Can Israel resolve the Hezbollah front without war? - analysis

The IDF appears to prepare for an inevitable escalation, while the Israeli government seems to believe that calm can be reached without demilitarization.

 HEZBOLLAH OPERATIVES salute during the funeral of comrades killed in an Israeli strike, in Shehabiya, south Lebanon, April 17. (photo credit: AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES)
HEZBOLLAH OPERATIVES salute during the funeral of comrades killed in an Israeli strike, in Shehabiya, south Lebanon, April 17.
(photo credit: AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES)

With the Biden administration’s latest ceasefire proposal for Israel and Hamas, Jerusalem and Beirut may also be closer than ever before to a ceasefire.

From November 23-30, Hezbollah scrupulously observed the Israel-Hamas ceasefire unilaterally even as Israel said it might consider still attacking the Lebanese terror group (it didn’t in the end.)

Hezbollah Chief Hassan Nasrallah has been clear throughout the war, and the November example seems like concrete evidence, that the moment Israel and Hamas reach a ceasefire, he will also stop firing, as he just wanted to support the Gaza terror group.

And yet, even if a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas does not go into effect imminently, the chances of a major war between the Jewish state and Nasrallah may be much further off than how things look because of a major disagreement between the defense establishment and the government.

For several months, many Israelis have been predicting an imminent mega war in the North which would put the Gaza War to shame in terms of the harm Nasrallah could cause to the Israeli home front.

 Training of IDF forces in the north (credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON'S UNIT)
Training of IDF forces in the north (credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON'S UNIT)

This is because Nasrallah has more than 150,000 rockets, around 10 times what Hamas had on October 7, and much higher quality rockets.

Within the IDF, many have grown impatient about finally being given the opportunity to teach Hezbollah a lesson and to facilitate returning the northern residents to their homes with an exclamation point.

National Unity Party leader (and possibly about to be outgoing war minister) Benny Gantz is closer to the same wavelength at this point to the IDF.

He might have wanted them to hold off earlier in 2024, but he has now set September 1, the start of the school year, as the time period when he believes Israel should set an ultimatum for Hezbollah, and be potentially ready to go to war if a deal is not reached to demilitarize southern Lebanon.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has pushed back hard against this.

Netanyahu stays vague on Lebanon

The prime minister has scrupulously avoided committing to any date by which southern Lebanon must be demilitarized or when the northern residents will be able to return to their homes securely.

With some exceptions, he has even avoided many meetings with northern resident leaders, clearly knowing that his unwillingness to give them a reliable horizon for returning to the North soon would produce either awkward or negative headlines.

At a basic level, Netanyahu is unlikely to risk a large war with Hezbollah if there is already a ceasefire in place. This will be true now or in a few months from now if it takes longer to reach a hostage deal-ceasefire with Hamas.

It is doubly true given that around 90% of Hezbollah’s Radwan forces have been out of southern Lebanon for months and given the huge reinforcements that the IDf has had on the border since October.

One dirty truth is that almost the entire political and defense establishment now regret that they evacuated so many tens of thousands of northern residents at the start of the war, and did not try to keep the evacuation limited to a much smaller number of thousands.

In real time, there was panic of a potential Hezbollah invasion which the IDF might not be able to immediately fully stop. But subsequently, when Hezbollah did not invade, the vast tens of thousands of evacuees have put profound internal pressure on the government and the IDF to act, even when the policy deciders may prefer strategic patience.   

Netanyahu would rather indefinitely put off a bigger war in the North, and have it occur only if there is some new larger provocation.

The IDF would rather take advantage of its heightened readiness and the weakened defensive position it has put Hezbollah in to fight what it views as an inevitable war, even if the battle could be postponed a few more years.

Part of the disagreement also relates to the likelihood of an in between scenario.

Netanyahu and much of the government believe that any escalation much above where things currently stand will spiral out of control into Israel’s entire home front being hit with 150,000 Hezbollah rockets.

Some top IDF officials believe a much shorter escalation of weeks with limited targets and goals could get Hezbollah to demilitarize in southern Lebanon without the need for a huge war.

But the government, not the IDF, makes the final decision.

This means that even as IDF officials continue to think a bigger war is more inevitable than ever and soon, the political officials, led by Netanyahu may find a way to end the current battle in the North without a major escalation, without a 100% demilitarization of southern Lebanon, and with telling northern residents to return to their homes based on an improved security situation – but one far short of what they were promised when they evacuated.