The most prevalent question being asked as the IDF and Hezbollah escalate their attacks on each other without any sign that either side will de-escalate or quickly deal a decisive blow is when or whether the IDF will launch a ground invasion of Lebanon.
Until Tuesday of last week, an IDF ground invasion of Lebanon seemed unthinkable and was mostly discussed by coalition government partners to the right of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whom he made a point of ignoring.
But the playing field has changed radically since last Tuesday, with Israel emerging, so far, much better off in the escalating conflict with Hezbollah than anyone could have dreamed.
This could mean an invasion within weeks or even within days.
Thousands of Hezbollah operatives were wounded by explosions of beepers and other electronic devices across Lebanon, many senior and mid-level Hezbollah commanders were killed, and on Monday night, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said the IAF had destroyed tens of thousands of Hezbollah rockets within a matter of days.
The IDF’s success against Hezbollah is nowhere near ending the grave threat posed to Israel’s home front by the terrorist group, which has used rocket fire to force much of the northern third of the country, including Haifa, into lockdown since Tuesday night.
That being said, Hezbollah has not managed since last week to kill a sizable number of Israelis or damage critical infrastructure, but it has been taking a pounding regarding its strategic weaponry.
Juggernaut rocket arsenal taken major hit
All prior forecasts declared that in a major conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, thousands, if not more, of Israeli civilians would be killed, and large portions of the Israeli home front, including critical infrastructure, would be ravaged – even as the IDF would have the upper hand militarily.
The Jerusalem Post has learned that Hezbollah’s prewar juggernaut rocket arsenal of more than 150,000 rockets has taken a major hit both in volume and in quality.
However, the Post has also learned that Hezbollah is far from beaten, and the celebratory proclamations by some Israeli analysts that the danger has passed are highly exaggerated.So what is next?
The IDF has reserved the possibility of attacking Beirut, as it has attacked southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, but without actually doing so.
The strategy has been to hope that Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah will want to save his capital, and himself, from the destruction he now sees in other areas where the IDF has attacked.
The problem is that while this strategy still could work, all indications are that Nasrallah’s religious perspective and pride will prevent him from falling in line with Israeli dictates even under threat of attacks on Beirut.
All of the major escalations that Israel has undertaken over the past week – including mass attacks on Hezbollah’s short-range threats in southern Lebanon, attacking its long-range threats in the Bekaa Valley, and attacking its senior commanders in Beirut repeatedly – seem to have just brought on greater fire from Nasrallah.
Even more worrying, Nasrallah has also escalated his attacks gradually. He has not yet tried to target Tel Aviv and central Israel, seemingly holding off on these threats hovering over Israel should it attack Beirut or try a ground invasion.
The main reasons Israel is more likely to launch a ground invasion now, rather than last week or at any earlier time in the war, are:
- it is running out of other escalation cards to stop Hezbollah’s rocket fire.
- the risk of going all out with a very weakened Hezbollah seems much lower now than it seemed a week ago.
- Israel has given the US 11 months for diplomacy with Hezbollah without achieving anything, so it might have more slack from Washington to go all in than it would have last October or even six months ago.
Even a ground invasion, of course, does not necessarily mean one option. The Post has learned that if the IDF carries out a ground invasion, while all options are on the table, its first choice would likely be to take over a security zone in southern Lebanon to eliminate short-range rocket fire and have a chip to bargain with to get Hezbollah to remain out of the area.
It would only likely broaden the invasion if Hezbollah started to succeed in ravaging the home front with longer-range rockets embedded deeper in Lebanon – in which case, part of taking them out could require a deeper invasion.
When would this happen?
Last week, the deadline for a major escalation and invasion seemed like mid-October to try to finish most of it before November and the formidable Lebanese winter kicks in. But the past week’s events may have moved up the clock.
It is hard to see Israel allowing Hezbollah to shut down a third of the country and Haifa all the way until mid-October without upping the ante to an invasion.
Whether the invasion is days away or might still wait a couple of weeks to get greater buy-in from the US for last-minute diplomatic efforts, in all likelihood, no one knows due to how dynamic the situation is.
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that an invasion is not an end in itself. There is no scenario in which the IDF will occupy all of Lebanon for a year like it has Gaza. This would not be possible militarily, diplomatically, or economically.
So, in all scenarios, Israel will eventually need to cut a deal with Hezbollah. It is just a question of when that will be and who has the upper hand regarding the terms.
The last question is whether Israel will manage to separate a Hezbollah deal from a deal with Hamas, or whether the sheer volume of rockets that Hezbollah has, along with its religious commitment, even after it is mostly “beaten,” will eventually force Jerusalem into a deal with Hamas to end the threat in the North.