The Middle East, a region perpetually marred by conflict and geopolitical entanglements, reached an unparalleled crescendo of chaos following the heinous attacks of October 7, 2023.
The orchestrated aggressions—emanating from Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, supplemented by a constellation of Iranian-aligned militias across Yemen, Iraq, and Syria—underscored the region’s fragile architecture. The Israeli government's response has spurred significant changes in the governmental structures of both Lebanon and Syria, with implications for other entities. In particular, new governments have assumed office in both countries following the sharp decline in Hezbollah's power in Lebanon and the removal of Assad’s regime in Syria.
But the key question—will the new governments in Lebanon and Syria yield the transformation the region and the world expect—requires considerable thought. I argue that these new governmental structures are not sustainable because none addresses the fundamental problem of the entrenched sectarian gridlocks in both countries.
Why are the new governments in Lebanon and Syria unsustainable?
While immediate military responses and fleeting diplomatic negotiations often dominate headlines, these measures seldom address the underlying fissures that perpetuate instability. A sustainable future for the Middle East demands bold, structural re-imagination—a disentangling of nation-states and the emergence of smaller, sovereign entities reflective of the region’s diverse communal and sectarian identities. This concept, proposed for Lebanon, finds equal, if not greater, relevance in the case of Syria.
Designing a new geo-strategic structural order in the Middle East necessitates complex, multi-layered, and multi-faceted changes if a fundamental transformation of the region's geopolitical order and the realization of more sustainable solutions are to be achieved. This begins with reframing how political leaders and policy makers perceive, interpret and act upon critical grand challenges. Rather than following artificial borders these leaders should seriously consider sectarian strife and communal identities.
The modern state system in the Middle East is a product of historical processes, significantly shaped by imperialist interventions and machinations. The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, an emblem of colonial partitioning, ignored the region’s ethno-sectarian composition, forcing disparate groups into uneasy coexistence.
The significant extension of the frontiers of Lebanon made by the Maronites at the Paris Peace Conference in October 1919, the announcement that Lebanon would become independent (but still under France’s influence) in November 1941, and the elections and their acceptance in 1943 only perpetuated the artificial and problematic geo-political structure and order of this country. Lebanon was an amalgam of Christian Maronites, Sunni and Shia Muslims, Druze, and other communities, whose tenuous alliances disintegrated during its 15-year civil war. Even today, despite the passage of decades, sectarian fault lines remain unhealed.
Syria, much like Lebanon, is a mosaic of communities—Sunni Arabs, Alawites, Kurds, Christians, Druze, and others—whose forced cohabitation under a singular national framework has proven untenable. The Syrian Civil War has underscored the devastating consequences of this unnatural unity. The call of the de facto leader of Syria, Ahmed al-Sharaa, for a unified Syria is based on unfounded pillars. Sonner or later communal groups, propped up by their supporting countries (e.g., Iran, Turkey), would engage in a zero-sum game as they cling to overpower the others.
The current state of fractured sovereignty—a de facto partition in everything but name—offers a glimpse of what could be formalized as a solution: dismantling Lebanon and Syria into smaller sovereign countries based on communal and geographic lines.
Lebanon’s partition into microstate entities and the dismantling Syria into a federation of city-states, based upon ethnic and sectarian realities as well as with community identities, bear some at least two key strategic implications for a new, sustainable geo-political order in these countries and the region as a whole.
First, this would allow for the creation of more homogeneous and stable entities, reducing the potential for intercommunal violence within each country. Second, it would bear implications for the lasting conflict between Israel and neighboring countries. A federation of autonomous zones in Lebanon, coupled with a demilitarized buffer zone in its south, could neutralize Hezbollah’s military dominance and curtail Iranian influence. Similarly, applying this framework to Syria could dilute the power of one patron over the other (each viewing Syria as its proxy), thus fostering a more balanced regional order.
The rationale for Lebanon’s partition into smaller entities—argued as a solution to its entrenched sectarian gridlock—provides a compelling blueprint. The Middle East’s history of imposed unity has yielded relentless cycles of conflict. By embracing the natural diversity of its peoples and reimagining governance through smaller, sovereign entities, the region can chart a new course. Lebanon and Syria, as microcosms of the broader Middle Eastern crisis, present an opportunity to pioneer this paradigm shift.
While the dismantling of existing nation-states may seem radical, it aligns with the realities on the ground. Far from a utopian vision, this model represents a pragmatic approach to ending the cycles of violence and instability that have plagued the region for over a century.
To paraphrase an old adage, good fences—or in this case, good communal borders—make good neighbors. By reshaping the geopolitical map, the Middle East may yet find the peace and prosperity that have long eluded it.
The writer is a professor of strategy and management at Tel Aviv University and is the Lilly and Alejandro Saltiel Chair in Corporate Leadership and Social Responsibility.