The political landscape in Israel among repatriates from the former USSR has undergone significant changes following the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel. A recent poll conducted in collaboration with the Midgam Institute reveals key shifts in their political orientations, leadership preferences, and pressing concerns. These findings underscore evolving attitudes within this demographic in response to the heightened security challenges.
One of the most striking developments is the shift toward right-wing positions. Those identifying as “very right-wing” rose from 6.4% before the attack to 7.2% after it. While the proportion of “right-wing” respondents slightly decreased from 34% to 32.8%, support for the “center-right” jumped from 24.7% to 28%.
The number of centrists remained mostly unchanged, while the collective representation of “very leftist,” “leftist,” and “Center-Left” respondents dropped from 8.9% to 6.8%. These trends indicate a noticeable movement toward Right-leaning political stances, largely driven by security concerns, a trend that may persist as Israel continues its military operations in Gaza and Lebanon.
Respondents were also asked to share the key influences shaping their political views. A majority (61%) said they formed their opinions independently, either before or after repatriation. Media also played a significant role, with 26.5% crediting Hebrew-language media and 9.4% citing Russian-language media as influential. Other significant factors included family (25.1%) and acquaintances (12.9%), with smaller percentages attributing their opinions to other repatriates from the former USSR (2.8%) and other countries (3.9%).
When it comes to pressing concerns, security topped the list for 63.5% of respondents, followed by economic issues (38.9%). Concerns over Israel’s future as a democratic state were expressed by 20.9%, while other issues such as personal financial stability (19.9%), Israel’s future as a Jewish state (17.2%), societal tensions (15.1%), and trust in state institutions (11.8%) were also noted. Israel’s stance on the war in Ukraine was a major concern for only 2.5% of respondents.
In terms of leadership preferences, 57.3% of respondents indicated that Israel needs a strong leader who can make decisive choices without influence from the Knesset, media, or public opinion. While 51.2% see Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as a strong leader, the Likud party has experienced a sharp decline in support. In 2022, 23.7% of repatriates voted for Likud, but now only 11.8% plan to support the party in the next election.
Liberman viewed more favorably than Netanyahu
Avigdor Liberman, leader of Yisrael Beytenu party, is viewed more favorably than Netanyahu, with 55.7% of respondents describing him as a strong leader. Yair Lapid, leader of Yesh Atid party, fares less well, with only 23.5% considering him strong, while 63.6% view him as weak. Benny Gantz, head of the National Unity party, is seen as moderately strong by 25.7% of respondents, but 36.2% consider him weak.
Favorability ratings show Liberman as the most well-regarded leader, with 57.3% of respondents expressing a positive opinion of him. Netanyahu has the highest disapproval rating, with 66.4% viewing him unfavorably. Gantz and Lapid receive moderate favorability ratings, at 45.1% and 37.9%, respectively.
Liberman’s favorability corresponds with increased support for Yisrael Beytenu, now the most popular party among these repatriates, with 30.1% planning to vote for it in the next election, up from 20.9% in 2022. Support for Yesh Atid has dropped significantly, from 19% in the previous election to 9.8%, while National Unity is polling at 13.2%, up from its 2022 result of 12.2%, when Gantz ran together with Gideon Sa’ar and his party, which was then called New Hope. However, with Sa’ar now part of Netanyahu’s coalition, his party has garnered only limited support, standing at only 3.1% among Russian-speaking repatriates.
Otzma Yehudit, led by National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir, which ran in the previous elections together with the Religious Zionist Party, headed by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, received 4.6% of the vote in 2022. Their current support remains almost unchanged, with Otzma Yehudit polling at 4% and the Religious Zionist Party at 0.8%. This contrasts with the situation of the Meretz and Labor parties, which have now merged under the leadership of Yair Golan into a new party called Democrats. While Meretz secured 1% and Labor 1.6% in the previous elections, the Democrats party is projected to receive 2.1% in this poll, which is 0.5% lower than their combined result two years ago.
It is notable that the ultra-Orthodox parties, United Torah Judaism, led by Yitzhak Goldknopf, and SHAS, headed by Arie Deri, are projected to receive 1% and 0.5% of the Russian-speaking vote, respectively, in the upcoming elections. This represents a slight decline from the previous elections, where United Torah Judaism received 1.4% and Shas garnered 0.7%.
This drop in support is likely tied to their stance on the contentious issue of drafting the ultra-Orthodox into the military. It is also important to note that sociologists estimate that Russian-speaking voters account for about 14-15 mandates in Israeli elections, meaning that approximately 6.5%-7% of this electorate is equivalent to one mandate.
A striking 79.3% of voters from the former USSR identify as secular, with an additional 14% describing themselves as traditional but not observing Shabbat. As a result, the overwhelming majority of these repatriates do not vote for ultra-Orthodox parties, and their support for the other coalition parties remains relatively low.
According to this poll, Netanyahu’s coalition is backed by just 21.2% of these voters, roughly equating to three mandates. Interestingly, this figure is even lower than Netanyahu’s personal favorability rating, which stands at 28%.
This discrepancy highlights an important conclusion: Favorability ratings and personal perceptions of political leaders do not necessarily translate into voting behavior. Respondents may view certain politicians favorably or rate them highly as leaders, but this doesn’t always mean they will vote for them.
Furthermore, many polls seen in the media often overlook the crucial 14-15 mandates represented by Russian-speaking voters, whose preferences have shifted dramatically since the last elections. As a result, when the next elections come around, we may once again see media outlets caught off guard, as their polls and even exit polls fail to account for these mandates, which have quietly moved across the political spectrum.
The writer is a researcher at Hadassah Academic College and a former Yisrael Beytenu MK.