‘I have a great relationship with a man named Erdogan – I like him, he likes me, and it drives the media crazy. We never had any problems, although we went through a lot.” With these candid and surprising words, US President Donald Trump characterized his relationship with his Turkish counterpart during a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House.
Trump went even further, adding a more provocative statement when he disclosed a private conversation with Erdogan: “I said, ‘Congratulations, you’ve done what nobody’s been able to do in 2,000 years. You’ve taken over Syria.’ With different names, but same thing.”
In a consequential diplomatic gesture, Trump offered to mediate between Israel, portrayed as the state with the right to exist and hold privilege in the Middle East and Turkey, described as the state with historical Ottoman influence over its former Arab territories. He affirmed his readiness to bridge relations between the two nations.
Against this backdrop, the appointment of Tom Barrack as the new US ambassador to Turkey makes perfect sense. Barrack, well-known for his close ties to Trump, has received extraordinary and comprehensive authority, a clear indicator of the high priority the White House places on relations with Ankara during this decisive period.
According to informed sources, the new ambassador’s mandate focuses on three chief strategic areas: expanding economic and military cooperation between both countries, harmonizing positions on volatile regional questions, and repositioning Turkey as a necessary strategic partner for the United States in the region.
In the current state of intensifying regional competition, Turkey emerges as a historical counterbalance to Iranian and Russian sway.
I believe that the Ottoman legacy serves as one of Ankara’s strongest cards in this strategic power play.
Turkey strategically harnesses the collective memory of Arab populations who lived under Ottoman rule for centuries. While some Arab nationalist movements have promoted negative narratives about the Ottoman era, certain religious factions – particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, designated as a terrorist organization in numerous Arab countries – advocate a more positive interpretation of that historical period, especially in light of the chaos and fragmentation following the Sykes-Picot Agreement.
As the self-proclaimed legitimate heir to the Ottoman Caliphate, Turkey also seeks to participate in managing its “former Arab domains,” as Western analysts often term them, to promote stability and prevent security vacuums that extremist groups might exploit. This accentuates the enduring relevance of Ottoman heritage and Turkish cultural influence throughout these regions.
Energy cooperation makes another decisive strategic dimension, specifically regarding shale oil exploration in Turkey and natural gas development in the eastern Mediterranean.
Economic observers report that American oil companies, especially those with connections to Trump, are eager to invest in Turkey’s shale oil sector, drawing on their substantial experience while also seeking access to Syrian oil and gas resources.
Another opportunity involves Turkey’s potential participation in the EastMed gas pipeline project, a proposed infrastructure initiative designed to transport natural gas from Eastern Mediterranean fields (primarily Israeli and Cypriot) to European markets via Greece and Italy. Currently, this collaborative project between Israel, Cyprus, Greece, and Italy intentionally bypasses Turkish territory.
Recently, amid warming relations between Trump and Erdogan, hints point to possible Turkish involvement in the project, potentially rerouting it through Turkish territory, an alternative that might offer greater economic advantages.
Turkey wants to limit conflict in Syria
The third strategic priority involves carefully avoiding confrontations with Washington’s regional allies, chiefly the Syrian Democratic Forces and Israel.
This context helps explain recent statements by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who revealed ongoing “technical” discussions with Israel, aimed at reducing conflicts in Syria.
“We have no desire for confrontation with Israel in Syria,” Fidan stated unambiguously. He added that Turkey does not intend to enter into conflict with any country in Syria.
In a telling development that supports the thesis of behind-the-scenes Turkish pragmatism, Turkey and Israel held their first official meeting in Azerbaijan on April 10, 2025, establishing a deconfliction line between the two countries in Syria. The Israeli Prime Minister’s office confirmed this meeting the following day.
Turkish diplomatic sources indicated that these technical talks in Azerbaijan mark the commencement of efforts to create reliable communication channels to prevent potential clashes between Turkish and Israeli forces operating in Syria. The meeting occurred after escalating hostilities following Israel’s bombing of Syrian air bases where Turkey had planned to deploy forces.
This diplomatic engagement contradicts Erdogan’s public rhetoric, which has consistently featured harsh criticism of Israel.
It also reveals the dual nature of Turkish foreign policy: fiery anti-Israel rhetoric, for domestic and regional audiences, coupled with practical, pragmatic cooperation with Tel Aviv behind closed doors.
In my assessment, this meeting hardly surprises those familiar with the inner workings of Turkish statecraft. Erdogan, despite his inflammatory public statements regarding Israel, clearly acknowledges the importance of maintaining functional communication channels, given the connected security and economic interests at stake.
These developments, which appear to contradict Erdogan’s combative public statements, expose the true essence of Turkish policy: pragmatism that ultimately overrides ideological considerations.
Evidently, the primary beneficiary of this arrangement is Trump, who stands to secure major economic and political advantages. American companies within his orbit will benefit from lucrative oil and gas deals across Turkey and Syria, while the US president can present his diplomatic tactics to American voters as successful peacemaking in the Middle East without direct military intervention.
For his part, Erdogan receives valuable American political and economic backing that helps mitigate his domestic hurdles while reinforcing his position as an indispensable regional power broker.
The clear losers in this equation are the misled Arab societies in these “former Ottoman territories,” who once again find themselves pawns in great power politics.
Ultimately, what we are witnessing today is a strategic reconfiguration of Middle Eastern power, orchestrated by two pragmatic leaders: Trump, pursuing profitable business opportunities, and Erdogan, determined to maintain power while widening regional authority.
In this grand geopolitical chess match, lofty principles and rhetorical flourishes serve merely as public relations tools, while consequential decisions unfold behind closed doors, propelled by interests rather than values.
The writer is a UAE political analyst and former Federal National Council candidate.