The new FBI in America faces a significant challenge that has intensified with the arrival of the new director, Kash Patel: the expansive terrorism network of the Islamic Republic’s regime. This concern stems not just from the overt terrorist activities, but also from the intricate and broad networks that the Islamic Republic has cultivated to further its international objectives.
Recently appointed as the director of one of the world's most pivotal security and intelligence agencies—the FBI—Patel confronts formidable challenges that are directly tied to the strategies and tactics of the mullah’s regime in Iran. The persistent and principal issue, which continues to inflict harm, is linked to the Islamic Republic of Iran and the mullah regime in Tehran. To effectively counter these imminent threats, the FBI must enhance its strategies and continuously innovate in its research methodologies and information gathering techniques.
First Point: The Islamic terrorism network clearly demonstrates how the Islamic Republic, using complex mechanisms and significant resources, manages and directs between 11 to 21 different terrorist groups and more than 11 dangerous cartels. Beyond the Middle East, in Africa, Europe, and Latin America, groups affiliated with the Islamic Republic undertake actions that leave profound regional and international impacts. These groups, often operating underground and using complex communication networks, carry out their destructive activities under the guise of civil or humanitarian actions.
For the new FBI, finding these organic connections between dangerous and destructive networks is a challenging task. This difficulty is not only due to the secrecy and encryption of information by these groups but also due to the lack of accurate and up-to-date information. Although the Counterterrorism Division of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security was well aware of the complexities of these networks from 2017 to 2021, their strategies have always faced challenges. Even after the assassination of Qasem Soleimani by the CIA during Donald Trump's first presidency, the FBI did not accurately predict the reactions of the Islamic Republic within U.S. territory, inadvertently contributing to an increase in threats. They acted arrogantly, unwilling to heed the opinions and analyses of other parts of the U.S. security and intelligence community, which in turn created blind spots in their assessments.
Second Point: The sleeper terrorist cells of the Islamic Republic of Iran within U.S. soil represent a multidimensional and complex threat. These cells are controlled and managed by the Ministry of Intelligence, the Revolutionary Guards, and the Quds Force, each of which has a dedicated "America desk." The existence of these desks indicates a high level of focus and expertise in activities related to America, directing extensive and targeted operations on American soil.
Agents from all three organizations in North and South America are managed from within the embassies and consulates of the Islamic Republic, and specific missions are assigned to them. This tactic, involving the use of diplomatic covers for espionage and terrorist activities, creates significant challenges for the FBI, as arresting and dealing with these individuals without violating international laws is difficult.
Third Point: The propaganda machine network of the Islamic Republic is hidden under various umbrellas, including charitable organizations, religious institutions, Persian media affiliated with the U.S. government (most of whose experts and guests are despised individuals affiliated with the Islamic Republic), infamous lobbies supporting the Islamic Republic (which attempt to infiltrate the political corridors of Washington and English-language media in America), and the academic network and educational centers that strive to echo the propaganda machine of the Islamic Republic within America. These networks are active not only on Iranian soil, known as "Islamic Republic 1," but also extensively on American and European soils as "Islamic Republic 2."
During the Obama and Biden administrations, the FBI did not show any inclination to scrutinize religious institutions. Persian media outlets like VOA Persian and RFE/RL, which are affiliated with the U.S. government, have been largely ineffective and have not contributed positively to U.S. policy, only draining the budget. To date, the FBI has also not shown any willingness to shut down infamous pro-regime lobbies, such as NIAC and Quincy, which support the Islamic Republic from within American soil.
Furthermore, the FBI has not demonstrated any tendency to expel professors and experts who disseminate the destructive ideology of Khomeinism on American soil. This failure to tackle the influential networks of the Islamic Republic stems not only from a lack of political will but also from a deficiency in effective strategies to identify and counter these influences. Unless the FBI revises its policies, the secondary propaganda machinery of the Islamic Republic will continue to operate actively within the United States.
Fourth Point: The challenge of discovering agents affiliated with the Islamic Republic remains. The FBI lacks precise knowledge and correct guesses about the activities and operations of the Islamic Republic within American soil. However, FBI analysts are certainly aware that the mullah-led Islamic Republic, under various covers and signs, possesses a very complex and closed security and intelligence system that makes accessing reliable information difficult. This complex system includes intelligence networks that are actively operating worldwide and use various techniques to protect their information.
This intricate network contributes to the increase in cyber attacks against America. These threats can include cyber espionage or attacks on vital infrastructures. These attacks are designed not only for destruction or disruption but also as part of a long-term strategy to gather information and gain strategic superiority.
Indeed, alongside the CIA, the FBI also needs to upgrade its capabilities to counter cyber threats. This improvement must include strengthening technological capabilities, updating training courses for personnel, and developing new strategies to identify and counter new enemy tactics. Moreover, international collaborations to counter these threats must be strengthened, as the Islamic Republic does not operate only in one geographic region, and its effects are globally visible.
Some advice to the FBI
As a counterterrorism analyst, I stress the importance of recognizing challenges and security strategies. The FBI, as a domestic judicial entity in the United States, encounters significant legal constraints when conducting international operations. These constraints substantially affect the agency's ability to monitor and counteract threats from the criminal ayatollah’s regime in Iran. Moreover, the intricate political and security dynamics between the United States and Iran, often shaped by political tensions and sanctions, impact the FBI's operational effectiveness.
To counter threats from Iran effectively, the FBI must engage in close collaboration with other international intelligence and security agencies. This collaboration should encompass the exchange of information, coordination of joint operations, and leveraging shared experiences in combating terrorist networks. Such partnerships are crucial in bolstering capabilities to identify and prevent terrorist activities, thereby enhancing national security.
Additionally, the FBI must bolster its technological infrastructure and enhance its cyber capabilities to effectively counter the malign activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Given the escalation of cyber threats capable of damaging critical American infrastructure, this enhancement entails advanced training for personnel, the development of sophisticated technological tools, and the formulation of innovative methods to identify and neutralize threats.
Lastly, the challenges and obstacles the FBI encounters in combating the Islamic Republic of Iran demand continual vigilance and revision. This process should include persistent threat assessments, updates to strategies, and enhancements in international cooperation to ensure that the agency operates at its highest efficiency.