The fall of Bashar al-Assad in late 2024 was a seismic event, though many in the international community are only beginning to absorb its implications. After over a decade of civil war, foreign occupation, and geopolitical stagnation, Syria has entered a transitional phase. For Israel and its allies, this is not a moment for nostalgia or paralysis—it is a moment for strategic recalibration.
The question is no longer whether Syria can return to what it was. The real question is whether we can help it become something better than the sum of its ruins.
A New Chapter in Damascus
The rise of Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former jihadist leader who now heads Syria’s transitional government, signals a major shift. Al-Sharaa is not a Jeffersonian democrat. But he is a political realist who understands that Syria’s survival depends on legitimacy, reconstruction, and cautious re-engagement with its neighbors. His initial moves—easing NGO restrictions, restarting constitutional reform talks, and pledging to expel foreign militias—suggest a fragile but genuine desire to stabilize the country.
Damascus today is no longer a fortified outpost of Tehran or Moscow. It is weak, fragmented, and politically exposed. But that also makes it open to influence—and for the first time in years, that influence need not come from our adversaries alone.
What’s at Stake for Israel
Israel’s traditional posture toward Syria has been defined by military deterrence and red lines. That approach was necessary under Assad, whose regime served as a weapons conduit to Hezbollah and a staging ground for Iranian proxies. But Assad is gone. And while our security calculus remains the same—zero tolerance for hostile buildup across our northern frontier—the tools we use to secure that objective must evolve. As rightly said by Golda Meir “one cannot and must not try to erase the past merely because it does not fit the present.”
A Syria that remains a failed state is far more dangerous to Israel than a Syria inching toward conditional reintegration. In the absence of functioning institutions, Iran will attempt to reinsert itself, extremist groups will fill governance voids, and drug trafficking networks like the Captagon trade will continue to threaten Jordan and Israel alike.
This is not an argument for naivety. It is an argument for options. And right now, Israel has an opening to influence what kind of Syria emerges next—not through grand peace conferences, but through quiet, deliberate positioning.
Realpolitik, Not Romanticism
There are practical steps Israel can support—either directly or through trusted intermediaries. These include backing limited international stabilization efforts that bypass regime elites; encouraging border zone de-escalation through U.S. or Gulf-led channels; and quietly supporting reconstruction programs that give ordinary Syrians an alternative to Iranian patronage.
Most critically, we must recognize and support the role of Saudi Arabia, which is increasingly asserting itself in Syria’s rehabilitation. Riyadh’s leverage—economic, political, and religious—is significant. If Saudi Arabia succeeds in guiding Syria back into the Arab fold, rather than allowing it to remain a client state of Persian ambitions, Israel stands to gain from a less radical and more balanced northern neighbor.
We do not need to formalize this coordination. We need only to signal that we prefer a Syria stabilized by modern Arab diplomacy over one shattered by endless conflict and foreign manipulation.
The Cost of Doing Nothing
If we turn our backs on Syria’s transition, we hand the file back to Tehran by default. We invite the next phase of asymmetric threats, smuggling networks, and proxy escalation along the Golan. We also risk missing the rare opportunity to influence a post-conflict outcome rather than just endure it.
Those who argue that Assad’s fall simply clears the way for the next strongman miss the point. Even if al-Sharaa fails, the transitional government’s early gestures toward independence—both from Iranian influence and Russian overreach—signal a deep regional fatigue with the old alliances. That fatigue can be turned into leverage.
To be clear: Israel should remain vigilant, uncompromising on security, and skeptical of any premature diplomatic normalization. But skepticism should not blind us to strategy.
A Fluid Landscape Is a Strategic Landscape
Syria today is a fluid state—not a failed one, not yet a functioning one. And in the Middle East, fluidity is opportunity. It is in Israel’s national interest to shape what comes next. That means working with allies in the Gulf, coordinating with Western policymakers, and maintaining calibrated deterrence against any resurgence of cross-border threats.
It also means leaving behind the comforting inertia of the status quo. Assad is gone. The region is shifting. And while we do not owe Syria a second chance, we would be foolish not to give ourselves one—to influence, deter, and help design the architecture of a more stable regional order.
Let’s be clear: giving Syria a chance does not mean trust. It means leverage.
David Zaikin is a strategist specializing in international affairs and crisis diplomacy. He is a founder and CEO of Key Elements Group. He has previously contributed to the Jerusalem Post, Barron’s, CNBC, BBC and Bloomberg. David advises public and private sector clients on Middle Eastern and Eurasian geopolitics.