Writing during the French mandate of post-World War I Lebanon, celebrated poet-patriot Kahlil Gibran mused, “You have your Lebanon, and I have my Lebanon,” effectively expressing the duality of a country caught between East and West and the danger of its demise. Almost a century since Gibran’s words and exactly 50 years after the start of the country’s civil war, it seems that nobody has Lebanon.
The Islamic regime of Iran is largely to blame for Lebanon’s isolation, as its most powerful proxy Hezbollah has infiltrated all aspects of Lebanese society while also launching attacks on Israel’s northern border.
Furthermore, the influx of Syrian refugees has strained Lebanon’s limited resources, which, in turn, has weakened the central government. Lebanon’s stability – in fact, Lebanon’s existence – has been in question for decades.
To be sure, recent developments, such as the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and the pager attack against rank-and-file members, have pushed the militant group on its back foot – while the election of army commander Joseph Aoun to the presidency has greatly improved Lebanon’s prospects. The hope that Beirut, and not the Bekaa Valley Hezbollah stronghold, will decide Lebanon’s future seems at long last plausible.
Yet, this small country is still far from reaching its outsized and historic potential as a multicultural, multi-confessional, and tolerant sovereign state. Most importantly, Hezbollah’s patron, the Islamic regime of Iran, though teetering on its own structural flaws, remains defiantly standing. And, until Israel feels secure on its northern border, Lebanon will remain in a state of siege.
Can the US play a role in shaping Lebanon’s future?
Can US President Donald Trump navigate Lebanon out of its isolation and away from Tehran? There is already cause for optimism.
Lebanon was the first planned trip by the United States deputy special envoy to the Middle East Morgan Ortagus, who upon her arrival set a clear and friendly agenda by declaring America’s “commitment” and goodwill to “this sophisticated country with amazing people” while declaring that “the end of Hezbollah’s reign of terror in Lebanon and around the world has started.”
Ortagus had good reason to be positive. The Trump administration had just allocated $95 million to help support the Lebanese Armed Forces.
“An infusion of cash to the right hands is always a good idea,” said Firas Maksad, a Lebanese American policy director at the Eurasia Group. “Beirut has no money to support its soldiers and many of them are forced to supplement their small salary as food delivery workers after they come off their shift. You cannot run a country like that.”
Lebanon has a complicated power-sharing structure that has defined the country since 1943. Power is allocated to the “troika” of a Maronite Christian president, a Sunni prime minister, and a Shi’ite speaker of the Parliament. Considering that the population is also split three ways, Lebanon has clear sociopolitical fault lines.
Nevertheless, the American envoy has positive words for the Lebanese government: “The dynamic between [president] Aoun and [Prime Minister Nawaf] Salam is refreshing to see… Two patriots working in tandem.”
Trump positions Lebanon as an ally
Trump is keen to signal that Lebanon is no longer viewed as an appendage to Israel’s security but as an aspiring ally. “We welcome the American president’s efforts in judging us for our potential, not our past,” said a high-ranking Lebanese official. “We will see if he will change his mind,” continued the official, who wished to remain anonymous.
Change is warranted considering that Iran has been an opportunistic player in Lebanon both before and after the Islamic revolution. In the early 1970s, while Beirut was thumping with the vibrancy of a European capital – it was often called the Paris of the Middle East – the PLO was training anti-shah militia to help launch a revolution in Iran.
It was also in Lebanon that cassette tapes of Ayatollah Khomeini’s virulent sermons were duplicated and sent to flood the streets of Iran. Secretly, Lebanon was used to launch both the militia and the misinformation campaign that toppled the shah in 1979.
To bring back the Lebanon of Gibran, we must counter the Islamic regime both ideologically and operationally. For example, bolstering the LAF in manpower, money, and morale can raise the economic power of the Lebanese who are reeling from high inflation and unemployment. Furthermore, it can instill a sense of cohesion that advances shared ideals and encourages civil participation.
A united Lebanon will transform the ecosystem from which Hezbollah recruits, as it will be the state (and not Hezbollah) that will provide housing, healthcare, education, and other public goods to poor and underserved Shi’ite communities. Moreover, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) can be restructured as a prosperity-building mission to help Lebanon rebuild.
Finally, in keeping with the spirit of this administration, Lebanon should become the next Riviera, as it used to be 50 years ago. To that end, a strong diplomatic push to include Lebanon in the Abraham Accords would invite FDI and signal to Tehran that the country is no longer its playing field.
Socioeconomic incentives backed by a strong American commitment is the right course of action. It will take time, but after 50 years of Iran-induced solitude, the Lebanese might be willing to wait a bit longer.
The writer is an associate fellow at the Middle East Institute and holds a PhD in Iranian Studies. She is currently working on her book about narratives of grievance in US foreign policy.