Despite ambiguous answers from IDF Spokesman Daniel Hagari on Sunday, it seems clear that the six hostages were killed by Hamas over the last week since Qaid Farhan Alkadi was found.

This immediately raises questions about whether the operation of rescuing Alkadi led Hamas to kill the other six hostages lest the IDF succeed in rescuing them alive.

It also immediately raises questions about government policy regarding freeing the hostages and pausing the war (which could also potentially pause the conflict with Hezbollah, Iran, and Yemen, but this analysis hones in more on the Gaza implications.)
There should be no mistake that Hamas is to blame for killing the hostages and for kidnapping them on October 7.

But that is only part of the story.

Since May, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, Mossad Director David Barnea, and the entire IDF high command have been pushing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to cut a deal to return between 18-30 live hostages of the around 50 or so remaining live hostages, out of the 100-plus total, which includes many hostages who were already dead.

Netanyahu has said Hamas was not ready to cut a deal.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seen over a wall of hostage posters in an illustrative. (credit: FLASH90/CANVA)
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seen over a wall of hostage posters in an illustrative. (credit: FLASH90/CANVA)
However, according to Gallant, Barnea, and the IDF, Hamas likely would have been ready to cut a deal if Netanyahu had accepted a full withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor as well as from the Netzarim North-South Gaza Corridor.There are debates about whether Hamas would have given 30 hostages or only closer to 18, but certainly 18 was viewed as possible, and some believed 25 or 30 might be.
All of this would have been part of a phased deal in which Hamas had accepted that after around 45 days, the IDF could potentially return to anywhere in Gaza it had withdrawn from.
The IDF has already shown it can do this.
It paused the war from November 23-30 and then returned to fighting.
It withdrew from northern Gaza in January-February and then has come back numerous times starting in March and over and over again since May.

It withdrew from Khan Yunis in early April and has returned twice.

Despite these realities, Netanyahu argued that, politically, Israel would find it impossible or nearly impossible to return under the dynamics of such a deal.
He has demanded keeping some kind of a foothold at Philadelphi and Netzarim, as well as 30 live hostages, instead of 18 or somewhere in between.
Now, six hostages are dead who were alive until last week and might have been freed in a deal supported by Gallant, Barnea, and the IDF.

Was it worth it?

The question the country will now debate is whether Netanyahu’s tougher negotiating stance was worth it.
Some will continue to support him and say quietly that being extra sure about the post-Gaza war framework and taking no chances about Hamas coming back was worth the deaths of these six hostages – though no politician will likely say this out loud.
Others will say that if so many top defense officials believed that Israel can, has, and would return to Gaza as needed after 45 days, then Netanyahu’s hard stance heavily contributed to the deaths of these six hostages.
Which side of the issue the majority of Israel will be on is anyone’s guess.