadly incident on April 1, 2024, when the IDF killed seven members of a World Central Kitchen aid convoy. This convoy of three vehicles had left an area controlled by the IDF and was in an area controlled by Hamas at night.
A drone killed the workers. As with the killing of the convoy members on March 23, the entire convoy appears to have been targeted, without a decision to stop and confirm the targets during the incident.
This seemingly means that once these incidents unfold, there’s no clear way to cease fire and check. Once flagged as an enemy, a convoy of vehicles and individuals doesn’t seem to have a way to raise an alarm and indicate they are not hostile.
At night, it’s clear this is even more difficult.
THE HEART of the issue is a lack of coordination and also some kind of lack of clarity about the need to re-check rules of engagement after an incident begins. For instance, were arms identified in the convoy on April 1 or March 23?
A second question relates to the definition of terrorists and what this means for the overall assessment of the number of terrorists killed in Gaza.
“Fifteen Palestinians were killed, six of whom were identified in a retrospective examination as Hamas terrorists. Due to poor night visibility, the deputy commander did not initially recognize the vehicles as ambulances.
“Only later, after approaching the vehicles and scanning them, was it discovered that these were indeed rescue teams,” the IDF report says.
This incident only seems to have come to light because of the victims’ identities. They were Red Crescent personnel and included a UN car. Let’s say they had been civilians in civilian cars who were mistakenly identified as a threat?
Would there have been a secondary investigation about the identity of the fallen? Let’s say the civilian vehicles had also been identified as containing Hamas members? Would there have been a secondary investigation as to how many were actually terrorists?
Would the determination draw its conclusions from the presence of weapons or other identification means? Hamas and other terrorist groups often dress in civilian clothes.
The story of March 23 appears to indicate that the usual process after these incidents occur is to leave the bodies of the enemy or others who are killed in the field. There doesn’t seem to be a process in place where determinations and documentation take place.
If the IDF soldiers involved in the March 23 incident could have initially believed all 15 of those killed were threats and only later determined that six were terrorists, what does this mean for other assessments of the number of terrorists killed in Gaza?
Assessments throughout the Israel-Hamas War have pointed to high numbers of enemies being killed, including claims back in March 2024 that 20 of the Hamas 24 battalions had been dismantled. What were the assessments based on?
The IDF also claimed that Hamas’s Rafah Brigade was defeated between May and August 2024. Today, reports say the IDF will need to re-clear Rafah and that elements of this unit still exist.
Perhaps the killing of the medics sheds light on the larger problem of assessing the number of terrorists killed.
How many other incidents occurred in the war in which 15 men were killed and six were terrorists? What process is used to determine that the six were terrorists? Were they armed?
The IDF report on the March 23 incident does not specify these details. This leaves many questions about “known unknowns,” to use the phrase former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld liked.
There are many known unknowns in Gaza. How many tunnels are there? How many were dismantled in 18 months of war? How many men has Hamas recruited?
How many Hamas battalions have actually been “dismantled”? How many more incidents are there where an inflated number of enemies were “eliminated”?
The last question raised by the report relates to why the IDF decided to crush the vehicles after finding out they were ambulances and rescue vehicles?
“The decision to crush the vehicles was wrong,” the IDF says. That one sentence doesn’t tell us much about why the decision was made. Is it the usual order to crush vehicles after a firefight?
If the vehicles are obstructing a road and disabled, why not just push them to the side? Why would anyone order an ambulance to be crushed? The fact that the decision was “wrong” doesn’t really tell us about the larger context or if this is the usual practice.
The IDF says it “regrets the harm caused to uninvolved civilians.”
It also says it will learn from this incident to “reduce the likelihood of similar occurrences in the future. Existing protocols have been clarified and reinforced – emphasizing the need for heightened caution when operating near rescue forces and medical personnel, even in high-intensity combat zones.”
While this is good, it doesn’t address larger questions about other civilians or why aid convoys continue to run at night through IDF-controlled zones if such convoys cannot be protected.
The report also doesn’t fully explain how the number of terrorists is determined after a firefight or why vehicles are crushed after these incidents.