Earlier this week, Druze militants in the Suwayda province in southern Syria announced the establishment of a new military organization dubbed the “Military Council of Suwayda.” The council announced that its missions would encompass protecting the Druze areas from extremist terrorists and weapon smuggling.
To preemptively counter any accusations of secessionism or treason, the leader of the new council, Tareq al-Shoufi, a former high-ranking officer in the Assad regime military who defected during the previous decade and engaged in anti-regime activity, also announced that the council views itself as a building block of the Syrian national army, which will join the renewed military – but only once a secular, democratic, and modern Syria is secured.
Shoufi also gave two important clues regarding the new council: that it was formed in coordination with the local spiritual leadership, led by the revered Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, and that it was supported by a vague “international coalition.”
To understand the current standing of the council, one must look at the recent history of the Druze of Suwayda and their relations with the ousted regime, its agents, and the jihadist organizations that thrived in Syria since the beginning of the civil war, almost a decade and a half ago.
A painful history
The Druze in the Suwayda area have been engaged in long-standing peaceful anti-regime activity ever since the mid 2010s. Relations between the regime and the Druze began to deteriorate since around that period of time, as the Assad regime and its agents attempted to recruit large numbers of Druze soldiers to combat the rebels, applying much pressure and oppressive measures against the community in Suwayda.
This led to a series of anti-regime measures from the Druze community, including defection and peaceful weekly demonstrations and even armed activity against the jihadist factions surrounding the community.
These, in turn, coalesced into the “Rijal al-Karamah” (Men of Honor) movement, which openly protested against the regime. The movement called to implement UN Security Council Resolution 2254 from 2015, which implicitly called for a transition of power in the country following the early years of the civil war.
Rijal al-Karamah was led at its start by revered spiritual leader Sheikh Wahid al-Balous, who was assassinated in 2015 – most likely by the Assad regime – further worsening the relations between the residents of Suwayda and the oppressive regime.
In turn, the regime applied even more oppressive measures, described by locals as essentially “besieging” and “suffocating” the local communities and their economy in an attempt to discourage them from acting against the regime or even drive them away from their land altogether.
ANOTHER CRUCIAL date deeply etched into the collective minds of the Druze community in Suwayda was July 25, 2018, deemed by some as “the October 7 of the Druze.” On this day, jihadist militants massacred more than 250 people in the southern Druze province and wounded about 180, by means of suicide attacks, mass shootings in homes, and even kidnappings and beheadings.
Many believed that the massacre took place with the knowledge of the Assad regime, and perhaps even with its encouragement, which explains even further the disdain felt by the Druze of Suwayda toward both the ousted regime and the jihadist factions, whose kin now control the new Syria.
The horrid attacks of July 25 became a symbol in the eyes of the Druze of the critical need to maintain their own armed forces to protect their community, and as a sign of the terrible fate that awaits those who stand in the way of the jihadist sects without defense. They have no desire to see these events taking place again, and the forming of the military council in the face of all the critics from within should be viewed in this context.
Intervention or aid
The issue of foreign intervention or aid to the council has made many headlines in the last week, with many highlighting Shoufi’s vague words about an “international coalition” aiding the council.
Additionally, Shoufi made comments vis-à-vis Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s remarks from Sunday demanding a demilitarized southern Syria and warning from any threats against the Druze community, replying vaguely that “any aiding hand to Syria is welcome.”
However, Shoufi was not the only one from the Druze community who did not reject foreign intervention. Hijri, the current spiritual leader of Suwayda, also implicitly denounced Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa this week.
Hijri claimed, “Until now… we have not seen the ability [of the current leadership] to lead the country, or to consolidate the country in the right way.” He then called openly, much to the dismay of many in Syria, for “international intervention” to “ensure that the process leads to a civilian state, with the separation of powers and the rule of law.”
ANOTHER FOCAL point in the context of external relations is the Druze community in Israel, who have long been a supporting force for their kin in Suwayda, securing humanitarian, political, and even diplomatic assistance, to the extent possible under the political circumstances.
Despite being less significant in terms of population size, the Druze in Israel have become one of the strongest Druze communities in the region due to their respectable power within Israeli politics.
In this context, it is enough to see the recent meetings held by the spiritual leader of the community in Israel, Sheikh Mowafaq Tarif, in the United Arab Emirates, to get a taste of the Israeli Druze’s overt and covert contribution to the situation of their brethren beyond the border.
It is important to note that the Druze in Syria are not at all a monolithic entity. Only two months ago, a viral video circulated online showing a Druze council of dignitaries in the Hader area, near the Golan Heights, in which the dignitaries expressed their desire to be annexed to the Israeli Golan, deeming Israel as the “lesser evil” and warning against horrific crimes from part of the jihadists.
However, the Druze from the Hader region were traditionally loyal to the ousted Syrian regime, and the events of al-Karamah and July 25 did not affect them. Therefore, for them, the fall of the regime was an even more shocking event, unlike their kin in Suwayda who had been openly calling for its ousting for many years.
It is important to add that even within Suwayda itself there are conflicting trends, with the new military council facing criticism from a slightly older Druze organization called Hizb al-Liwaa, which received American support and tried to lead a different line of reconciliation with the previous regime.
Critical days
The coming days and months will be critical in the process of the consolidation of Syria, with the main question posed revolving around the success or failure of Sharaa’s attempts at presenting a vision of integrating the ethnic and religious minorities into a predominantly Sunni society led by Salafist ideologues – all the while maintaining Syria as clear of unwanted foreign intervention as possible.
The Druze in Suwayda are viewing the current government with growing disdain, while looking eastward at the successful Kurdish experiment of self-rule and autonomy, and westward at the growing fears of the Alawite minority following the sporadic violent riots directed at them by armed militants, always carrying their own catastrophe in mind.
For the Druze, these may be historical days leading to self-rule, self-defense, or perhaps even self-determination in some form or other. For Israel, these days should be seen as an opportunity to act wisely and ensure the establishment of stability, coexistence, and lasting peace in our tumultuous region.