Since the outbreak of the war, several Arab states have played supportive roles – Egypt and Qatar as mediators, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan in providing humanitarian aid to Gaza, and Saudi Arabia through its diplomatic efforts – but as a collective, the Arab League has not been an important actor.
The exception to this was the Arab and Islamic summit hosted by Saudi Arabia in November 2023. However, aside from declarations against Israel and calls for a diplomatic solution based on the two-state approach, with borders along the lines of 1967, this summit did not result in any practical action.
There are two explanations for the weak Arab response. First, there is the continuing decline of the Arab League as an institution for addressing Arab issues.
Since its formation – and that of the Arab Summit, its supreme body – it has experienced many failures, although it has also been credited with some significant achievements, such as thwarting Iraq’s threat to invade Kuwait in 1961, halting the civil war in Lebanon in 1976, and adopting the Arab Peace Initiative, among others.
The second reason is the general reluctance to intervene in Gaza until the war has ended. This is especially relevant to the Gulf states, which can contribute substantial funds toward the rebuilding of Gaza, but will not do so until the fighting is over.
The convening of the emergency summit on March 4 – symbolically called the “Palestine Summit” – was an Arab response to US President Donald Trump’s idea for Palestinian emigration from Gaza. Though the idea is flawed and impracticable, it has forced the Arab states to formulate their own counterproposal.
What Trump did not take into account was that striking at the Arab holy cow – the Palestinian problem – would unite the Arab states, thus forcing the moderate Arab states to fall into line with more extreme positions.
Most of the leaders of the Arab states attended the summit, including the new Syrian president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who was making his first appearance at the supreme Arab institution.
However, the Saudi crown prince and the president of the United Arab Emirates chose to send their foreign ministers, seemingly after they realized which way the wind was blowing. For Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the conference was an opportunity to give a show of Arab leadership.
Hamas is not mentioned
The concluding statement issued by the summit was worded in a rhetoric characteristic of Arab conferences and reflects the lowest common denominator on which Arab consensus could be achieved. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the statement includes condemnations of Israel. On the other hand, Hamas is not mentioned at all.
IGNORING THE negative rhetoric toward Israel, the Arab proposals can be summarized as follows:
A call for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force not only in the Gaza Strip but also in the West Bank; a reaffirmation of the Arab strategic decision to pursue peace, as outlined in the Arab Peace Initiative, which would guarantee the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people through the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with east Jerusalem as its capital; a total rejection of all acts of violence, terrorism, and extremism; full opposition to any attempt to uproot Palestinians from their land; a warning against annexations in the West Bank that could lead the region into a renewed cycle of violence; adoption of the Egyptian plan for the reconstruction of Gaza (see below); a call to convene, at the earliest possible time, an international conference to discuss reconstruction and raise funds; and a call for the full implementation of the ceasefire, including Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza and the Philadelphi Corridor.
Interestingly, the statement refers to a Palestinian agreement to establish a temporary, local, technocratic administration in Gaza, “under the umbrella of a Palestinian government,” alongside efforts to help restore the Palestinian Authority to Gaza, following necessary reforms within both the PA and the PLO. In the meantime, Egypt’s foreign minister has announced that the individuals who will serve in this administration have already been selected.
Egypt and Jordan, for their part, have pledged to train Palestinian police units in preparation for the PA’s return to Gaza. The statement also calls on Israel to honor the ceasefire agreement with Lebanon, cease its acts of aggression in Syria, and withdraw its forces to the lines outlined in the 1974 Disengagement Agreement.
Iraq and Tunisia, for their part, expressed their reservations about the use of the terms “two-state solution,” “June 4, 1967,” and “east Jerusalem,” thus indicating their disapproval of the 2002 Arab Peace Plan.
Before the summit, the media highlighted the 91-page document outlining the Egyptian reconstruction plan. The total cost of the plan is estimated at $53 billion, to be invested in three stages: $3b. immediately; $20b. in the second phase, which includes debris removal, construction of public and residential buildings, and land improvement; and $30b. in the third phase, which focuses on constructing industrial zones, ports, and an airport.
To raise the necessary funding, Egypt plans to host a conference with the participation of representatives from the international community.
It is worth noting that following Operation Cast Lead in 2014, Cairo hosted a similar conference in which donor countries pledged $3.5b. However, only about half of this amount was actually transferred, due to concerns that, despite the establishment of a mechanism to bypass Hamas, most of the funds would ultimately go toward strengthening the organization and financing its terrorist activities, as was observed in practice.
THE SUMMIT highlighted several paradoxes: First, though a reconstruction plan was adopted, it is unclear where the funding will come from, as no country has committed to allocating funds yet. This is due to the fact that the war has not yet ended, and there is no guarantee that fighting will not resume.
Second, with the exception of assistance with training police forces, no Arab country is willing to intervene in Gaza. In other words, the Arab states view Gaza as a burden for which they have no desire to take responsibility.
Moreover, the statement – which, as noted, does not mention Hamas at all – fails to explain how the organization will be dismantled and removed and how technocrats will be able to take over the management of Gaza.
Additionally, the summit failed to offer Israel any incentive by linking the solution of the Gaza problem to a comprehensive settlement, aside from a vague reference to the Arab Peace Initiative, from which two states have already withdrawn.
Ultimately, the summit did not produce a useful and effective tool in the immediate term for negotiations over Gaza. It did, however, grant vague Arab approval for the removal of Hamas, opening the way for an alternative Palestinian ruling body. This approval will be significant in the longer term, when this question becomes a more realistic one. In the meantime, the path to that outcome remains shrouded in uncertainty.
The writer teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a board member of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.