Iraqi Kurdistan party at a crossroad

However, since the absence of its charismatic leader, the PUK’s authority has disintegrated, and the party is in disarray. 

Lahur Talabani emerged as the de-facto leader of the PUK with personal politics based on hatred towards the KDP – threatening the KRI’s unity. Lahur maintained good relations with the United States and ostensibly distanced himself from Iran, the Kurdish Counterterrorism Group (CTG) was allegedly involved in killing Qasem Soleimani. However, Talabani’s cousin, Bafel Talabani, ousted him, a move Talabani called a coup. Nonetheless, rifts within Talabani’s entourage led to his ousting. Talabani was accused of abusing his power according to the PUK leaders and commanders I spoke with. Talabani’s group began reorganizing and fighting back. 

A member of the ruling triumvirate of Kurdistan worker’s Party (PKK), Duran Kalkan lent his support for Lahur Talabani and called the move a coup against Talabani, further complicating the situation. Talabani’s refusal to step down might throw the region to chaos. As the US’s remaining forces are in the KRI, the PUK’s fate determines the stability of the KRI.

The power struggle in the PUK began in 2012 after the absence of its leader, Jalal Talabani, Bafel’s father. As the party’s central authority crumbled, only its military and intelligence services endured. The PUK’s elite force is the CTG, and the Information Agency (IA) is the party’s intelligence service, called the Dazgay Zanyari. They came to dominated the rest of the PUK. 

From the early days of the CTG, Talabani joined the CTG. Under Talabani, the CTG became a political force with its own press, media, and staff. The CTG’s popularity rose during the war against Islamic State. Despite sharing a long border with the Islamic State, the KRI was secured. 

Talabani became IA’s director in 2013 and began controlling the PUK. Previous directors usually shunned politics. A member of the PUK leadership told me that “Talabani deposed the PUK members and placed members of the IA and the CTG in their stead.” Talabani’s faction relied solely on the CTG and the IA to rule. The group smuggled goods through the PUK-Iran border. 

However, Bafel Talabani was a threat to Talabani’s power because Talabani lacked what Bafel had: his father’s legitimacy. Talabani, a former business owner with little military training, built a cult of personality around himself and excluded most of the old PUK establishment. His political views were formed within security and intelligence apparatuses that led him to equate compromise with failure. 

On the other hand Bafel has gone through military training and joined the CTG in its early days. He maintains close relations with the PUK establishment and has good relations with the United States, Iran, Baghdad, and the KDP. After consolidating his power, Talabani held the PUK fourth congress and managed to garner most of the votes and he and Bafel became co-presidents even though Bafel lack substantial authority. Talabani’s opponents, called the congress illegitimate. However, Talabani’s supporters called him a reformer for bringing new people to the party. Although Talabani consolidated his power, the struggle became more intense.

Talabani was left powerless when Bafel sacked headquarters of the CTG and the IA changed their directors. “The reason for deposing Talabani was abuse of power,” a CTG commander told me. “The IA was used for mass surveillance and attempted to poison co-president Bafel.” Later a spy working for the IA was arrested in Bafel’s home.

A rift among Talabani’s core supporters that led to his defeat. A member of the CTG specified “There were serious disputes between the IA’s top adviser, Sirwan Talabani and Wahab Halabjay, former CTG head of operations ... Talabani lent his support to the IA.”

This further politicized the CTG and the IA and brought them directly into the power struggle. When Bafel took over the headquarters of the CTG and the IA, their loyalty switched from Talabani to him. Talabani couldn’t personalize the CTG and the IA. Later Halabjay, now promoted to CTG commander, stated “his problems with Sirwan have been solved thanks to President Bafel.” This assured Bafel’s authority over the CTG and the IA. 

Talabani’s faction accused Turkey of plotting against them. However, Turkey doesn’t possess real influence in the Green Zone, even though Talabani assisted the PKK. On the other hand, the House of Talabani has traditionally called for a united KRI that could potentially limit outside intervention. The PKK-PUK relations date back to the 1980s. Assisting the PKK helps the PUK to balance the KDP and halt Turkish expansion southward. Moreover, the CTG and the IA that led to Talabani’s collapse were already purged of any pro-KDP members under Talabani. Therefore, the KDP and Turkey won’t benefit from a centralized PUK even though they are obliged to collaborate. 

A secured and strong KRI comes with unity among the region’s security forces. Talabani’s opposition to the KDP impeded this. A united KDP-PUK Peshmerga is the key to a powerful KRI. Even though Iran and Turkey oppose a destabilized KRI, they wouldn’t be fond of a united PUK-KDP military and Kurdistan Region Security Council (KRSC). The IA and the CTG officially operate in the framework of the KRSC. Talabani isolated the IA and the CTG from KRSC. However the incumbent directors are approved by the council.

With Talabani gone, hopes for a united KRI are revived. For the KRI to host American forces, which Erbil relies on for its security, it has to balance relations between the United States and Iran and not antagonize one at the expense of the other. A united KRI could guarantee the security of one of the most persecuted nations in the world.