Normalization with Saudi Arabia has become a central issue during the Israel-Hamas war. Despite the great advantages the normalization holds for Israel, the current government is unable – and seemingly unwilling – to take the initiative. In other words, an open process leading to a formal agreement that will bring normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia does not seem to be in the offing.
Yet, journalist Barak Ravid revealed last month that under the umbrella of the US Central Command (CENTCOM,) IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi met secretly in Bahrain in mid-June with senior figures in the armed forces of Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE,) Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.
CENTCOM is a unified combatant command of the US military responsible for operations in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, and plays a crucial role in coordinating military and security efforts among US allies. Such a meeting, particularly with the participation of a Saudi representative, is also a form of normalization. So what exactly is going on?
Normalization has many faces. The term is used in many different contexts and can be confusing. In the context of international relations, its use is usually linked to the establishment of diplomatic relations, sometimes after a conflict.
In Israel, “normalization” has become a codeword for “warm” peace with other countries – as opposed to the situation between Israel and Egypt, and between Israel and Jordan, in which there are diplomatic relations and a “cold” peace, but not “normalization.”
By contrast, in the Arab world, the connotations of “normalization” (tatbi in Arabic) are negative, and thus the term usually preferred is “normal relations.”
Thus, “normalization” should reflect several levels of relations. The first is that of functional formal normalization. This model features cooperation on defense and intelligence, and occasionally also on economic issues. This kind of normalization is mainly based on the existence of common interests and enemies, and it takes place mainly behind the scenes, though it can also have public expressions stemming from the existence of diplomatic relations.
Cooperation is conducted between formal representatives in the royal court, the president’s office, the military, intelligence agencies, and relevant government ministries. This is the model of Israel’s relations with Egypt and Jordan.
The second model is unofficial normalization, characterized by bilateral relations – mainly secret – without the establishment of diplomatic relations. This is the situation in which Israel found itself for many years after independence, up until the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, the Oslo Accords, and the Abraham Accords.
The third model is that of legitimate normalization, characterized by cooperation not only at the government level but also between civil societies. The cooperation is held openly and publicly, albeit with some covert cooperation as well. This is the model of Israel’s relations with the Abraham Accord states – Morocco, the UAE, and Bahrain.
Why do we need a formal agreement?
THE SECRET meeting in Bahrain raises an important question: If Israel is benefiting from military and intelligence cooperation during the war, even as it is being vilified in the Arab world, then what need is there for a formal agreement with Saudi Arabia, especially if Israel is required to agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state in return, or to take some concrete steps toward this outcome?
There are several answers to this question: First, in the absence of any real progress on the Palestinian issue, Israel is liable to return to its former status in the Middle East – that of a mistress with whom dealings are held behind the scenes, but without such transactions being publicly acknowledged.
Israel’s decision-makers had no choice but to accept this status because the rulers of Arab states feared for their lives and their legitimacy. Without any formal commitment, such relations are vulnerable and unstable, at the mercy of circumstances, interests, and the consequences of their own exposure.
Second, Israel’s ability to cooperate economically with Arab states is dependent on the existence of a warm legitimate peace. The relations that developed with the Abraham Accord countries are an example. Building significant diplomatic and economic ties is only possible when there is openness.
Thus, for example, the Negev Forum, created to combat Iran’s efforts to attain military nuclear capability, held its first meeting (and to date, its last meeting) in March 2022, with representatives in attendance from Israel, the United States, Egypt, Morocco, Bahrain, and the UAE, while Jordan and the Palestinian Authority were also invited.
Trade with the UAE had reached around three billion dollars before October 7. Moreover, according to the Abraham Accords Report, for the first five months of 2024, bilateral trade between Israel and the UAE was $1.39 billion, constituting an 8% increase from the first five months of 2023.
A smaller increase also occurred in the volume of trade between Israel and Morocco, Egypt, and Bahrain. A decrease in trade (17%) occurred with Jordan, while Turkey announced a complete ban, though figures are not yet available.
Economic cooperation of this kind with Saudi Arabia can only happen when diplomatic relations exist; the economic possibilities with Saudi Arabia are much greater. There is also the possibility of realizing President Joe Biden’s proposed economic corridor from India to the Mediterranean and Europe, via Saudi Arabia – an ambitious infrastructure project aimed at connecting India to Europe through the Middle East.
Third, Israel is already becoming a pariah state in the international arena. Moreover, there is a risk that further escalation would even damage the secret cooperation held with states in the region. Ending the war, with a linkage to a regional process vis-à-vis the Saudis, will halt and even reverse this process, and might expand the circle of countries that normalize relations with Israel.
And finally, it is in Israel’s interest to offer a vision for a solution to the Palestinian issue, as all attempts to bypass this problem have failed.
The fact that quiet normalization continues with the moderate Arab countries during the war is an important sign of the strong existing interests behind this alliance.
The writer teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a board member of Mitvim –The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.