Post-war Gaza: Competing plans for governance and reconstruction – opinion

As the first phase of the ceasefire and hostage handover comes into effect, media and public opinion are divided on whether we are witnessing Hamas snatching victory from the jaws of defeat. 

Very early on, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that one of his war aims was to destroy Hamas. Wounded, even disabled, Hamas may be, but it is not destroyed. Playing the hostage card to its advantage, it is imposing its demands on the deal.

Even so, one thing is reasonably certain – Hamas will never again govern Gaza. The future of post-war Gaza will lie in other hands, but exactly what follows the permanent end of hostilities in Gaza remains to be resolved. 

Meanwhile, the formidable Hamas fighting machine of October 6, 2023, armed to the teeth with state-of-the-art Iranian weaponry, is a shadow of what it once was. 

On October 7, 2023, it sowed the wind, and ever since, it has been reaping the whirlwind. Its leadership has been decimated. At least half of its original 25,000 manpower has been eliminated, and its depleted ranks have been replaced by raw, untrained recruits. No longer a structured militia, it has become a degraded terrorist guerrilla force. 

The agreement must be completed

The three-phase agreement hammered out in Qatar and announced on January 15 is clear on phase one. It is less so regarding phase two, involving a second exchange of hostages and Palestinian prisoners, and the withdrawal of the IDF. As for phase three, which requires establishing a system of governance for Gaza and the start of its reconstruction, there are only aspirations. 

All interested parties in the Middle East, and the West generally, understand that agreement must be achieved before too long on a clear-cut path to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the Gaza Strip. There is no shortage of ideas, plans, proposals, suggestions.

ON DECEMBER 1, the Israel Policy Forum published a comparison of four plans for the post-war governance of Gaza. They are proposals from Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, the Biden administration, and the Palestinian Authority. 

Egypt, the UAE, and the US were joint brokers of the ceasefire and hostage release operation. The Israel Policy Forum paper reveals in some detail their concepts of how Gaza is to be governed and reconstructed after the war. The various formulae overlap to some degree but there are also some significant differences.

Egypt favors a community support committee in Gaza to focus on transitional governance. Using local expertise, the arrangement would have minimal international involvement and would unite Gaza with the West Bank. Following talks with Egyptian and Fatah officials in Cairo in early December, Hamas officially approved this plan.

The UAE wants to impose international control over Gaza on a temporary basis, eventually transferring responsibility to the PA, provided the PA fulfills two conditions: meaningful reforms, including a new prime minister; and allowing regional and international forces to assume responsibility in the short-term for security and law enforcement. Gaza would be stabilized as a first step toward a two-state outcome.

 The US position – or rather, that of the Biden administration, endorsed by Secretary of State Antony Blinken in his farewell speech on January 14 – is to establish hybrid international oversight for a phased transfer of control to a reformed PA. 

The transitional mission would be managed by an executive board with Palestinian and partner representatives. The IDF would undertake a phased withdrawal in coordination with the deployment of PA security forces. An international fund would funnel donations for Gaza’s recovery through the PA. The ultimate aim would be to establish a two-state solution.

The incoming Trump administration has not yet revealed its hand on post-war Gaza.

The PA proposes that Gaza and the West Bank unite, as a step toward the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state on territory recaptured by Israel from Egyptian and Jordanian forces in the 1967 Six Day War, including East Jerusalem. 

International donors would support reconstruction and economic development in Gaza. An international peace conference would aim to establish a sustainable two-state solution, guaranteed by Arab and international partners.

The Israel Policy Forum analyzes these four plans point by point in a table that enables each to be compared with the others.

MEANWHILE, REUTERS reports that alongside the formal ceasefire negotiations in Qatar, which were joined on January 12 by the heads of Mossad and Shin Bet, behind-the-scenes discussions have included the possibility of the UAE and the US, along with other nations, temporarily overseeing the governance, security, and reconstruction of Gaza after the IDF withdraws and until a Palestinian administration is able to take over.

Post-war planning for Gaza is not confined to discussions in Qatar. It is being carried out independently by other bodies. For example – and to mention but a few – the UN, the World Bank, and the EU, are jointly heading a Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment process, and formulating a Conflict Recovery Framework to be implemented when conditions in Gaza permit. 

This partnership has been active since late 2023, and their draft strategy aims to rebuild Gaza as an integral part of a fully independent, contiguous, viable, and sovereign Palestinian state within a two-state solution. These operations, which have been agreed with the PA, will support the PA’s own planning for recovery and reconstruction in Gaza.

Le Monde recently reported that a group of French experts, known as the International Coalition for Peace and Security, is suggesting that a coalition of Arab and Western states assume guardianship over Gaza while the PA reforms and renews itself. This proposal includes recognizing a Palestinian state, securing a UN Security Council resolution endorsing a two-state solution, and forming a coalition dedicated to peace and security.

Analysts at the Washington Institute have proposed establishing a Gaza Interim Administration comprising three main components: a civilian administration, a law enforcement body, and a counterterrorism force. This structure would aim to dismantle Hamas’s military capabilities, prevent future attacks, and create conditions for a positive socioeconomic and political reality in Gaza. 

Certain elements are common to many of these schemes. One is the objective of a two-state solution; another the prominence many accord to a reformed PA. The most likely source of a viable plan for the governance and reconstruction of post-war Gaza is the group that mediated the ceasefire-hostage release discussions in Qatar.

The best indication that Hamas has lost its political clout, and that a viable plan for Gaza’s future will emerge and be implemented, is the recent posting by President Donald Trump on his social network. He asserted that his team “through the efforts of Special Envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, will continue to work closely with Israel and our allies to make sure that Gaza never again becomes a terrorist safe haven.”