The recent special International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iranian nuclear violations added many points, one being that Iran carried out multiple implosion tests, a key military skill necessary for developing the atomic bomb.Implosion tests do not have civilian nuclear uses.

Notably, though much of the report refers to Iranian military activities from 20 years ago, Tehran’s careful record-keeping means that any progress that the Islamic Republic made back then could be used to help with a more sudden, rapid push for a breakthrough to a nuclear weapon in 2025.

The fact that it carried out various explosive tests also suggests that Iran is further along in other skills needed for developing a nuclear bomb, besides just enriching uranium, than many observers may have thought.

This and multiple other findings are analyzed in detail in a position paper introduced this weekend by the Institute for Science and International Security, spearheaded by lead author and president David Albright.

A missile is launched during an annual drill in the coastal area of the Gulf of Oman and near the Strait of Hormuz, Iran (credit: REUTERS)
A missile is launched during an annual drill in the coastal area of the Gulf of Oman and near the Strait of Hormuz, Iran (credit: REUTERS)

Much of the IAEA report is based on evidence from Mossad

According to the think tank, the IAEA Board of Governors must refer Tehran’s nuclear violations to the UN Security Council during its meeting, which opens on Monday and runs until June 13.

All of this is occurring as the Islamic Republic and the US are the closest they have been to a new nuclear deal in years, but also not far from a possible collapse in the talks, which could lead to an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities.In a more detailed analysis of the IAEA report, the think tank said that the agency discloses its assessment “that Iran tested neutron initiators produced at Lavizan-Shian and cites specific dates, but notably, it does not mention a location.”Albright wrote that the IAEA report said instead that “the EDNS [explosively driven neutron sources] produced at Lavizan-Shian were small-scale, designed for testing, and integrated into scaled implosion systems. [They were] tested on at least two occasions (on February 15 and July 3, 2003).”

Next, the May 2025 report also stated anew that the IAEA found indications that “equipment was developed and tested at Lavizan-Shian that included neutron detectors and housings” and that “an identical housing for neutron detectors was deployed in an explosive test at Marivan on April 15, 2003.”

Further, the IAEA report provided new information about the equipment and materials that were present at Varamin, saying, “This equipment contained all of the essential equipment for a uranium conversion facility, including small but heavily contaminated (and possibly full) UF6 Cylinders, uranium extractants (such as tributyl phosphate (TBP), uranium extraction and conversion hardware, fluorine-based chemicals (hydrofluoric acid (HF) and potassium difluoride (KHF2), and radiation monitoring equipment.”

Moreover, the IAEA said that in sorting the material and equipment and placing it into containers, Iran categorized the items as either “essential” or “nonessential.”

This resulted in five containers being deemed “essential” and eight containers being categorized as “nonessential.”“The operators of Varamin” also took into account the level of contamination with nuclear material and that one of the containers considered “essential” was categorized as being “the highest level of contamination,” containing “small UF6 Cylinders and other ‘special materials,’” according to Albright.

The report also concludes that Lavizan-Shian, Marivan, and Varamin, as well as “other possible related locations,” were “part of an undeclared structured nuclear program.”

It added that Iran retained nuclear material or related equipment from this program at Turquzabad from 2009 to 2018. The whereabouts of these resources is currently unknown.

The IAEA also discussed and connected these activities to the missing amount of uranium that was once present at Iran’s Jaber Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratory (JHL).

Also, Albright wrote that for the first time, “the IAEA revealed its assessment that the four sites and missing nuclear material in Iran are directly connected.”

Moreover, the think tank said that the report provided new information on the extent of Iranian attempts to sanitize locations of interest to the IAEA and provide false information when faced with questions.

It stated that “the provision of inaccurate and sometimes contradictory explanations seriously obstructed” the IAEA’s efforts.

The atomic watchdog agency said explicitly that although the matters on Lavizan-Shian and Marivan were “no longer outstanding,” this did not mean the issues were “resolved.”

Much of the IAEA report originated from evidence brought to it by the Mossad, which seized Iran’s nuclear archives in 2018.