In February 2012, I was privileged to have been selected to be Israel’s representative at then-US secretary of state Hillary Clinton’s Economic Diplomacy Summit in Washington. Representatives of 180 countries with whom the US had diplomatic relations were joined by an equal number of US corporate executives, gathering at the Department of State for two days of deliberations on how bilateral economic activity between countries could contribute to world peace.
During breakout sessions, I was in discussions with other delegates from the MENA (Middle East-North Africa) region, and we deliberated over the potential long-term benefits of joint economic activity in this region. Even at that time, logical voices agreed that a solid basis for addressing the challenges that we face in this region could be the development of ongoing economic activity between countries in the area.
In many ways, that conference was one of the early activities that ultimately led to the signing of the Abraham Accords in the first Trump administration.
Former US president Barack Obama and secretary Clinton understood that economic diplomacy had the potential to unleash the real benefit from countries trading with each other in a framework of constructive diplomacy that would lead to future functional diplomatic relations as well. It was a near perfect example of the benefits of traditional diplomacy.
Fast forward 13 years to last week’s visit by President Donald Trump to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. While the press reported on the economic successes of the visit, whatever the long-term benefits of those might be, the trip was a clear example of transactional diplomacy rather than (traditional) economic diplomacy.
Truth be told, the results were all in the realm of “here’s what I can do for you; what can you do for me?”
Transactional diplomacy with Qatar and Saudi Arabia
Qatar is a good example. The US agreed to continue to maintain a huge military base in the country, which provides a significant boost to its economy. In return, the Emir of Qatar offered to gift the US president a 13-year old $400 million Boeing 747-8 for use as Air Force One, ultimately to end up owned by the Trump presidential library foundation for his personal use after he leaves office. It’s gift, by the way, that he cannot accept under the US constitution’s emolument restrictions.
And, of course, the US will conveniently forgive and forget Qatar’s hosting of Hamas’s leadership for years in luxurious surroundings, its extensive funding of Hamas’s operations in Gaza and Qatar’s abysmal human rights behavior. After all, we’re all friends now.
In Saudi Arabia, the leadership promised to make investments in the US of $645 billion in return for which it will supply the Saudis with huge amounts of advanced weaponry that will make them the world’s largest buyer of US defense equipment. In addition, the US president gets approval to build four new Trump resorts there as well.
Oh, and while we are at it, we’re friends now so we’ll just forget about the MBS-sanctioned murder and then dismemberment of Saudi journalist and government critic Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 as it really is not so important any longer, is it?
Pros and cons of transactional diplomacy
Transactional diplomacy, of course works much faster than traditional diplomacy, which is why it has so much appeal to someone like Trump. What was seemingly accomplished last week in the Gulf countries would have taken much longer via traditional means.
However, the downside is that the staying power of such transaction-based commitments are a factor of the changing moods of the people who signed the agreements. We know, from too many examples, that such agreements can be vacated with the same speed they were created based on the mood swings of the country leaders involved.
One only has to look at the bilateral trade agreement that Trump negotiated personally with Canada and Mexico in his first term, but which became one of the worst trade agreements ever signed when he began his second term.
Amazing, is it not, how fast enemies can become friends?
In Doha, the president spoke about his philosophy of enemies. “I have never believed in having permanent enemies,” he said. “I am different than a lot of people think.”
He’s right: The Western allies had to fight World War II, for example, in order to make Japan and Germany allies. Once they surrendered or were toppled, there was a real peace at hand. But they had to be vanquished before they could become rehabilitated. Had the West instead offered trade and investment opportunities to their enemies at the onset of WW II, we’d be living in a very different world for sure.
The writer is founder and chair of Atid EDI Ltd., an international business development consultancy. He is also founder and chair of the American State Offices Association, former national president of the Association of Americans and Canadians in Israel, and a past chairperson of the board of the Pardes Institute of Jewish Studies.