The Israeli Security Service (Shin Bet) has failed in its mission to protect the citizens of Israel, and it openly admits to this failure. Therefore, it is only natural that public trust in the agency has been damaged.
Indeed, a recent survey conducted by the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI) shows relatively low levels of trust in the Shin Bet leadership among Jewish Israelis: some 52% report very low or somewhat low trust, while less than half (45%) have high or somewhat high trust in the agency’s top echelon. (Incidentally, these figures are better than those regarding the prime minister – 68% have no trust in him at all.)
However – and this is the key point – it turns out that trust levels in the Shin Bet leadership correlate with political affiliation. Some 85% of right-wing Israelis do not trust the agency’s leaders (51% have very low trust, and 34% have somewhat low trust), while trust levels are significantly higher among those identifying with the political center and Left.
For example, over three-quarters of National Unity and Yesh Atid voters, as well as over 80% of supporters of The Democrats (the merger of Meretz and the Labor Party in 2024) have high or somewhat high trust in the agency.
The clear conclusion is that the dominant factor influencing trust in the Shin Bet leadership is not the operational failure on the eve of the October 7 massacre, but rather the political divide in Israel. Tell me who you voted for in the last elections, and I will tell you your level of trust in the Shin Bet leadership.
This serves as a clear example of the dangerous infiltration of ideological and political views into the evaluation of professional institutions.
We have become accustomed to this: similar findings emerge in relation to other state systems, particularly the judiciary. Even though the judicial reform agenda has not yet been implemented in the real world – its only concrete achievement thus far being the recent legislation concerning the composition of the committee that appoints the judicial oversight commissioner – the controversy engulfing it has altered the public consciousness. Here, too, trust in a professional system largely depends on political and ideological affiliation.
The politicization of trust in the Shin Bet leadership is particularly dangerous given the agency’s powers and responsibilities. According to the Shin Bet Law, one of the agency’s roles is “to prevent and thwart illegal activity aimed at harming the security of the state, the democratic regime, or its institutions.” In addition to its responsibility for preventing terrorism by external enemies, the Shin Bet is also tasked with safeguarding the sensitive mechanisms of governance and democratic institutions. To fulfill its duties, it possesses unique tools and powers, including intelligence-gathering capabilities, wiretapping, covert computer searches, and interrogations, among others.
We, the citizens of Israel, entrust the Shin Bet with significant power, but the clear condition for its use is that the agency operate in a nonpartisan, professional manner. The Shin Bet Law mandates this.
Some ask whether the agency has a role to play in the event of a constitutional crisis – if, for example, the prime minister or the government refuses to comply with a Supreme Court ruling. I believe the answer is no.
However, it cannot be disputed that the agency has the authority to act against ideological criminals – those guilty of incitement, sedition, hate crimes, and similar offenses – when they pose a threat to “the existence of democracy.” The potential implications for freedom of expression and protest, independent journalism, and ideological association are clear.
The Shin Bet also considers itself authorized to act against activities that are in themselves legal but have a foreseeable outcome of undermining the democratic system (such as summoning political extremists for warning conversations under certain conditions).
The broad scope of the Shin Bet’s powers within Israel and toward Israelis, along with the ambiguity in their interpretation; the interface of its areas of activity with ideological and political issues; and the powerful arsenal of tools at its disposal – all underscore the critical importance of keeping the agency out of the political fray. This requires the Shin Bet and its leadership to steer clear of ideological disputes in Israel, and that the political system refrain from branding the agency as “for us or against us” along political fault lines.
The Shin Bet can and should be held accountable for its shortcomings, but public trust in its professionalism and impartiality must not be undermined. While the agency must be subject to judicial and parliamentary oversight, turning it into a political battleground is not only an assault on its professionalism but also a potential opening for a struggle for political control over this powerful agency – to the detriment of us all.
The Shin Bet has no role and must take no position in Israel’s internal discord over the national vision and mission; it is entrusted with safeguarding our covenant of fate. Only by protecting its impartiality can it effectively protect the nation.
The writer is president of the Jewish People Policy Institute and a professor emeritus of law at Bar-Ilan University.