War with Iran: What’s working and big question marks - analysis
The IDF said that it was critical for the air force to attack Iran in stages, first removing air defenses, top commanders, and the highly defended Natanz nuclear site.
The open war between Israel and Iran may have many rounds left, but after three days of strikes and counterstrikes, some of its ramifications can be ascertained.
The IDF on Sunday afternoon said it has had tremendous successes so far against Iran’s nuclear and ballistic-missile programs, top commanders, and economic targets. Nevertheless, there has not been enough progress to give a clear prediction about when the IAF attacks might substantially deplete Iran’s counterstrikes with ballistic missiles, which have killed 10 Israelis and wounded more than 250, the IDF said.
The successes are very real. If Iran’s nuclear program is still standing and could still constitute a threat due to the facility at Fordow, which the IDF has not struck, it is heavily damaged and less of an immediate potential threat to rapidly break out to a nuclear weapon or multiple weapons.
The harm to Iran’s command apparatus will have far-reaching short- and long-term consequences in terms of their effectiveness.
But regarding Iran’s conventional ballistic-missile threat, the picture remains extremely hazy.
Iran already fired about 300 ballistic missiles at Israel during its April 2024 and October 2024 attacks, more than 200 this past Friday to Saturday, another mass salvo on Saturday to Sunday, and more on Sunday afternoon. Israeli officials were hinting they believe Tehran potentially could fire at least several hundred more.
The IAF has struck a large number of ballistic missiles and their launchers, including a major underground site with dozens of ballistic missiles. But the IDF is either keeping a tight lid on Iran’s exact potential number of ballistic missiles, or it does not know the real answer.
If Iran at some point starts firing “only” 50 to 100 missiles per day, and possibly at some point cuts that number to dozens per day, and it had more than 1,000 at the start, it could potentially keep Israel’s home front under heavy fire for weeks or months.
Nevertheless, the IDF said it was critical for the IAF to attack Iran in stages – first removing air-defense systems, top commanders, and the highly defended Natanz nuclear site.
After that stage, the IDF started focusing more on individual ballistic-missile sites and attack vehicles, although this is difficult because they are mobile and IAF aircraft must fly back to Israel for fuel at various points.
Defense Minister Israel Katz on Sunday said the IDF rules for Tehran would be the same as the rules for Beirut, where the IDF can pretty much attack unhindered on short notice and with almost no consequences.
Unlike attacking Hezbollah, however, the IDF cannot use overwhelming firepower against Iran every day indefinitely.
Most drones cannot reach Iran, and aircraft take several hours at a time to reach there instead of 15 minutes. Aircraft also require complex midair refueling maneuvers, which require advance planning, unlike striking Hezbollah, which requires little fuel and much less planning.
An IDF officer did say progress has been faster than planned, and that the US military is highly impressed. But that does not answer questions about the extended threat to the Israeli home front.
Right now, the war on Iran has been “worth it” – even with 13 fatalities and 400 wounded – to potentially remove a long-term existential nuclear threat and a short-term ballistic-missile threat.
But will that be true if the number of casualties jumps? Will it be true if Iran can extend the conflict past one or two weeks? Will it be true if some key portions of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not destroyed?
It is too early to judge how this conflict will be viewed in a few days, let alone in a few weeks or longer.