Over the past few months, several developments in Lebanon have prompted observers to ask whether the Lebanese state is finally moving to confront Hezbollah’s grip over the country.
There have been a number of positive government-led actions, such as arrests of Hezbollah-linked individuals, symbolic changes in public spaces, and stronger rhetoric from top officials . However, these moves still do not signify a full-scale confrontation with Hezbollah or its entrenched power.
One of the more notable developments was the Lebanese government’s decision to remove pro-Hezbollah signs and symbols from public roads and highways, particularly in areas under Hezbollah influence. This was accompanied by the arrest of 30 individuals employed at Beirut’s international airport, a move reportedly linked to an effort to curb Hezbollah’s infiltration of critical infrastructure for smuggling purposes.
Significant shift
Additionally, a significant shift has occurred in airport operations: Iranian flights that previously landed frequently in Beirut – suspected of transferring weapons and cash to Hezbollah – have reportedly ceased. On April 30, Agence France Press cited a Lebanese security official as claiming that the Lebanese Armed Forces dismantled over 90% of Hezbollah’s infrastructure south of the Litani River since the November 2024 ceasefire went into effect. There is no confirmation or proof of that.
The Lebanese president reportedly stated on April 16 that he plans to disarm Hezbollah this year, though Hezbollah responded to that statement with a firm “No.”
The Lebanese Armed Forces began reporting activities designed to remove some of Hezbollah's terror infrastructure from southern Lebanon, such as the April 8 report about the LAF finding a launcher and two rockets in the Tyre area.
Strict supervision
Further encouraging voices have come from the highest levels of the Lebanese state. On April 11, President Joseph Aoun, along with Transportation and Public Works Minister Fayez Rasamny, paid an unannounced visit to the Port of Beirut. Aoun stressed the need for strict governmental supervision over port activities, emphasizing proper documentation and full enforcement of regulations.
Aoun also floated the idea of gradually integrating Hezbollah operatives into the official LAF.
He explicitly rejected the notion of a separate force, such as Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units, instead suggesting Hezbollah members could be absorbed individually, through official military training channels as was done with other militias following the Lebanese Civil War.
On the surface, such moves and statements suggest a realignment of the Lebanese state against Hezbollah’s dominance. Optimists interpret this as a turning point, fueled by Hezbollah’s major losses in the recent conflict with Israel and by the weakening of its regional patron, Iran, and the fall of its ally, the Assad regime in Syria.
According to this view, Hezbollah’s internal opponents have gained confidence and political space, and Lebanon might finally be able to reclaim full sovereignty and dismantle the “state within a state” structure that Hezbollah has maintained for decades.
Approach with caution
However, this perspective must be approached with caution. While the atmosphere may feel different, the deeper patterns are all too familiar. Lebanon has been here before. After major political shocks – such as the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri in 2005 and the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah – similar hopes also surfaced. National dialogues were initiated, promises of disarmament were made, and pressure from the international community intensified. Yet in those instances, Hezbollah emerged not weakened, but stronger. It rebuilt, rearmed, and consolidated its hold at both the political and military levels, often with the passive or even active cooperation of elements within the Lebanese state.
The October 7, 2023, mass murder attacks teach us to evaluate actions, not rhetoric. The true test is not found in symbolic acts, but in whether Hezbollah’s ability to operate as a military and political power is being materially diminished. Recent Israeli activity offers a stark contrast. In just the past few weeks, Israel has eliminated over 140 Hezbollah terror operatives, including commanders from key operational branches – smuggling networks, special forces, and Radwan operatives.
UNIFIL and Hezbollah's bank
Over 40% of these strikes occurred south of the Litani River, an area where Hezbollah’s presence is supposed to be forbidden under UN Security Council Resolution 1701. These figures highlight a central reality: Israel, not the Lebanese Armed Forces or UNIFIL, is the one actively enforcing the terms of Resolution 1701.
UNIFIL, for its part, turned out to be a harmful element when it comes to the mission of disarming Hezbollah.
Another critical gap lies in Hezbollah’s civilian infrastructure. Despite being designated a terrorist organization by the United States, Hezbollah’s financial institutions, like its bank Al-Qard al-Hasan, continue to operate openly in Lebanon. These civilian arms are not secondary – they are the logistical and ideological enablers of Hezbollah’s military apparatus.
As long as this network remains intact – running schools, distributing aid, managing reconstruction, and indoctrinating youth – the foundation for future military resurgence remains intact. Even now, while Hezbollah faces logistical, resupply, and operational setbacks, the support structure that will eventually allow it to recover is functional.
Dismantling institutions
For real change to occur, Lebanon must act against both arms of Hezbollah: the visible military formations and the civilian systems.
This would require the Lebanese state not only to arrest operatives but to dismantle financial and social institutions tied to the group. It would also require a clear break from the fiction that Hezbollah can coexist within the Lebanese political system while maintaining a private army and foreign allegiance.
There are currently no signs that the LAF is willing or able to undertake such a challenge. There are occasional reports of weapons caches being discovered, but these pale in comparison to the scale and specificity of intelligence-driven operations carried out by the IDF.
Hezbollah’s weapons remain hidden across southern Lebanon, Beirut, and other areas under its influence. The quantity of weapons that likely remains in the areas that the IDF didn't maneuver in reflects a simple fact: Lebanon’s security forces have not significantly altered the status quo.
Hezbollah in Beirut
Recent Israeli strikes in Beirut reflect the presence of Hezbollah arms in the Lebanese capital. On April 27, the Israeli Air Force struck a building in Dahiyeh, southern Beirut, containing precision missiles, according to the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit. On March 28, a strike targeted a building in Dahiyeh that the IDF said was housing Hezbollah drones.
Intentions are irrelevant when assessing national security threats by terror groups. Despite its leadership crisis, Hezbollah’s infrastructure – military and civilian – remains largely intact, and Lebanon’s central institutions have yet to demonstrate that they can, or will, impose meaningful limits on its power. An important action in the right direction could be a Lebanese government order to close Al-Qard al-Hasan, Hezbollah's bank in the country.
While recent developments in Lebanon may appear to signal a shift in posture toward Hezbollah, history and current evidence suggest extreme caution.
Until there is demonstrable and sustained Lebanese action that matches the scale of Israeli efforts to dismantle Hezbollah’s threat, optimism about a new era in Lebanon should remain cautious and conditional.
The increase of efforts by the Lebanese authorities to degrade Hezbollah will inevitably up the chances of a Lebanese civil war – one of the key reasons why such efforts were not made before the current war. However, the alternative is worse: A reality in which Hezbollah emerges stronger from the current conflict, as has occurred in the past.
There is now an excellent opportunity to bring change to Lebanon. It is in the hands of the Lebanese, and they must not miss it.
The writer, an IDF Lt. Col. (res.), is founder and president of the Alma Research and Education Center. She served for 15 years in the IDF Intelligence Corps, initially in research and analysis and later with the Northern Command.