Change in the Palestinian Authority
Al-Ittihad, United Arab Emirates, May 4
The Israeli government is closely monitoring the Palestinian leadership’s recent efforts to adopt new positions and directions in response to proposals discussed at the latest Arab Summit. These proposals emphasized the need to modernize the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) institutions, many of which suffer from a legitimacy crisis due to the prolonged absence of presidential and legislative elections – an issue that has deeply impacted their functionality.
The Palestinian Central Council has been entrusted with various responsibilities, operating under the direct supervision of President Mahmoud Abbas. However, the core issue is not the appointment of a vice president, as seen with Hussein al-Sheikh, but rather the lack of genuine reform across the Palestinian political system. This system must be overhauled to reflect the realities and changes expected in the near future, regardless of whether a consensus is reached to end the war in Gaza or whether significant shifts unfold in the West Bank.
Whether Abbas embraces reform or continues offering nominal adjustments without substance, the status quo, marked by a strategic tug-of-war with Hamas, demonstrates that the Palestinian Authority requires more than symbolic changes.
On the international front, the US administration remains unencumbered by Israeli pressure in its dealings. The recent involvement of Adam Boehler, the American envoy for hostage negotiations, affirms that Hamas is operating with strategic and tactical intent. In turn, the Palestinian Authority is grappling with the implications of Hamas’s influence, attempting to reassert its role as a legitimate international actor.
Yet, tensions between the Palestinian factions and the PA have rendered meaningful cooperation nearly impossible, especially given Israel’s strategic containment of the PA’s movements in the West Bank. This reality points to the potential need for either a transformation of the Palestinian Authority or its replacement with a more accountable body.
Still, Israel remains deeply concerned about a power vacuum should the current leadership collapse, wary of possible internal conflict, even as al-Sheikh begins to assume a more prominent role. This moment calls for deliberate preparation, as Israel appears intent on shaping the post-conflict landscape in both Gaza and the West Bank.
However, addressing these developments requires more than choosing a successor to Abbas. The issue is structural: a dysfunctional foundation of governance that Israel itself understands all too well. The broader political environment remains in flux, without a clearly defined path forward. This demands a flexible, pragmatic response that enables the PA to evolve and regain credibility.
The revival of Palestinian institutions depends on restoring their legitimacy, setting priorities, and rejecting internal narratives – especially from within Fatah – that claim elections are unfeasible under current conditions, a claim that, while understandable, cannot justify inaction.
What is needed is a comprehensive reimagining of institutional legitimacy, beginning with the Central Council and extending across the PLO’s organizational structure. This reform should be inclusive, but without becoming mired in the debate over formally integrating Hamas or Islamic Jihad – groups that currently show no interest in joining, due to their own agendas and strategic calculations.
Ultimately, using the excuse of the status quo to justify stagnation is untenable. Israel’s strategy of entrenching the current reality, including measures such as withholding tax and customs revenues and facilitating US aid cuts to PA institutions, reveals a broader campaign to weaken the Palestinian Authority. These tactics aim to dry up the PA’s financial resources and perpetuate its erosion on the ground, reinforcing the urgent need for transformative action rather than reactive maneuvering. – Tarek Fahmy
When weapons become an ideology
Nida Al Watan, Lebanon, May 2
Since its founding, Hezbollah has worked to redefine Shi’ite identity in Lebanon, shifting it from a national affiliation rooted in the Lebanese state to an ideological one aligned with Iran’s Guardianship of the Jurist doctrine. To advance this agenda, the group engaged in so-called “brotherly wars” aimed at consolidating control over the Shi’ite community and undermining the framework of national belonging established by Imam Musa al-Sadr.
In its formative years, Hezbollah pursued this control through two primary levers: religion and armed resistance. Yet, its efforts to impose the ideology of the Guardianship of the Jurist met with resistance that prevented it from fully embedding this doctrine within Lebanon’s Shi’ite population.
A major impediment was the historically deep-rooted and religiously significant connection between Lebanese Shi’ites and the traditional jurisprudential authorities of Najaf – figures like Muhsin al-Hakim, Abu al-Qasim Khoei, and later Ali al-Sistani – who represent a school of thought that explicitly rejects Iran’s model of clerical rule and advocates for a separation between religious authority and direct governance.
Local independent religious authorities also stood as formidable barriers, especially the widely respected Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, and the enduring influence of Imam Mohammad Mehdi Shamseddine, who continued al-Sadr’s mission of grounding the Shi’ite community in national Lebanese identity and emphasizing its integral role within the state rather than in opposition to it.
Together, these figures and institutions erected a bulwark against Hezbollah’s ideological infiltration of the Shi’ite sect. Confronted with the failure of its ideological project, Hezbollah pivoted to a more pragmatic and resonant strategy, embodied in the rhetoric of “resistance.” This narrative gained traction during the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, when Hezbollah adopted the slogan “weapons to liberate the land” to secure political and popular legitimacy.
Yet, what began as a discourse of liberation evolved into an ideology of its own – one focused on the perpetual defense of the weapons themselves. In this transformation, the tools of resistance morphed into instruments of control, enabling Hezbollah to cultivate a sense of political and emotional detachment between the Shi’ite community and the Lebanese state, particularly in terms of loyalty and identity.
While the ideological project of the Guardianship of the Jurist failed to sever this connection, the ideology of weapons succeeded, recasting arms as the emblem of a unique identity and a symbol of unwavering allegiance to Tehran, the architect of this militarized vision. Within this framework, Hezbollah’s insistence on keeping its arms must be understood not merely as a strategic or tactical decision, but as the linchpin of its political and ideological existence.
To Hezbollah, these weapons are sacrosanct – not simply tools of defense or influence but the primary means by which it has alienated the Shi’ite community from the Lebanese state and erected a psychological and political divide that subordinates national loyalty to transnational allegiance. The arms serve as the last remaining tether connecting the Shi’ite community to Iran’s Guardianship of the Jurist project, with implications that reach far beyond Lebanon’s borders.
As such, the prospect of disarmament poses an existential threat to Hezbollah’s authority and simultaneously opens the door for the Shi’ite community to break free from the orbit of Iranian influence. Severing this link would not only undermine Hezbollah’s power but would effectively dismantle the ideological infrastructure of Iran’s presence in Lebanon.
Today, caught between the failure to impose the religious ideology of Guardianship of the Jurist doctrine and the severe blow dealt to the ideology of weapons by its military defeat in the recent war, the Iranian project in Lebanon stands precariously on the edge of decline. – Marwan El Amine
Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb. All assertions, opinions, facts, and information presented in these articles are the sole responsibility of their respective authors and are not necessarily those of The Media Line, which assumes no responsibility for their content.