India this month formally halted its participation in the permanent negotiations under the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), citing what it calls Pakistan’s “weaponization of a goodwill agreement.” New Delhi has demanded a fundamental renegotiation of the 1960 World Bank-brokered treaty, which for over six decades governed water sharing between the nuclear-armed neighbors.
Islamabad, already grappling with chronic floods and worsening water stress – driven by a 70% drop in rainfall and snowfall between September 2024 and January 2025 and amid political turmoil following a disputed 2024 national election – has called it an act of aggression.
Collapse of Indus Waters Treaty
The collapse of the IWT, which was once a rare success in India-Pakistan diplomacy, now risks plunging South Asia into a hydro-political crisis with global implications.
The Indus basin sustains the lives of more than 300 million people across India and Pakistan. It is also among the most climate-vulnerable regions on Earth, with Himalayan glaciers retreating faster than anywhere else due to warming temperatures.
Over 90% of Pakistan’s agriculture depends on water from the Indus system, much of which originates upstream in India-administered Jammu and Kashmir. Under the IWT, India retained control over the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej), while Pakistan was allotted the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab), with limited Indian use for hydropower and irrigation.
But the treaty’s logic is fraying. For the past decade, India has accelerated construction of hydroelectric projects such as Kishanganga and Ratle on the western rivers, arguing that these are within the treaty’s design parameters.
Pakistan has objected to nearly every such project, bringing cases to the World Bank’s dispute resolution mechanisms. India now claims that Pakistan is abusing the treaty to stall its right to develop legitimate infrastructure in a region where water security is a national imperative.
India’s decision to pause engagement under the IWT coincides with broader climate anxieties. Glacial melt, erratic monsoons, and declining water tables have pushed the Indus basin into what Pakistani authorities term “hydrological emergency.”
The 2022 floods displaced over 30 million people and destroyed large swathes of Sindh and Balochistan. Just last year, Balochistan again reported severe drinking water shortages and urban displacement linked to riverine stress.
During the 2017 Doklam and 2020 Galwan standoffs, China suspended the sharing of river data with India, raising alarm in New Delhi about the security implications of upstream control.
Chinese hydrological activity
To make matters more complex, China has emerged as a powerful upstream stakeholder. Although not a signatory to the Indus Waters Treaty, Beijing’s strategic control over the Tibetan Plateau – the source of key tributaries of the Indus and Sutlej rivers – gives it immense leverage.
Chinese hydrological activity – including the planned world’s largest Tsangpo Dam at the “Great Bend” on the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra River) and other water diversion projects in Tibet – is often opaque and conducted without regional consultation.
Meanwhile, Chinese state media increasingly frames water as a domain of “eco-civilization,” offering technical cooperation to both India and Pakistan.
However, Chinese-funded infrastructure projects in Pakistan-administered Gilgit-Baltistan, such as the Diamer-Bhasha Dam and a proposed cross-border railway, reflect China’s growing presence in a region India views as sovereign territory under illegal occupation. These actions, under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), heighten Indian concerns that China is using water infrastructure to strengthen its strategic foothold in South Asia.
The threat here is not just bilateral. The breakdown of the IWT could set off a regional precedent. Bangladesh, Nepal, and Afghanistan all have unresolved water-sharing tensions with their neighbors, often compounded by cross-border political mistrust and climate volatility.
If the longest-surviving water-sharing treaty in modern history can collapse, what guarantees exist for others?
For Israel and the United States, this crisis is instructive. Both countries have historically supported back-channel diplomacy to prevent India-Pakistan escalation – particularly after nuclearization. Washington was central to facilitating the original IWT in 1960. Today, its silence amid the treaty’s unraveling is conspicuous.
For Israel, with its renowned water-tech expertise and experience managing cross-border water diplomacy, this could be an opportunity for constructive engagement – perhaps via trilateral or multilateral forums promoting sustainable water governance.
At a minimum, this crisis must prompt urgent multilateral attention.
Water-sharing frameworks need to evolve beyond 20th-century rights to address 21st-century risks. Climate change is no longer a backdrop – it is the central variable. The next flood, glacier burst, or prolonged dry season in the Indus Basin could drive one or more actors toward irreversible escalation, with the worst-case scenario being an all-out war that risks drawing in global superpowers.
The writer is an India-based lawyer specializing in cross-border trade and investments and a senior fellow with the South Asia Democratic Forum in Brussels.